Centre For Advanced Strategic Studies

The Centre for Advanced Strategic Studies (CASS), Pune was registered on 21st September, 1992 under the Society's Registration Act, 1860, and as a Charitable Public Trust on 28th October, 1992, under the Bombay Charitable Public Trust Act of 1950. The Department of Scientific and Industrial Research, Ministry of Science and Technology, Government of India has accorded recognition to the Centre as a Scientific and Industrial Research Institution. The Centre has also been granted exemption U/S 80G of the Income Tax Act, 1961, which gives fifty percent exemption to the donors.

The Centre aims at undertaking research and analysis of subjects relating to national and international security and development through seminars, discussions, publications at periodical intervals and close interaction with the faculty members and research students in allied disciplines in the Universities and Educational Institutions as well as the Armed Forces. In the coming future, the Centre expects to award research fellowships for studies in various areas of National Security and National Development. It aims to generate and promote interest among the academicians and public in related subjects, with a view to increase awareness to national security concerns. It has received very valuable support from the University of Pune in all its activities, especially from the Department of Defence and Strategic Studies. It has a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with Yashwantrao Chavan Avademy of Development Administration (YASHADA), Pune for enabling mutual collaboration in the academic activities. The Centre has held a number of seminars, panel and group discussions in the past. The Centre has also embarked on publishing a Quarterly Journal with effect from January 2014.

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MK Mangalmurty, IFS (Retd)
President, CASS

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Message

We had an eventful 2016. The loss of lives of our soldiers to Pakistan sponsored terrorists increased. However, our government has sent a clear message to Pakistan that our army had been given a free hand to retaliate and even to carry out surgical strikes across the LOC. The Prime Minister took a new initiative against Pakistan by expressing sympathy and moral support for the struggle of the people of Baluchistan. India has also intensified its diplomatic efforts to isolate Pakistan in various international fora.

The Defence Ministry has restarted the stalled process of acquiring much needed new weapons systems without getting bogged down by previous scams.

The Services Chiefs were more often taken into the decision-making loop although formal reforms such as appointing a CDS and closer association of the defence officers in the working of the Ministry of Defence did not progress. Nevertheless, there is some positive movement in the implementation of both, OROP and the 7th Pay Commission, which are likely to provide much needed relief to the armed forces.

The bold initiative by the Prime Minister in demonetizing high value currency notes was generally welcomed although the disruption and inconvenience to the rural sector and casual labour could not be glossed over.

CASS has been quite active during the last year. We have collaborated with several organisations in organising meetings, discussions and seminars on strategic, defence and economic issues. The Journal has acquired further prestige and greater circulation. Several distinguished persons have contributed articles to the Journal, during the year.

I would like to thank them.

I would like to take this opportunity to wish our readers and members of CASS a very happy, healthy and fruitful New Year.

- MK Mangalmurti,
IFS (Retd.)

31st December 2016

Air Marshal BN Gokhale (Retd)
PVSM, AVSM, VM
Director, CASS

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Editor's Note

"Tomorrow is the first blank page of a 365 page book.
Write a good one"

- Brad Paisley

With this issue of the CASS Quarterly Journal, we have entered the 4th year of our publication. My grateful thanks to the readers, subscribers and authors, who have made this possible. I look forward to your continued support.

The last quarter of 2016 has been very eventful. With the incoming President of USA assuming office on 20th January 2017, rest of the countries await a tectonic change in the traditional narrative of American policies. If some of the pronouncements made during the bitterly fought election campaign are actually promulgated we will soon be witnessing a new world order; politically, economically and socially. Added to this are Brexit and its aftermath visible in election campaigns of some of the European countries. It is no wonder that doubts are being raised about the very existence of a united Europe. The Trans Pacific Partnership is in doldrums and closer home 'One China' policy is being questioned by the incoming President of USA. On the other hand, India looks forward to further strengthening of her relations with the US but not necessarily all the changes in US policies will be music to the ears; restrictions on out-sourcing and visas can hurt the Indian IT industries.

The Middle East continues to be in turmoil. In spite of overwhelming military superiority ISIL is still holding on to Mosul and in both Syria and

Yemen wide spread carnage continues amongst the loyalists and rebel forces. Latest casualty to the instability and terrorism is Turkey, which makes not only the Middle East but also Europe and the Central Asian Republics vulnerable.

India has been bearing the brunt of terrorism for many decades and has been advocating stern action against state sponsored terrorism in the UN and other organisations. It is to the dismay that many countries including China negate these efforts for what can be perceived as short term gains, not withstanding that this Hydra headed monster is bound to devour these countries in not so distant future. In turn, Pakistan continue to nurture, train, equip and sponsor terrorism the world over with India and Afghanistan bearing the brunt frequently. It is time that India abrogates the MFN status we have conferred on Pakistan and on the other hand declare Pakistan a 'Terrorist State', instead of waiting for other countries to do so.

This issue carries articles on a variety of subjects. There is an article by ACM Pradeep Naik on the often debated strategic role of the Indian Air Force. With Gulf countries also in the throes of turmoil in the Middle East, Amb Talmiz Ahmad suggests that India in particular and together with BRICS grouping takes more active role in ensuring stability in that region. After all India has a lot of stakes in the Gulf in terms energy resources, trade and a large numbers of Indian workforce.

With the Chinese belligerent forays not only in the South China Sea but also in the Indian Ocean, maritime interests have come into renewed focus. The issue therefore carries two articles and a book review on this important segment of national power. Amb Yogendra Kumar writes about the Navies and Maritime Diplomacy. He has also written a book recently on this subject and the issue carries a Review of his book by Amb Skand Tayal. There is also an article by Dr (Cdr) Arnab Das on the Acoustic Degradation of Indian Ocean and the need to increase Underwater Domain Awareness.

Maj Gen Mrinal Suman has written an analytical article on the new Defence Procurement Procedure 2016 and its impetus to 'Make in India' in the Defence sector. Although we have been fortunate this year with a normal monsoon, providing adequate water to all on a regular basis is far more challenging. The issue therefore carries an important article on India's Water Security by Dr Uttam Kumar Sinha.

During the year issues like OROP and the 7th Pay Commission have often brought to fore the vexed issue of Civil-Military Relations and the need to reorganise the Higher defence Organisation. There is an article on this aspect

by Shri R Chandrashekhar reflecting on the Indian scenario and another one by Rear Adm Sudarshan Shrikhande reflecting from a case study on the dispute between President Truman and Gen McArthur during the Korean War.

During the Presidential election campaign, the US media has often been criticised for being biased and in the bargain going wrong while predicting the election results. Shri Yogesh Parale, a journalist has written an article on the role of media and the need for unbiased reporting.

Once again I wish to thank all the authors, subscribers and the readers for your continued support. Wishing you also A Very Happy New Year.

Jai Hind.



(BN Gokhale)
Air Marshal (Retd)
Director, CASS

Date: 31st December 2016

IAF - A Strategic Air Force?

Air Chief Marshal Pradeep V Naik (Retd)

Tactics and Strategy

Two words that have confused me since my Pilot Officer days. Tactics and Air Combat Development Establishment (TACDE) had just been formed and every fighter jock whoever did a barrel reversal (sic) in a 2 v 1 was talking Tactics. Once in a while, in the bar, one heard the word Strategy, spoken in whispers, by senior and soofy Flt Lieutenants and above. Everyone else just nodded knowingly. I did consult one of our Squadron soofy ones, also read one of the articles he showed me and felt I was quite clear about the difference between Tactics and Strategy. The moment I, a bit superciliously, tried to explain the same to one of my colleagues, I realised I had no clue. Some say strategy identifies clear goals that advance the organisation and organise resources, while tactics utilise specific resources to achieve objectives that support the overall goals. Some say strategy is that above the shoulder while tactics is that below the shoulder. Military strategy is also defined as the art and science of planning, directing and orchestrating military campaigns to achieve national security objectives . Tactics, sometimes called Battlefield Strategy, on the other hand, are the art and science of employing forces on the battlefield to achieve national objectives. Tactics are concerned with doing the job 'right' while strategy deals with doing the 'right' job, see?

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Now, all that is okay. But then over a period of time what happened was that snake in the grass, Technology, came in. Long range sensors, long range weapons and delivery platforms came in. SATCOM, GPS, AWACS, Air-air refuelling (AAR) extended the zones of influence and battlefields dimensions expanded. Forces thousands of kilometres away were in contact with each other. Commanders realised it was possible to effect a strategic outcome by use of tactical forces and vice versa. Especially in the air through multi role aircraft. Today a Predator RPV fires a Hellfire tactical missile to kill a terrorist after a Strategic Recce. Things have become pretty mixed up. The easiest way is to remember that Tactics deals with forces in the battlefield and strategy deals with getting them there. The same interchangeability applies to whether an Air Force is tactical or strategic.

Like almost all other Air Forces Indian Air Force (IAF), too, started off as a tactical air force with a Flt of four aircraft on 01 Apr 1933. Its main role was to support the Army battle. This continued till independence. During this period, air forces all over the world were slowly realising their potential and the peculiar nature of air power, propounded by the trio of Douhet, Mitchell and Trenchard. By WW II the world had appreciated two unique characteristics of air power. The first was its inherent flexibility. Flexibility to switch roles as well as theatres of ops. The second was the ability to strike directly at the heartland or centres of power or centres of gravity of the enemy bypassing intervening obstacles. The Air Forces were slowly emerging from being a support element to an independent entity. Breaking Army shackles was not easy. Understanding the third dimension takes a lifetime of study. The Army top brass did not wholly appreciate the advantages of autonomous air. To some extent, Army still believes that 'Under Command' ops are the best. During WW II the Strategic Bomber emerged as a potent weapon. Air forces had to have the strategic bomber to be recognized as strategic. After WW II during the Cold War, the term Strategic referred to things nuclear, be it bombers or missiles. Technology continued to kick in changing definitions and, at times, driving doctrines and strategy rather than the other way around. Satellites, communications, PGMs, BVRs, cruise missiles, RPVs and UCAVs, all made many more missions possible, giving a plethora of options to the decision makers. This gave birth to a role oriented definition of a Strategic Air Force.

Prerequisites for a Modern Strategic Air Force

One way of judging whether it is a strategic air force is whether its employment directly achieves national objectives or meets the state's aspirations through deterrence or combat ops. A modern strategic air force must be able to undertake a variety of missions and must be equipped and provisioned to ensure this capability. Let us inventory some of the important prerequisites.

- A judicious mix of lo and hi tech aircraft in large numbers.
- 4th and 5th generation aircraft (including stealth ac) with nuclear capability.
- Modern long range bombers with nuclear capability.
- Early warning and control aircraft
- Strategic Transport ac.
- Short and long range Air Defence Systems and SAMs
- RPVs and UCAVs.
- Net centricity.

The above list is, of course, not exhaustive. Let us now see whether the IAF has the wherewithal to be called a strategic air force.

- We do not have a judicious mix . Our most modern fighter, the SU-30 is more than a decade old. MiG 21 and 27s are due to retire. Instead of 45 Sqns we may end up with about 35 by year end. We do not have 5th gen or stealth ac. Indigenous Tejas will take a long time to fill in the numbers required. It is a good thing that we have retained the required nuclear capability. We need to augment the numbers fast to prevent a downward spiral.
- We do not have a strategic bomber. These days many countries do not have a strategic bomber. Modern fighters with AAR can do the same job.
- We are quite current with AWACS and AEW&C capability. We will augment it with time.
- We have the IL-76 and C-17 strategic transport ac.
- Our short range AD is quite strong. It will be augmented with the Russian S-400 long range AD system.
- We have been operating the Searcher and the Heron RPVs for a long time. More are in the pipeline. UCAVs are being indigenously developed. We need accelerated development.
- We are well on our way to become net centric. At the moment we can call ourselves net enabled.

Are mere numbers and modern equipment sufficient to make you a strategic air force?

From the above we can see that IAF has most of the wherewithal to be called strategic. I would still say shaky grounds till our numbers fill up and we augment our modern ac. The Question I would like to pose is ,"**Are mere numbers and modern equipment sufficient to make you a strategic air force?**" We need to look at this question seriously. A lot of soul searching will have to be done before we can lay claim to being a strategic air force. I feel we can go about it in two ways. The first is to claim that the IAF has been a strategic force for many years. We then cite the famous 4x MiG-21 strike over Governor's house in Dhaka during the 1971 war, or the various HADR ops undertaken, and sit back on our laurels. This path, incidentally, has been trodden by many of our renowned experts on aspects military. The better way in my opinion is to analyse what more the IAF needs to acquire to truly be a strategic air force.

Pure hardware cannot make the IAF strategic. We have to reach bedrock. Examine and modify our own thinking process, our HRD policies, our acquisition process, our ops training, our capability development. We should be capable of assessing the dynamic threat environment to outmanoeuvre our adversaries. Today's environment is complex and demands a diverse set of skills to exploit the opportunities. We must be able to strengthen our partnerships within and outside to include industry, academic institutions, think tanks and with the other two Services. Basically we need to modify our thinking, our priorities, our processes so that The IAF is capable of contributing directly in fulfilment of important national security objectives. There are internal factors that the IAF can, probably, resolve on its own. Then there are external factors which seem incapable of easy resolution. Let us look at both with an open mind.

Nuclear Deterrence remains a clear priority of the IAF till the 'Triad' is in place. Even after it is effective, the air vector will still remain the first choice. IAF must work towards ensuring its effectiveness and credibility. This involves nuclear command, control, communications. It involves investing in improvements to quality and reaction time, infrastructure, delivery systems. Some of these may not be possible from within own resources and will involve help of partners.

Integrated C4 ISR (Comd, Control, Comn, Cmptrs; Intel, Surveillance, Recce) is a vital resource. IAF needs to relook, realign, if required, re-organise itself to meet the demands of today. Deterrence is more effective when the enemy thinks he is threatened by a prohibitive and credible threat. Good ISR can affect the behaviour of the enemy who knows he is being watched. IAF needs to increase the reach of its ISR to match the increasing zone of influence of the country. We must realise that

today's C4 ISR may not meet our needs of tomorrow. We must harness technology to ensure capability. Not only technology but the thinking of our leaders must be sufficiently elastic to meet future needs. We must train our personnel to operate in all domains and ops environments They must get used to taking decisions in conditions of uncertainty since good intel is generally delayed and decisions are often taken on raw ISR data. IAF could have a relook at its Doctrine to make it more responsive to ISR inputs.

IAF must remain sensitised to the fact that future conflict will see more joint ops. IAF will be required more and more for air defence, denial of EM spectrum, cyber ops and space control /denial. PGMs and stand-off weapons will become more common. We need to be able to stretch our C4 network to remain effective. Despite long range weapons and PGMs, maximum contribution will be through a shared situational awareness(SA). This is a vital component for reduced reaction time and increased effectiveness. Future conflicts will involve multiple domain dominance. IAF must pay adequate attention to cyber and space domains. This, currently, is a weak area since it involves external agencies. We need to adapt our thinking and our culture to develop a multi domain mind set. We need to train our personnel, from operator to commander, to think along these lines so that we are not stymied when faced with a complex situation and take recourse to multiple domains to find a solution. With our adversaries also enhancing their capabilities, we will have to deal more and more with contested airspace. Air Superiority in time and space is our job. So we will have to use space and cyberspace capabilities to retain freedom of ops. IAF could also look to integrate air and space platforms with cyberspace capabilities. This really is a big ask since we are talking here of a full combat network design and this may not be feasible in the near future but needs to be kept in the archives for future reference. Stand-off weapons, multi domain dominance, elastic C4, penetrating ISR, Inter theatre mobility are all necessary for survival in future conflicts. These capabilities are not easy to acquire but thinking along these lines must start if we in the IAF are looking at 2027.

The IAF Basic Doctrine has a chapter called Technological Perspective. Technology is presumed to be coming readily. In reality, pursuit of technology has to be relentless. Especially cutting edge or game changing technology needs sustained pursuit. More than technology per se, its application in an ops scenario causes the cutting edge effect. This application is done by innovative people and open minded leadership. This involves tapping as many sources as possible for ideas, engaging them, making small research investments as well as having the freedom to experiment. The element of risk must be acceptable to the leadership. Innovation, out of box thinking and engaged leadership is essential if game changing technology is to be made to work for you.

Cutting edge technology, innovative ideas are all fine. They are made effective by human beings. Human resource development, therefore, is vital in today's day and age. IAF has concentrated on it for many years but by and large we have been fire fighting. Ideally IAF should look to recruit the best. In our environment, the best may not opt for the Services. In any case we should look for those better able to exploit the global, information based environment. Within AF domain we could look to retain our expert air warriors, both officers and others by suitable incentives to them as well as their families. Incentives that go beyond mere financial. Overall, as we get more hi tech and more advanced, taking care of our people and their families must remain an IAF priority. After recruitment, training and skill development are paramount. We have tried many different systems, both to increase the intake and to multi skill. Future systems will include space sensors, power plants, multi domain communication gateways and multi domain armaments. Skill development should cater to this complexity. In the resource crunch era, this is a tough ask. A modular approach to systems, an open ended architecture and using clearly defined functions may make things more cost effective. The IAF needs to adopt modelling and simulation techniques in a much larger way. War gaming in a simplified form could be used in routine problem solving tutorials. Finally, despite the resource scarcity, it is the trust, both up and down which leads to performance beyond expectations. IAF needs to inculcate an atmosphere of mutual trust if we want superlative performance. This aspect should be leadership driven, or a 'washing the staircase ' approach and must be a part of IAF strategy.

Most of the factors we have discussed so far are internally controllable with a little outside help. The only external factor likely to affect everybody's happiness is that as per the Govt of India Transaction of Business Rules 1961, the three Services are designated as "attached offices" to the MOD and, therefore, placed subordinate to MOD. It means you cannot take policy decisions and you have to follow the policy laid down by MOD. What was envisaged as conceptual civilian control over the military has degenerated today into day to day control amounting to interference. Postings, promotions, assignments are cleared by MOD. The whole acquisition process, other than field trials, precludes much of a say by Services. Freedom for independent action has been totally curtailed by bureaucratic red tape. The Services have no role in decision making. Any move for innovation, out of the box solution is difficult. Therefore I feel that unless the MOD and the Services are integrated the road to becoming a strategic air force is going to be full of obstacles.

Conclusion

Summing up the discussion so far, IAF , if it is to become a truly strategic air force, will have to concentrate on many aspects. Some are within IAF capability and will involve a relook at many of our traditions, policies, procedures and processes. In many instances, IAF may have to look for assistance from its partners. Hence partnerships with external partners like industry, academia, think tanks, even the Parliament through its committees will need to be diligently nurtured. A modern strategic air force should, basically, be able to meet the strategic aspirations of the country and hence should be sufficiently enabled to adopt and exploit all the various technologies of the future that the country is likely to embrace. Pursuit of cutting edge or game changing technology has to be one of the prime missions for a strategic air force. We have seen that mere number of aircraft and weapons do not a strategic air force make. Although we have plans in the pipeline to crunch the numbers, the present state is not reassuring. A reading of Ashley Tellis's book, "Troubles, They Come in Battalions" will give us a reasonable idea of the immediate future. Of course, Tellis is a promoter of US enterprises like Boeing and Lockheed Martin but his statistics are generally reliable. But numbers will come. Alongside, we also need to change our thinking. We need to bring about certain fundamental changes in a few aspects of joint, multi domain ops, more penetrative ISR, more flexible or elastic C4 and inter theatre mobility. IAF's main resource harnessing and exploiting technology is the human element. We must shape recruitment, training, multi-skilling and employment to meet our strategic needs. Personnel education, retention and separation needs a nurturing touch if we are to get the best out of what we have. An atmosphere of trust needs to be created by the leadership starting right at the top.

The audience this article targets is very well au - fait with the sequence **Grand Strategy-> National Strategy-> Military Strategy** followed by the rest. The total absence of the first three tiers in India is not only startling but mind boggling. I have intentionally not addressed this quagmire because an entire book can be written on this absence. I am given to understand that this vital aspect is already being addressed. As usual, without involving the Services since we are not a part of the decision making matrix but 'attached offices of MOD'. The most vital external factor which will accelerate all our endeavours towards a strategic future is the integration of the Services with MOD. This and this alone will be the enabling factor which will grant the required degree of freedom to IAF to facilitate its journey towards truly becoming a strategic air force.

Air Chief Marshal Pradeep Naik (Retd)

Air Chief Marshal Pradeep Naik, PVSM VSM was born on 22 July 1949 and commissioned into the Indian Air Force on 21 June 1969. After initial schooling in the Sainik School, Satara, he graduated with the 33 course from the National Defence Academy.

In a distinguished career spanning forty years, the Chairman COSC and CAS has flown a wide variety of combat and trainer aircraft. After initial training on the HT-2, he has flown the Vampire and the Hunter, and has had extensive operational experience on all variants of the MiG-21. He is a Qualified Flying Instructor with vast instructional experience and a Fighter Combat Leader from the prestigious Tactics and Air Combat Development Establishment (TACDE). He was selected as one of the first eight pilots to convert to the MiG-23 BN in the erstwhile USSR, and was responsible for its induction into the IAF. Besides commanding a front line fighter squadron, he has commanded an important fighter base and air force station at Bidar. He has been the Directing Staff at TACDE and the Defence Services Staff College.

During his career, the Air Chief Marshal held numerous important staff appointments in different headquarters. He was the Senior Air Staff Officer at HQ Western Air Command, the Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief of Central Air Command and the Vice Chief of Air Staff, prior to his appointment as the Chief of the Air Staff. He also took over as the Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee on 01 April 2010.

The Air Chief Marshal is a graduate of the Defence Services Staff College, and an alumnus of the National Defence College. He is a recipient of the Param Vishisht Seva Medal and Vishisht Seva Medal.

Promoting a BRICS Role in the Gulf Security Scenario: An Indian Initiative

Amb Talmiz Ahmad (Retd)

Introduction

Over the last seven years since the BRICS countries—Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa—have been meeting at summit level, the organisation has achieved an extraordinary cohesiveness and confidence, and has articulated considered views on a variety of issues of global interest. This is besides expanding intra-BRICS cooperation in several areas, including trade, finance, and investments, among others.

BRICS has also been expressing considered positions on several serious political problem areas, particularly in West Asia and Africa, highlighting its central conviction that "development and security are closely interlinked, mutually reinforcing and key to attaining sustainable peace." It has emphasised the role of multilateral efforts to promote global peace and security, particularly through the United Nations (UN) system, and has decried unilateral military interventions and economic sanctions.

The situation in West Asia has been of particular concern to BRICS leaders, which is reflected in their remarks at BRICS and other fora, and in the Declarations of the BRICS summits. All BRICS members have an abiding stake in West Asian security: they all have very substantial energy and economic ties with the region, and in several instances their relations have also acquired a strategic value as they have shared concerns relating to terrorism, extremism, sectarianism, drugs and arms trafficking and piracy, all of which have bases in different parts of West Asia.

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China and India have special reasons to be concerned about the deteriorating security scenario in West Asia since their long term energy security and economic interests are linked to the region. Again, India has an 8 million-strong community in the region, while China's Silk Road project ("One Belt, One Road", or OBOR) is connected to West Asia both on the land and sea routes. Given such high stakes in regional security, BRICS cannot be "mute spectators" in the region's security scenario.

This paper proposes that India, with its 5000-years of unbroken ties with West Asia, its economic and political standing in the region, and the high level of cultural comfort it enjoys with the countries of the GCC, should shape and lead a BRICS diplomatic initiative to promote a structured BRICS-GCC dialogue, complemented by a dialogue with Iran, on the lines of similar discussions that have been held by BRICS with African and South American leaders. This should then be followed by a robust initiative to prepare a platform for the principal contending powers, Saudi Arabia and Iran, to interact with each other to build mutual confidence and address issues in a moderate and accommodative spirit.

The paper also examines the various challenges this initiative faces, such as the deep divide between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Iran; significant differences between India and China that might come in the way of BRICS' efforts in the region; and, above all, the readiness of BRICS to play such a security role.

The new world order

The Declarations of the BRICS summits so far indicate that the following are the main themes and approaches that have come to inform the BRICS agenda:

(i) The need for a thorough reform of the existing global financial, economic and political institutions so that they more fairly reflect the changes that have taken place in the world order since these institutions were set up several decades ago.

(ii) BRICS leaders favour the multilateral approach, with global and regional issues being addressed through the UN and its agencies; hence, they call for the reform and strengthening of the UN system.

(iii) BRICS is focused on enhancing intra-BRICS cooperation and interactions. In this regard, it is constantly looking for new ideas and opportunities, which are approved at summit level after they have been thoroughly examined at Track-II, official and ministerial levels. Every summit declaration is accompanied by an Action Plan for the next year which is then reviewed at summit level; thus,

not only has the BRICS agenda constantly been expanded, new institutions for cooperation and new platforms for dialogue have been set up year after year.

(iv) BRICS leaders are anxious to engage with other developing countries and groupings, having done so recently with African and South American nations.

(v) Above all, BRICS leaders recognise that "development and security are closely interlinked, mutually reinforcing and key to attaining sustainable peace."[1]

Not surprisingly, the BRICS's robust intervention in world affairs and its criticism of several aspects of the contemporary order had also provoked severe criticisms from several Western commentators who saw the group's pronouncements as "anti-American hot air". Walter Ladwig of the Royal United Services Institute opined: "this focus on institution-building is misplaced. It is the fundamental incompatibility of the BRICS nations, not their lack of organisation, which prevents [them] acting as a meaningful force on the world stage."[2]

Even as the BRICS countries have consolidated themselves institutionally and have taken firm positions on economic and political issues of global significance, the West-led world order, put in place after the Second World War and largely effective over the last 70 years or so, now gives every indication of fraying and of being much less resonant in world affairs.

Western writings over the last few years have been flush with references to the US in retreat. In a recent article, Ian Bremmer said, "Americans seem as uninterested as many Britons in a more ambitious foreign policy", and that, over the long term, they will not support commitments requiring more troops and dollars.[3] At the same time, he noted, "a growing number of governments have the self-confidence to resist Washington."[4] In this situation, Bremmer advocated that US allies "prepare for a world in which American power means less than it used to", and pursue other "constructive relations", including those with China and Germany.

The theme of US retreat from active international leadership has also been picked up by James Rubin, a senior official in the Clinton presidency, who noted the failure of its approach in West Asia, where, in his view, the US "has neither extinguished nor contained the wildfire of civil war and extremist terror."[5] In fact, Rubin even saw an all-round US failure in Europe where, he believed, Obama had failed to confront Putin, and in Asia where China has refused to back off on the Islands' issue.

Michael Klare believes that the US predicament is a result of "imperialist overstretch", described by Paul Kennedy as the situation in which "the sum total of the US's global interests and obligations is … far greater than the country's power

to defend all of them simultaneously".[6] Klare concludes that this situation is not likely to be reversed and points out that:

> China is far more powerful than it was 13 years ago, Russia has largely recovered from its post-Cold War slump, Iran has replaced the US as the dominant foreign actor in Iraq, and other powers have acquired significantly greater freedom of action in an unsettled world.[7]

In an interview with the *New York Times* in April 2014, President Barack Obama, after reviewing the various problem areas in West Asia–North Africa, asked in frustration: "Do I have the partners—local and/or international—to make any improvements [that] we make self-sustaining?"[8]

This question needs to be answered not just by China but by every other BRICS member since each of them has a direct and abiding stake in Gulf security. However, with the US exercising a monopoly on the use of power and influence in the region for the last several decades, they were not in a position to play an influential role in promoting the security of the region.[9] Now, with the US overwhelmed by the complexity of the competitions, conflicts and state-breakdown that its erstwhile policies have created in West Asia, and clearly unwilling to expend the human and financial resources required to address the region's confrontations, an opportunity may have opened for the BRICS members to play a role to stabilise the region.

The Gulf Security Scenario

Over the last 25 years, the Gulf has been in the throes of instability due to the following factors: (a) the US-led military intervention in Iraq in 1991; (b) its "dual containment" policies against Iraq and Iran in the 1990s; (c) its robust and ongoing military actions in the region after 9/11 as part of the global war on terror; (d) its assault upon Iraq in 2003; and, (e) till 2013, its confrontation against Iran with frequent threats of military action. Further west, in the same period we have witnessed the failure of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, the harsh Israeli response to the second Intifada in 2000, the assault upon Lebanon in 2006, and the attack upon Gaza in 2009. East of the Gulf, in South Asia, we see continued conflict in Afghanistan between the Taliban and a weak central authority, in tandem with Al Qaeda-fomented extremist violence which originates in Pakistan but whose destructive tentacles reach across South Asia, the Arabian Peninsula, large parts of West Asia, the Horn of Africa, and now much of north and central Africa as well.

The scenario has been further complicated by the emergence of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) as a political and military power across large parts of Iraq and Syria, now proclaimed as the caliphate of the Islamic State (IS). Thus, high levels of turmoil, insecurity and uncertainty are apparent across the entire swathe of territory from the Western borders of India to Palestine on the Mediterranean, described by Gary Sick as a "perfect storm".[10]

In the wake of the Arab Spring, over the last five years West Asia has been experiencing what Philip Gordon has called "a period of tectonic and destructive change", with Syria, Libya and Yemen in the grip of widespread civil conflict, even as a military dictatorship has been restored in Egypt.[11] Gordon traces these developments to the interplay of major historic forces which have caused: (a) collapse of state authority and erosion of national borders; (b) a burgeoning sectarian divide emerging from Saudi-Iran rivalry for regional influence; (c) an intra-Sunni divide, primarily between those advocating the continuation of the authoritarian state order and those backing the reformist doctrines of political Islam, largely influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood and its affiliates; and, (d) absence of any progress in the Middle East Peace Process.

The most significant development in the Gulf, in the face of the challenge of domestic reform emerging from the Arab Spring, has been the decision of the GCC countries to abandon policies of moderation and dialogue and to actively oppose what they see as Iran's hegemonic intentions in the region. Thus, the GCC countries, which till recently had been bastions of low-key, accommodative politics, are today confronting Iran on sectarian and strategic bases, in Syria, Iraq and Yemen. The GCC role has included a direct military assault on Yemen, and provision of weaponry, training and logistical support to rebel forces in Syria, including to Salafi elements with ties to jihadi forces affiliated to Al Qaeda, some of whom are said to be cooperating operationally with the IS in Syria. In Iraq, the war against the IS has taken a sectarian colour, with the Shia militia, backed by Iranian forces, leading the fight against jihadis in that deeply fragmented country.

The silver lining in this grim scenario has been the dialogue between the P5+1 and Iran, culminating in the agreement on the nuclear issue, referred to as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action [JCPOA] in January 2016. However, both Israel and Saudi Arabia continue to see in a settlement with Iran a grave threat to their interests, and have even mobilized support in Washington to obstruct the full normalization of US-Iran ties.

Both the US and West Asian political scenarios are likely to be further complicated by the victory of Mr Donald Trump as the 45th US president. During the election campaign, he had taken some extreme positions on Arabs and Muslims in general, and had been harshly critical of the nuclear agreement and of what he saw as Iran's emergence as a regional power after the agreement. He had also included Saudi Arabia among countries not assuming their fair share of the burden of looking after their own security. As of now, not only is the US paralysed in West Asia, its political order at home has also become increasingly divided and dysfunctional due to party political differences.[12]

Political Context of the BRICS Outreach to the Gulf

The above discussion indicates that spaces and opportunities have been thrown up for BRICS to consider playing a role in the Gulf for the promotion of regional security and stability. Before defining such a role, it is important to review the BRICS-related political context at global and regional levels within which it would take shape. This is looked at in the following sections.

Sino-Russia Relations

The most significant development at the global level is the estrangement between Russia and the western countries, led by the US, regarding Ukraine, commencing with the overthrow of President Viktor Yanukovych in February 2014. This issue has led to Putin abandoning his earlier "Greater Europe" project linking Lisbon with Vladivostok in favour of a "pivot" to Asia, particularly China.[13] Thus, over the last two years, Russia has robustly expanded its energy and economic links with China, not only providing China much-needed energy resources but also strengthening financial, investment, technology, and even defence ties.[14] More importantly, Putin has also accepted an enhanced Chinese presence in Central Asia by linking China's Silk Road Economic Belt with his own Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) proposal.

In May 2015, Russia and China conducted joint naval exercises in the Mediterranean, signaling their tightening military and political ties. The Russian deputy defence minister, Anatoly Antonov, said these exercises conveyed a common understanding of "challenges and threats" and "the need to restructure the current world order".[15] By conducting these exercises in the eastern Mediterranean, the first time that the Chinese navy sailed in these distant waters, the two countries have taken their cooperation to the very edge of Eurasia.[16] These seas constitute the

western end of China's New Silk Road, giving China the opportunity to upgrade Mediterranean ports such as those of Piraeus (Greece), Marseilles and Barcelona, besides building a railway line linking Haifa and Tel Aviv with Eilat on the Red Sea. Gabuev points out that over time Sino-Russia ties will "become stronger and more comprehensive".[17]

China's Interests in West Asia

Besides the extension of Chinese presence into the waters of the Mediterranean, facilitated by its burgeoning economic, political and defence ties with Russia, China is also taking a fresh look at its interests in West Asia. China already has very substantial energy and economic ties with the region: it provides 55 percent of its oil imports, with five of China's top suppliers coming from this region. West Asia will also be meeting China's increasing gas requirements in coming years, with Qatar having become its second largest supplier in 2013. China's two-way trade with West Asia is valued at $300 billion annually, while the total value of its contracts is $120 billion. Its FDI in the region is about $10 billion. With the setting up of the Renminbi [RMB] clearing centre in Doha in April 2015, China has taken forward its plan to promote global trade in its currency instead of the dollar and thus realise its aspirations to become a global economic presence.[18] The Chinese currency has been further buttressed after the IMF has included it in its basket of benchmark currencies to calculate the exchange value of its Special Drawing Rights.[19]

Outside the BRICS framework, China has set up the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB): on 15 April 2015, China announced that 57 countries had joined as founding members. The bank is expected to provide funding for infrastructure projects that normally do not attract funding from the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank. Thus, it is expected to complement rather than challenge the existing institutions. Its funds will be mainly used to finance the ambitious road and rail projects that are part of the Silk Road initiative (i.e., One Belt, One Road) across Eurasia. These investments will cover over 60 countries, with projects in Central Asia alone being valued at $50 billion.[20]

One new factor that has now become resonant in China's interests in West Asia: China's "Silk Road" proposals have a maritime dimension which links the Malacca Strait with India and Kenya, then north to the Horn of Africa and to the Mediterranean, before meeting the land route at Venice.[21] These plans place West Asia at the centre of the land and sea routes through Eurasia and the Indian Ocean. The Chinese special envoy for the Middle East, Gong Xiaosheng, has said

that West Asia will be important to implement the project and may become "the earliest to see the results".[22]

China's traditional policy in West Asia has been one of non-intervention. But, recent developments have persuaded at least some Chinese policy makers that continued adherence to this approach could jeopardise China's interests.[23] They note in this regard that political turmoil in Syria, Libya and Iraq has directly affected China's energy and economic interests, since China had significant investments in all these countries. Again, in the case of Libya, China was required to evacuate 35,000 of its nationals to safety. The situation in Iraq is particularly difficult since China already imports 50 percent of Iraq's production and had planned to raise this to 70 percent [850,000 barrels per day] before the advent of the ISIS menace in mid-2014.[24] Besides the purchase of oil, Chinese companies had invested heavily in the exploration and development of major oil fields in Iraq. The threat to its interests in Iraq has compelled China to reach out to Iraqi Kurdistan.

The problem of Syria has forced China to take considered positions in alliance with Russia against western military intervention: in 2011, China opposed external interference in that country, saying that the conflict was an internal matter. Since then, China has exercised its veto four times to deter foreign involvement in the conflict, while participating with the UN-sponsored initiative to rid Syria of its chemical weapons.

While China has gone against the US and GCC positions in regard to Syria, it has been more accommodative of the US in respect of Iran by respecting American sanctions and drastically reducing its purchases of Iranian oil; however, China remains Iran's largest trade partner, with two-way trade amounting to $ 52 billion in 2014, a 31 percent increase over the previous year. Again, China has also maintained a steady rhythm of engagement with the GCC countries and the Arab world in general through well-established dialogue platforms. The most important of these is the "Strategic Dialogue" it has with the GCC countries, established in 2010. At the third dialogue meeting in 2014, the two sides agreed to work towards shaping a strategic partnership, the highest level of engagement from the Chinese perspective.[25]

The Chinese scholar Chaoling Feng has noted China's important stakes in West Asia, the possible harm to Chinese interests due to non-involvement, the US interest in a Chinese security role in the region, and, above all, the interest of the GCC countries themselves in a larger Chinese role in the region to balance the western presence.[26] He has explained China's reluctance to pursue a proactive policy (advocated by Feng himself) thus: (a) China is not as familiar with West Asian affairs as compared to the US or Europe; (b) given China's substantial ties with both Saudi

Arabia and Iran, it is just not able to decide to pursue bilateral interactions or adopt a collective regional approach; it just does not have all the required information to take such a crucial decision; and hence, (c) it suits China not to challenge the incumbent powers in the region.[27]

India's Interests in West Asia

This lack of confidence on China's part to play a more proactive political role in West Asia, even when its interests demand that it do so, creates the space for India to initiate, craft and propel a BRICS engagement with the GCC and complement it with an interaction with Iran. The logic behind this initiative is compelling. Like China, India has an abiding interest in Gulf security: it obtains 80 percent of its oil from this region; this dependence will go up to over 90 percent by 2035. The GCC is also one of India's largest trade partners, with two-way trade being valued at $150 billion in 2013-14. India has already built very substantial investment and joint venture engagements with the GCC countries, with every indication that these will expand dramatically in coming years.[28]

But, in contrast to China, India has a unique asset and a responsibility in the region—the presence of its community. Indians now number about eight million in the GCC, with about three million each in Saudi Arabia and the UAE, well over half a million in Oman, Qatar and Kuwait, and just below half a million in Bahrain.[29] In fact, Indians constitute the majority community in at least three GCC countries—the UAE, Qatar and Bahrain; they are also the largest expatriate community in every country of the GCC and are well ahead of the number two community.

The Indian work force in the GCC remits to India about $35 billion annually.[30] Assuming that one expatriate worker supports at least four others at home, it can be safely assumed that about 40 million Indians benefit directly from the Indian presence in the GCC. Again, Indians play a significant role in the economy of the GCC: besides the contribution of labour, technicians and professionals in developing the region's infrastructure, industry and the services sector, Indian business persons, tycoons and small and medium entrepreneurs are increasingly becoming an important force in the economies of the GCC countries in diverse sectors—infrastructure and real estate development, industry, retail and services (education, health, etc.).

The welfare of the Indian community is of abiding interest to all governments in Delhi, and several state governments as well. On several occasions during periods of grave regional crises, the Indian government has mounted major rescue operations, mobilising substantial national resources for the purpose. The government also

has an interest in ensuring that Indians continue to be recruited for employment in the Gulf; thus, the review of domestic procedures and engagement with GCC governments to address welfare measures is a constant effort of the government and its officials in the region. The one point on which there is full understanding in India is that no national effort would adequate to bring millions of its citizens out of the region in the event of a conflagration directly involving the region's major powers. Hence, the primary responsibility of the Indian government is to ensure that such apocalyptic contingencies are *prevented* through diplomatic effort.

India thus enjoys an advantage in the Gulf that China does not have—deep familiarity with the region and its people, and a high level of cultural comfort that the two peoples have with each other. While India's political ties with the GCC states have had their fair share of ups and downs due to their different engagements during the Cold War—particularly the ties of GCC countries with Pakistan, their position against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, and their participation in global jihad to combat the Soviet occupation in Afghanistan—since the early part of the last decade there has been a steady upswing in bilateral political ties.[31]

This is best exemplified by the visit to India of every GCC head of state or government in 2005–07, and reciprocal visits by Indian leaders, culminating in the visit of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to Riyadh in February 2010. During this visit, the Indian prime minister and the Saudi monarch signed the Riyadh Declaration, which announced the commencement of a "new era of strategic partnership" on the basis of deeper political, economic, defence and security ties. This relationship emerged from the conviction of GCC leaders that they shared with India the threat from jihadi violence—dramatically illustrated by the Mumbai attacks of November 2008—and that this threat largely emanated from Pakistan. India's engagement with the Gulf has been robustly taken forwarded by Prime Minister Narendra Modi, who, commencing from August 2015, has visited four Gulf countres – UAE, Saudi Arabia, Iran and Qatar. These visits have imparted a "strategic" dimension to the relationships, as brought out in the joint statement concluded in each country.

From the GCC perspective, India represents the narrative of economic and technological achievement in a multicultural democratic order. India has the added advantage that, in its foreign policy posture, it adopts positions that are non-intrusive, non-prescriptive and non-hegemonic. India is thus well-placed to take the lead in setting up the proposed diplomatic engagement with West Asia.

BRICS-Gulf Dynamics

What attraction does engagement with BRICS hold for the GCC? First, with the GCC shrugging off the American embrace even as the US has signaled its desire to minimise its military commitments in the region, new opportunities to pursue other engagements have opened up for the GCC countries. In fact, their "Look East" policies announced over 10 years ago now have real opportunities to fructify, particularly when they already have deep and valuable ties with all the BRICS countries in the economic and energy areas.

Second, the BRICS' agenda is almost entirely in conformity with the GCC's own interests: they have been conscious for about the inequities of the world economic order, which has failed to give them due recognition in its councils. More importantly, they know they will benefit from cooperation with the dynamic economies of the BRICS countries, particularly with regard to financial flows, energy and food security, trade, transportation, industry, technical education, scientific research and development, and development of financial markets.[32]

Third, with respect to the BRICS' positions on international issues, there is much the GCC would be comfortable with, particularly its concerns relating to terrorism and extremism, piracy, narcotics, cyber security and climate change. The GCC may disagree with BRICS in regard to Iran and, linked with it, the overall situation in West Asia for which it holds Iran responsible. But, even here dialogue with the BRICS members would enable it to project its views and concerns.

Above all, engagement with BRICS would give the GCC the opportunity to become a role player in shaping the new world order that reflects changes in global economic and power equations over the last few decades; an era in which non-western countries are high growth entities, major consumers of global energy, a major part of global trade, and are important repositories of global foreign reserves and sources of investments. UAE scholar, Dr Mohammed Al Asoomi, has stated the case for a BRICS-GCC merger thus:

> A GCC partnership with the BRICS would be an important move, for strategic, economic and political dimensions on the one hand and the reviewing of international relations on the other. This is important in light of the changing balance of power in the world; at a time when the West shies away from buying Gulf oil, the BRICS are drawing closer to the Arabian Gulf and its oil products and exports.[33]

BRICS would also benefit from this interaction. The GCC is at the heart of global energy scenario, has much synergy with energy producers Russia and Brazil, and is central to the energy security interests of both India and China. It is also a financial powerhouse, with substantial investible resources available to fund energy, industry and infrastructure projects in the BRICS countries, as also in areas of priority interest to BRICS, Africa and Latin America. Again, the support of the GCC would enhance BRICS's bargaining position in reforming global financial and economic institutions. Over the longer term, the region would be an integral part of the logistical land and sea connectivities being structured across Eurasia, thus reviving the age-old Silk Road and Spice Route ties that had seamlessly linked the Indian Ocean littoral and had placed the Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula as a central player in these trade and civilisational connections.

Besides engagement with the GCC, it would be desirable for BRICS to have a separate interaction with Iran as well. Besides its energy resources and economic potential, Iran enjoys considerable geopolitical significance, straddling as it does South and Central Asia and the waters of the Gulf. It has great influence in West Asia, and holds the key to stability in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Yemen. It also can be a major force against the twin regional threats of sectarianism and extremism. Iran is already an observer at the SCO and is expected to be a full member within a year or so.

While it clearly suits Iran to engage with BRICS, the latter would also benefit from the formal interaction. First, since the world's major non-western powers would be Iran's interlocutors, they would carry considerable influence with Iran, ensuring that Iran fulfils all its commitments to the international community under the nuclear agreement, whenever it is finalised. It should be recalled here that, while BRICS has fully supported Iran's right to the peaceful development of nuclear power and has criticised the unilateral sanctions imposed by western countries, no BRICS member has countenanced a weapons programme by Iran.

Again, Iran will be central to the success of the Eurasian logistical and economic initiatives sponsored by China and Russia, besides the specific advantage it would provide India in respect of its projects to reach Afghanistan, Central Asia and beyond. Finally, both China and India would welcome an Iranian role in stabilising Afghanistan and confronting extremist elements in the region.

Challenges before the BRICS-Gulf Engagement

While an interaction between BRICS and GCC on the one hand and Iran on the other, is quite feasible, this engagement would serve a much greater international

purpose if it would lead to improving the security situation in the Gulf region by providing a platform for Iran-GCC dialogue and promoting mutual trust and confidence between them. Such an initiative would, however, have to address a number of important challenges:

(i) the first difficulty would be the deep divide between Saudi Arabia and Iran emerging from the Kingdom's sense of an existential threat from Iran, whose increasing influence across West Asia is viewed as a sectarian and strategic challenge;
(ii) within BRICS, the continuing differences between India and China and strengthening Sino-Pakistan relations; and,
(iii) the fact that BRICS has not played such a security-promotion role so far.

These issues are examined in the following sections.

Saudi-Iran Relations

Saudi Arabia's concerns pertaining to Iran have propelled it toward an active military role in West Asia to confront Iranian interests in different theatres, Syria, Iraq and Yemen. The present situation, thus, would appear to be rather unpropitious for a new, more accommodative diplomatic engagement between BRICS and the GCC. But, it seems unlikely that this battle between the Islamic giants can carry on much longer: while much destruction has been wreaked upon Syria, regime change, the Kingdom's cherished hope, does not seem near at hand. In Yemen, too, while several thousand people have been killed, it does not seem that the Houthis are anywhere near being defeated; a negotiated settlement seems to be the only way forward. In Iraq, while the Haidar Al Abadi regime is fragile, it does face the daunting task of confronting the scourge of the "Islamic State" (IS). In fact, the IS is a common threat to all of West Asia and this fact alone should encourage Saudi-Iranian engagement, besides of course the long term threat posed by burgeoning sectarian discord.

While Saudi-Iran differences show no sign of abating, the attacks in Paris and other parts of Europe by ISIS, the proliferation of jihad across large parts of Asia and Africa, and the continued allure that jihad has for sections of Muslim youth even in western countries, all of these concerns should move Saudi-Iran ties in a positive direction in the near future.

Sino-Indian Differences

While there is little doubt that Sino-Indian differences persist in spite of the recent exchanges of high-level visits, these have not so far had a negative effect on the BRICS

agenda. The two countries have compromised on the BRICS's New Development Bank, agreeing that its headquarters will be in Shanghai, while India will provide the first president for a five-year term. Chinese has dropped its misgivings relating to India's membership of the SCO, so that India is poised to join this important regional security organisation in 2016, giving India a role in contributing to the security initiatives affecting Afghanistan and Central Asia, besides opening up opportunities to enhance energy links with the Central Asian nations. In February 2015, India joined Russia and China in announcing their joint commitment "to build a more just, fair and stable international political and economic order" and a "multi-polar" world. They also backed the Chinese call for "a modern security architecture" in the Asia-Pacific.[34]

India is certainly concerned about the recent upswing in China's ties with Pakistan, specifically the Chinese promise to invest $46 billion in the country to set up logistical connections, referred to as the "China-Pakistan Economic Corridor" [CPEC]. With full Chinese control over Gwadar port at the mouth of the Gulf and the increasing presence of the Chinese navy in the Indian Ocean, India perceives a security threat.

However, these concerns need not be over-played: China's presence at Gwadar is readily matched by the substantial links that India has developed with Oman: India has regular biennial exercises involving all three wings of the country's armed forces. The Indian and Omani navies have been holding regular biennial maritime exercises since 1993; these now include complex seamanship drills, firing serials and tactical exercises. Over 150 Omani military personnel train in India annually. Some Indian defence analysts have even pointed out that, given China's stakes in the Malacca Strait and the Gulf, its enhanced naval presence in the Indian Ocean is quite natural, and that it would good policy for India to engage with China on this subject. An excellent start in this regard has been the invitation from India to the Chinese navy to participate in the International Fleet Review scheduled to take place in Vishakhapatnam in February 2016.[35]

As far the Gulf is concerned, India should shed its timidity vis-à-vis China: the latter can just not match India's historic links, the high level of mutual comfort, and its assets in the shape of its community. While China has just experienced the challenge of evacuating 35,000 of its citizens from Libya, India has accomplished this feat several times, starting with the airlifting of over 150,000 of its nationals from Kuwait 25 years ago.

Again, the expansion of Sino-Pakistan ties and the integration of Pakistan into the OBOR should not alarm India. This should be seen as an attempt by China to contribute to Pakistan's stability. As former Indian diplomat MK Bhadrakumar points out:

> Pakistan's stability has come to be a matter of serious concern from the perspective of China's internal security, which is attributable not only to the spurt in terrorist activities in Xinjiang by groups that are to be traced to the Af-Pak region, but also out of China's emergent concerns as a stakeholder in regional stability that is an imperative need to advance its regional and global policies more optimally.[36]

Similarly, India should be more positive about the Chinese OBOR project. The project enjoys the support of all regional powers led by Russia, which has happily integrated it with its own regional cooperation proposals. With India expected to become a full member of the SCO in 2016, it makes little sense to remain outside the region's most important project. In this context, it is important to recall that for some years India has been pursuing its own dream project—the International North-South Transportation Corridor, a road and rail connection from Chahbahar port in Iran (outside the Gulf, just next to Gwadar in Pakistan) to Tukmenistan and Russia and then on to northern Europe, with links to the Iranian ports of Bandar Anzali and Bandar Amirabad on the Caspian Sea. A separate road from Chahbahar would link up with the existing Zaranj-Delaram highway in Afghanistan, which would then go on to Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.[37] The importance of these projects when realised would be significantly enhanced if they were to be part of the Chinese-sponsored OBOR project.

Can BRICS Promote Security in the Gulf?

Can BRICS now build on its strengths and achievements and cross the last frontier to pool its resources to bring security to the Gulf? The basis for this is already being prepared: on 22 May 2015, the BRICS deputy minsters of foreign affairs, meeting in Moscow, issued a joint communique on the situation in West Asia and North Africa. The communique called for international efforts to address the scourge of extremism and terrorism and criticised unilateral military interventions in the region. The document referred to all the major trouble spots in the region—Syria, Libya, Yemen, Palestine, the Iran dialogue—and agreed to hold regular consultations.

Given the deep divide in the Gulf, its comment on the region was most cautious: "They duly noted the importance of building a system of relations in the Gulf zone that would guarantee equal and reliable security to all States of the sub-region."[38] Briefing the media on this communique, the Russian deputy minister for foreign affairs, Sergey Ryabkov, said:

> I am sure that BRICS has a huge potential for work in all the regions that have problems…. The Middle East region is on fire. Of course, we cannot stay on the sidelines of this process as a cooperation format. … The next step will be collective engagement of BRICS as a structure in the work on these directions.[39]

Within a few days of this unprecedented stand-alone comment on the West Asian situation, President Putin addressed the BRICS' national security advisers. Besides referring to terrorism and financial crime, the only other problem area mentioned by him was West Asia and North Africa, specifically the IS. Recalling the US military attack on Iraq in 2003, he said: "The consequences are clearly grave and everything that happened in the past years on the international arena needs to be adjusted."[40] After the meeting of BRICS national security advisors, the secretary of the Russian Security Council called for increased military and technical cooperation among BRICS countries to combat terrorism, extremism, separatism and cross-border crime, as also what he referred to as "new challenges and threats".[41]

Perhaps, the strongest call for intervention has been recently made by the Indian Prime Minister, Narendra Modi, when he delivered his address at Tsinghua University during his visit to China in May 2015. Referring to the situation in India's neighbourhood, the prime minister said:

> We must also deal with the changing character of terrorism that has made it less predictable and more diffuse. We source a large part of our energy from the same region that faces instability and an uncertain future. India and China conduct their international commerce on the same sea lanes. The security of the sea lanes is vital for our two economies; and our cooperation is essential to achieve it.[42]

Conclusion

With its seven years of engagement at summit level and the nearly two dozen meetings that take place throughout the year at ministerial and senior officials' levels, BRICS has now acquired a clearly defined personality as a significant player in the global economic and political scenario. Its forays into institution-building in areas that, for nearly seven decades, have been the preserve of the West are already being seen as revolutionary. It has articulated views on a variety of global issues that have been principled and often at odds with western positions. Thus, it would be accurate to describe as a fairly cohesive political entity.

Of course, its member countries may have views on specific matters that are sharper or more strident than the consensual positions that emerge in the summit documents, even as members may have serious bilateral differences with other members. But, this is clearly seen as normal in a multilateral scenario, the important factor being the issues that unite all members for a shared purpose and interest. Here, BRICS, a conglomeration of very diverse entities, has shown far greater capacity for consensus than had been expected by its critics when it was taking shape in its early years. Of course, the discipline of multilateral engagement has inherent in it the ability to moderate both conduct and positions.[43]

But, moderation and support for consensus also emerge from the confidence among the members who are convinced that greater success will come from working together rather than in ploughing a lonely furrow. This confidence among BRICS members is founded on real economic achievement, which has led to legitimate claims for a place on the high table of global institutions, both political and economic. The reluctance of the West to yield space has added to the sharpness of the debate and also encouraged efforts to develop institutions and positions outside the West-dominated framework.

This has also led to an explosion of creativity, so that every summit Declaration is replete with new ideas for intra-BRICS cooperation as also interactions with nations outside the conclave but still claiming its attention, as in the case of Africa, where the old order has left behind polities with inadequate capacities for governance, development and prosperity, or, as in Latin America, where the nations are anxious to be in the vanguard of economic and social development in a nascent democratic order. Thus, BRICS refuses to be a closed shop of newly rich and successful nations that were underdeveloped just a few years ago.

In coming years, BRICS will grapple with achieving a new global financial architecture, sustainable development, and peace and security. In fact, even as BRICS has built new institutions and developed consensus on a variety of global economic

and political issues, it is acutely conscious of the need to be more active in the political arena. Thus, the Fortaleza Declaration stated:

We recall that development and security are closely interlinked, mutually reinforcing and key to attaining sustainable peace. We reiterate our view that the establishment of sustainable peace requires a comprehensive, concerted and determined approach, based on mutual trust, mutual benefit, equity and cooperation, that addresses the root causes of conflicts. [Para 26]

In the very next paragraph, the BRICS leaders set out their political position more categorically:

We will continue our joint efforts in coordinating positions and *acting* on shared interests on global peace and security issues for the common wellbeing of humanity. [Emphasis added]

No international issue has obtained as much attention from BRICS leaders as the situation in West Asia. The Fortaleza Declaration devoted considerable space to the issues relating to Syria (which had four substantial paragraphs), Iraq, the Palestine issue, Iran, Al Qaeda and extremism, the Middle East as nuclear weapon-free zone, and piracy. In his brief opening remarks at Fortaleza, Prime Minister Modi devoted at least half his speech to West Asia, saying:

> The region stretching from Afghanistan to Africa is experiencing turbulence and conflict. This is causing grave instability that is seeping across borders. This impacts us all. *Remaining mute spectators to countries being torn up in this manner can have grave consequences*. … The situation in West Asia poses a grave threat to regional and global peace and security. India is particularly concerned because this affects the lives of seven million Indian citizens living in the Gulf region [Emphasis added].[44]

There can be little doubt that, as new political crises emerge or present problems get aggravated, BRICS will take cognizance of them, develop consensual positions and take action: there will be no room for 'mute spectators' as derided by Mr Modi in his remarks. However, it is not envisaged that BRICS will be a military alliance on the lines of NATO; it will be a force for peace and security on the basis of its recognised political and economic standing which will impart to its diplomatic effort the required muscle and influence.

In this background and taking into account the deep concerns that animate the BRICS' leaders and their understanding that urgent remedial action is required, the

case has been made in this chapter for a BRICS diplomatic initiative, led by India (and perhaps organised during its presidency in 2016–17) to engage the GCC as a grouping and Iran bilaterally, on the lines of similar interactions held with African and South American leaders. This is to be followed by an active diplomatic effort to prepare platforms for dialogue between the contending parties to promote mutual trust and confidence. BRICS is both prepared and well-equipped for this initiative.

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29 In the GCC countries, China has 60,000 workers, including 35,000 in Saudi Arabia; it has another 10,000 in Iraq and 2000 in Iran. [See Andersen, p. 28.]
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Talmiz Ahmad joined the Indian Foreign Service in 1974. Early in his career, he was posted in a number of West Asian countries such as Kuwait, Iraq and Yemen and later, between, 1987-90, he was Consul General in Jeddah. He also held positions in the Indian missions in New York, London and Pretoria.

He served as Indian Ambassador to Saudi Arabia twice (2000-03; 2010-11); Oman (2003-04), and the UAE (2007-10). He was Additional Secretary for International Cooperation in the Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas in 2004-06, and Director General, Indian Council for World Affairs, New Delhi, India's premier foreign affairs thinktank.

After retirement from Foreign Service, he joined the corporate sector in Dubai for three years as President responsible for business development with an Indo-German joint venture in the energy and infrastructure sector. He is now an independent consultant, based in Dubai, advising Indian and Gulf companies on business development. He is Honorary Advisor to FICCI for the Gulf region.

He has published three books: *Reform in the Arab World: External Influences and Regional Debates (2005), Children of Abraham at War: the Clash of Messianic Militarisms (2010) and The Islamist Challenge in West Asia: Doctrinal and Political Competitions after the Arab Spring (2013).* He writes and lectures frequently on Political Islam, the politics of West Asia and energy security issues.

Navies and Maritime Diplomacy

Amb Yogendra Kumar (Retd)

Context

Amongst the long list of security challenges for India in the 21st century, the maritime security is quite unique. It is both a challenge as well as an opportunity. It, even, points the way towards a future direction of its socio-economic progress: it is the future which is just about beginning to be explored. Whilst our land-based threats, not to be minimised, are to be fought off and, when possible, reversed, our sea-based challenges have to be converted into an opportunity. As we look at the maritime challenges and opportunities, tasks for the maritime diplomacy suggest themselves; indeed, the exploration of the scope of the title of this paper would be in the context of national security and the role of the Indian Navy and maritime diplomacy. Prime Minister Modi's SAGAR ('Security and Growth for All in the Region') speech, delivered at Port Louis on 12 March, 2015, on the commissioning of the Mauritian National Coast Guard ship 'OPV Barracuda', encapsulates this conception with great clarity and lucidity.

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Maritime Security Paradigm

The growing international profile of India, the maritime salience of globalisation and of global trade and the shifting of geo-strategic contestation towards the East, especially centred around China, puts India right into this vortex given its own difficult relationship with that country in contrast with the days of the US-USSR contestation. The maritime dimension of the current geo-politics means also that the problems once distant are, now, close enough where India is expected to respond to protect its own interests. It has a natural interest in the safety of navigation and in the pursuit of favourable balance of power in various oceanic spaces in its vicinity; its vast coastline and the island chains of Andaman and Nicobar and the Lakshadweep and Minicoy Islands impose heavy responsibilities on the Navy as well as other maritime agencies. India's extended EEZ (Exclusive Economic Zone) is nearly as large as its land mass but only a fraction of its resource potential is being currently tapped given the country's inadequately developed capacities.

But, the challenge of this opportunity is not only huge but also complex. There is no overarching security architecture for the Indian Ocean Region; this circumstance defines India's national security paradigm quite substantially. There are regional hotspots, as witnessed in the Persian Gulf and the Horn of Africa, due to armed conflicts and inter-state tensions drawing in external powers; India-Pakistan tensions have a significant naval dimension. The littoral instability, in the form of failed or failing states/regions, spawns its own maritime challenges manifest in the phenomena of piracy, jihadist extremism and trans-national crime; weakened state institutional capacities, also, multiply the destabilising effect of climate change. All of this makes the task of peaceful exploitation of maritime resources, securing the SLOCs (Sea Lines of Communication) and creating the strategic framework for developing the 'Blue Economy' that much more difficult.

The methodological conundrums for security analysis present challenges for both analysts as well as for capacity creation for scenario-building and these are quite relevant for the maritime security challenges of concern to India; in terms of the Indian Navy's as well as the Indian Coast Guard's hardware and doctrinal preparedness for their potential diplomatic role in the immediate – and not so distant – would sleep future characterised by worrying strategic flux and uncertainty, these conundrums need to be paid serious attention to. The US National Intelligence Council (NIC) report, published in December 2012 and

projecting global trends up to 2030 (GT 2030) brings out these conundrums for the analysts very sharply as they relate to the following:

- Examination of outcomes concerning the role of the US in the international system in the situation of its decline and decisive reassertion in terms of the response of the other powers;
- Enquiry into the dynamics of governance and exploration of complicated relationships among a diverse set of actors, especially the role of states versus non-state actors.;
- The realisation that the tendency has been to underestimate the rate of change with respect to the trajectories of rise/decline of different states;
- Better exploration of the framework of relationship between trends, discontinuities and crises;
- Better focus on 'smaller political-psycho-social shifts' that do not go under the umbrella of ideology but drive behaviour rather than grand ideologies like fascism or communism;
- Better identification of looming disequilibria; more war-gaming and simulation exercises to understand possible dynamics amongst international actors at crucial tipping points.

India has strategic stakes in the neighbouring oceanic waters. Its stakes in these neighbouring waters exist on account of the dependence on sea trade, presence of considerable Indian diaspora in the littoral countries as well as significant trade and investment interests. The East China Sea is experiencing considerable turbulence due to competing territorial claims and regional rivalries drawing in external powers; the strategic contestation between China and US has sharpened precipitately resting uneasily on nuclear deterrence, the failure of which can have disastrous consequences for global security and stability. The South China Sea has witnessed, in last decade or so, rapidly escalating regional tension due to competing territorial claims on the Spratlys and the Paracels and naval as well as air force stand-offs almost on a daily basis which have also involved the US and the Chinese forces; this tension has also manifested itself in the form of creation of defence infrastructure as well as acquisition of hardware, especially submarines, by the littoral countries. There is growing tension in the Red Sea as well as the Mediterranean and the Black Sea due to conflicts in Syria, Iraq, Libya and the sharpening US-Russia military tension in Europe; all of these waters are used by Indian commercial shipping and their littorals host large Indian diaspora.

Navies And Maritime Diplomacy

What do navies do when they are not fighting wars? As a tool of diplomatic signaling which has a long reach and which can, when necessary, be unobtrusive, national leaderships use navies to reinforce or undermine, as dictated by national interest, a prevailing regional – or, even global – balance of power between nations or the strategic framework within which other national pursuits, such as economic or cultural interests, are undertaken. Yet, this raw – 'zero-sum' – application of state power, whilst still necessary due to nation states being the primary actors in international affairs, has to be tempered by the compulsions of collective action, even amongst adversaries, to tackle looming, overwhelming challenges beyond the capacity of any single country or a group of countries. These 'non-traditional' security challenges, such as climate change, piracy, jihadist terrorism et cetera, require, as has been evident in recent times, collaborative action from all countries, irrespective of their adversarial relationships with the other participating countries. Thus, the imperatives of building coercive capabilities have to be matched with capabilities and skills for collective action.

As we build our naval capabilities, physical as well as doctrinal, we need to cater for both these requirements. In his opening address at the 4th Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) on 26 March 2014, the then chair of IONS, the head of the Royal Australian Navy, Vice Admiral Ray Griggs, referred to the inculcation of "habits of cooperation" amongst the participating navies which needed to be backed up by "relationships at political level". To prepare the adversarial navies for collective, collaborative action – in contrast with their 'zero -sum' equations – in addressing the 'non-traditional' security challenges, freer flow of information amongst them would go a long way. Whilst being conscious of the enormous challenges in the diminution of strategic distrust amongst major powers, frontloading of the 'non-traditional' security missions can, conceivably, lead to this desirable end. It could, even as a most optimistic scenario, lead to an understanding about CBMs and about force levels which would diminish the prospects of maritime system destabilisation. The Indian Ocean region, less turbulent than the other adjacent waters, can be the possible ground for the realisation of this ambition.

The foregoing paragraph gives an indication about the enormous scope for maritime diplomacy in both its compellance as well as collaborative dimensions. An essential prerequisite for both these capabilities is to develop through

generation of inputs regarding a diverse range of scenario building both in-house as well as through the involvement of highly specialised think-tank inputs spanning the full spectrum of whole-of-the-government activity.

Adjacent Waters

The Indian naval capabilities, which would include for our purposes the Coast Guard depending upon the context, are necessary for power projection aiming to reinforce regional power balance in the adjacent waters to the Indian Ocean Region through strategic equations – and, suitable signaling – with friendly countries; these entail flag-showing patrols, port visits and joint exercises, participation in multilateral forums dealing with international security, especially maritime security, bilateral exchanges for training and sales/purchase of naval equipment. India is particularly active in the various forums in south-east Asia as well as the western Pacific. That footprint is, incrementally, growing aiming at a stabilising role, especially in the increasingly tense south-east Asia, in support of the ASEAN even though China views India's 'Act East' through the prism of strategic rivalry; certainly, Indian Navy's physical and diplomatic footprint there is an important means of strategic signaling. In the western Pacific, the Indian Navy is also, occasionally, undertaking flag-showing exercises through port calls, joint naval exercises as well as multilateral naval exercises such as US-led RIMPAC exercises and participating in the Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS).

Indian Ocean Region (IOR)

The primary focus, however, remains the Indian Ocean which represents, virtually, the entire microcosm of security challenges as witnessed in the world at large. Here, the waters are placid but the strategic situation remains fragile. The challenges to the existing maritime order, from India's point of view, can arise from three sources. First source is the strategic fragility around the Persian Gulf and the Bab El Mendeb chokepoints where a precipitate deterioration in the relations amongst the principal protagonists, namely, US, Iran and Saudi Arabia, can lead to pressure on these chokepoints as such pressure constitutes the key component of their respective grand strategies. The second source is the growing presence of the Chinese navy in the Indian Ocean region, manifest in almost permanent patrol by its nuclear submarine, naval exercises

and naval support infrastructure, which is suggestive of the Chinese thinking of expanding their naval role far beyond the participation in the anti-piracy operational coordination with other navies. And, the third source is the growing nexus between the Pakistani and the Chinese navies which can be counter-active to the existing maritime order and, even, be disruptive if it leads to their collaboration in developing Pakistan's sea-based nuclear deterrent, an aim publicly avowed by the Pakistani government. All of these 'hard-core' challenges are compounded by the systemic fragility amongst some littoral states which is likely to be aggravated by the impact of climate change. These challenges, undoubtedly, would demand very high power projection as well as doctrinal capabilities on the part of the Indian Navy.

Indian Navy's latest maritime military doctrine, 'Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy' [Integrated Headquarters, Ministry of Defence (Navy), New Delhi], published in 2015, dwells upon these challenges. Envisaging its role as a 'net maritime security provider' for the Indian Ocean, Navy's endeavour is to shape a favourable and positive maritime environment; the recently concluded India-US logistics-sharing agreement (LEMOA) can, potentially, expand Indian Navy's and the Coast Guard's reach across the entire stretch of the Indian Ocean. Its regional role is welcomed by littoral countries, with the exception of Pakistan, due to the country's benign image.

The Indian Navy's diplomatic engagement is achieved bilaterally, through formal arrangements envisaging visits, berthing facilities, training, sale of military equipment, and, most importantly, developing maritime domain awareness by means of creating a network of ocean surveillance installations with the participation of several friendly countries; strategically significant also is the growing practice of joint patrols – for anti-piracy, search and rescue, hydrographic surveys and EEZ surveillance – with the participation of friendly countries as part of capacity building as well as intelligence sharing activity. It also has International Maritime Boundary (IBM) meetings, at the Navy and Coast Guard levels, with the Sri Lankan counterparts. Apart from patrolling the EEZ of Mauritius and the Seychelles, the Indian Navy also has periodic presence off Mozambique and has been manning military installations in the Maldives; it has been making regular visits to Djibouti, having anti-piracy deployment in the Gulf of Aden and has been doing several bilateral/trilateral exercises, including one with Oman around the Hormuz chokepoint. West of the Malacca Straits, it has coordinated patrols (CORPATs) with Indonesia, Thailand and Myanmar. Its major multilateral exercises are IBSAMAR (India, Brazil and South Africa),

MILAN in Bay of Bengal, MALABAR (involving US, Japan and Australia and, occasionally, Singapore) in different places in the Indian Ocean, the South China Sea and the Western Pacific. Naval officers participate in multilateral maritime conferences as well as several official dialogues on maritime issues, the most recent being the one with China.

IOR Governance Issues & Maritime Diplomacy

A critical part of the process of shaping a favourable maritime order in the Indian Ocean is the multilateral diplomatic track. The scope of this activity has grown in the very recent times because nearly all multilateral and sub-regional organisations are putting maritime security on top of their agenda. Here, the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) comprising 21 countries and seven dialogue partners (including the US and China) and the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS), comprising 35 navies with several dialogue partners (including Pakistan, Iran, Saudi Arabia and China but excluding the US), present themselves as potential building blocks of a maritime order. These two organisations are paying attention to institutional capacity-building and the IORA's Perth Foreign Ministers' Communiqué (9 October, 2014) expressed commitment to work collaboratively with IONS and "other relevant organisations to address shared maritime and security challenges that threaten sea lanes of communication and transportation in the Indian Ocean, notably piracy and terrorism". Strengthening of these institutional linkages, governing the Indian Ocean, is a major diplomatic effort requiring naval inputs; another institution to link up - offering a promising arena for a maritime diplomatic, leadership role on India's part - could be the BIMSTEC (Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation comprising, besides India, Bangladesh, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Bhutan and Nepal), given the rapidly changing strategic situation in the Bay of Bengal.

Leveraging its growing heft, the Indian Navy could take the lead in steering the strategic discourse concerning the Indian Ocean; convergent interests with US Navy, which, indeed, currently underpins the maritime order through its bases, the various combined task forces and the supportive role of NATO and EUNAVFOR detachments, constitute a facilitative factor. This discourse needs to be on issues such as 'defence of the (maritime) system' and the 'rules of the road' clarifying, illustratively, the CBMs for chokepoints and the terms of port visits by extra-regional navies; a successful discourse could, also, obviate a possible 'disruptive' entry of the Chinese

navy into the Indian Ocean even whilst it's oceanic interests are acknowledged, as evident in the Prime Minister Modi's SAGAR speech.

The interoperability experience with diverse navies and coordination experience against piracy can be built upon by strengthening institutional structures. Its other diplomatic roles to project Indian maritime capabilities in the region and beyond, as envisaged in the Navy's military maritime strategy, are search and rescue missions, HADR (Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief) operations and NEO (Non-combatant Evacuation Operations) tasks; these demands are expected to increase multifold in the coming decades due to extreme strategic fluidity in the littoral areas of Indian strategic interest. Yet another role, conceivably in the future, could be 'stabilising operations' as well as asymmetrical warfare, individually or multilaterally, if the littoral instability continues getting worse. The phenomena of piracy and terrorism have demonstrated the considerable naval capabilities of non-state actors; an alarming prospect could be 'loose nukes' in the hands of these non-state actors which is not too far-fetched if the abortive Al Qaeda attempt, in September 2014, to capture the Pakistani naval ship 'Zulfikar' and the declared Pakistan policy, of placing nuclear weapons at sea, are to be recalled. These naval roles may have to be carried out, some time, in a hostile environment and, in the future, in a situation of worsening climate change process which will impact on the sea conditions with negative ramifications for the navigation operations; climatologist Stephen Harrison's assessment is that the climate change process in the region would be non-linear and abrupt.

Prime Minister Modi's SAGAR speech, in essence, puts the national leadership's imprimatur on many of the key elements of the Indian Navy's maritime military strategy. Prime Minister's policy is premised on the "primary responsibility for peace, stability and prosperity in the Indian Ocean" being that of the countries of the region itself. In recognising the extra-regional interests, he put emphasis on climate of trust and transparency, respect for international maritime rules and norms by all countries, sensitivity to each other's interests, peaceful resolution of maritime issues and increase in maritime cooperation. He described climate change as not an issue of debate "but a serious threat to existence" for those who live by the ocean which is a threat not for the future but a manifestation, on a daily basis, in the "tragedy of tsunamis and cyclones." Presenting the India-manufactured ship to the Mauritian Coast Guard, he greeted the Indian Navy officers present there, as "our guardian of the seas", reaffirming, later on in his speech, that India will work to "ensure a safe, secure

and stable Indian Ocean region" and that it will make its capabilities available to others to strengthen theirs' to meet the challenges from the ocean. He referred to India having started maritime security cooperation with Maldives and Sri Lanka and hoped that Mauritius, Seychelles and other nations in the region will join this initiative: "we will also train and patrol the seas together".

Concluding Comments – A Holistic Vision

It is this holistic vision – of a strategic framework – by the Indian Prime Minister for the Indian Ocean which lays out a roadmap for ensuring a stable maritime order. Whilst this strategic framework is underpinned by the Indian Navy's force projection capabilities, it retains the flexibility to address the entire spectrum of the challenges inhering in its actualisation. The focus of this vision, essentially, is to facilitate the natural urges of the Indian Ocean regional community for socio-economic progress which is ecologically sustainable; India aims to strengthen the relevant institutional capacities for this purpose through proactive bilateral and multilateral diplomatic engagement, leveraging India's benign image in the region and its enduring civilizational linkages. Prime Minister's speech also laid down the ground rules for extra-regional powers' activities in the Indian Ocean whilst recognising their legitimate interests in these waters. For India, the circumstances are quite fortuitous in that the Indian Ocean is relatively placid and its strategic interests are convergent with those of the US which, in the ultimate analysis, sustains the prevailing, favourable maritime order. With its robust diplomatic engagement in the region, the Indian Navy is well-placed to further strengthen the governance mechanisms by providing thought leadership to the strategic discourse on 'defence of the system' and the 'rules of the road': two such issues are CBMs for naval chokepoints and ground rules for use of port by foreign, visiting navies which, indeed, are critical for a stable maritime order. Given the rapidly mutating nature of the challenges in this task, including the destabilising potential of climate change for the regional order, the Indian Navy needs to build up its own capacities as well as to develop, with the help of a network of think tanks dealing with maritime issues, the capacity for scenario building for diplomatic action backed by calibrated application of its hard power.

A successful realisation of this vision could, in fact, suggest a template for possible replication in other maritime regions which are witnessing considerable tension – or, looming disequilibria – currently. As discussed in the previous paragraphs, India has vital stakes in those regions too.

Amb Yogendra Kumar (Retd)



Ambassador Yogendra Kumar retired as Indian Ambassador to the Philippines, with concurrent accreditation to the Pacific island countries of Palau, Micronesia and the Marshall Islands, in 2012. He was also High Commissioner to Namibia and Ambassador to Tajikistan (2000-03) during which period he had also handled Afghanistan affairs. He has been on the faculty of the National Defence College and, in MEA, he has handled multilateral organisations/dialogues such as G8-G5 Dialogue, ASEAN, EAS, IBSA, IORA etc.

He is in an avid writer and has been writing and speaking on foreign policy and security affairs. His latest book titled, 'Diplomatic Dimension of Maritime Challenges for India in the 21st Century', has been published by Pentagon Press India in 2015.

Book Review Of
'Diplomatic Dimension of Maritime Challenges for India in the 21st Century'
Authored By Shri Yogendra Kumar
By Pentagon Press India

'Diplomatic Dimension of Maritime Challenges for India in the 21st Century'

Amb Skand R Tayal (Retd)

Since the end of the Cold War, Indian strategic thinkers have started to give more attention to India's maritime interests and the country has offered to provide security to sea lanes in the Indian Ocean. This book contains a detailed presentation of India's past maritime history, the present situation and the challenges ahead.

Chapter III is a masterly narration of the gradual evolution of maritime thinking and its diplomatic dimension since independence to the end of the Cold War. The concept of Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace floated in the 1970s has now been revived by some analysts. Readers would recall that at the height of the war for the liberation of Bangladesh in December 1971, USS Enterprise had sailed into the Bay of Bengal to intimidate India. Of course, the insurance for India was the Indo-Soviet Treaty for Peace, Friendship & Cooperation and the fact that Enterprise was followed by a flotilla of 20 Soviet warships (Page 28). This Chapter also describes post-independence capacity and institution building by the Indian Navy, Coast Guards and other maritime agencies.

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

Diplomatic Dimension of Maritime Challenges for India in the 21st Century by Yogendra Kumar

- Pentagon Press
- Pages: 272
- Price: Rs. 995
- Publication Year: 2015

Chapter IV deals with the balance of power concept of big powers and examines it in the context of globalisation and frequent display of unilateralism by the superpowers. There are lessons in it for countries like India which have an independent foreign policy. On page 58, the author rightly laments the weakening of multilateral institutions. This is a reality reflecting the jungle rules of 'might is right'. China's defiant actions in the South China Sea symbolize the arrogance of power and impotence of UNCLOS.

On pages 64-69 is a very erudite narrative of the 'Changing Geopolitical Dynamics and India's National Objectives' including the impact of automation, digitisation and cyber on future conflicts. This chapter examines the weakening of global and regional governance structures like United Nations and EU and their failure to meet new threats of mass migration, as well as violent local conflicts in Africa and West Asia. On page 70, the writer is hopeful that there is no inevitability in the outcome of globalisation – its impact can be shaped by visionary leaders and managed through robust institutions.

Chapter V deals with the still evolving post-Cold War international maritime milieu and the increasing role of India's maritime agencies to deal with the emerging challenges. China's medium and long term plans to operationalise 'Maritime Silk Route' as a camouflage to cover their strategic objectives of containing India through a 'String of Pearls' has been well analysed on pages 77-78.India's maritime neighbourhood and emerging tensions in South China Sea and Western Pacific have been covered incisively in this Chapter. The author has covered the Arctic, Atlantic and the Mediterranean security situation even when it may not of much relevance to India for assuming a direct role.

All Indian maritime agencies i.e., Indian Navy, Coast Guards, Coastal police and shipping have been briefly covered in this chapter which is useful for availability of all relevant information in one volume. It summarises the evolution of their strategy and objectives as well as the current situation and plans. The author rightly concludes that most of India's plans are 'aspirational' which identify a destination but the country is a long way from attaining the infrastructure, platforms and capacity to achieving them. The author has rightly pointed out the necessity of a national security doctrine so that the nation as a whole could come together and unleash the synergy to follow that doctrine.

Chapter VI is a and well argued presentation of the present and future maritime challenges to India in the 21st century. It covers new theatres of war e.g. cyber, space, terrorism and NBC weapons. Naval assets' role in mitigating natural disasters and pandemics is especially relevant to South and East Asia and has been included in this chapter. The writer rightly concludes that the naval rivalry in India's neighbourhood is likely to increase with the rapidly increasing capacity of PLA Navy to acquire significant blue water capacity. The changes in the strategic environment as well as capacities of competing navies would not be linear and would need to be watched and studied carefully.

The point made on page 132 that "the challenges posed by the mutating threats that are existential in nature--------" is arguable. The rivalry among relevant States would be for the domination of the sea lanes and exploitation of maritime resources. But these certainly do not pose a threat to the very existence of any sovereign state. It may, however, lead to a new strain of 'neo-colonialism' in, for instance, what one is witnessing in China-Pakistan and China-Philippines relationship.

Chapter VII comprehensively deals with the present status of various attempts for collective and collegial governance of maritime spaces, challenges and interests. The author refers to Indian initiatives like IOR-ARC, BIMSTEC etc. which have as yet failed to meet any of the stated objectives. It is the collective responsibility of all their members to breathe some life in their activities. Similarly, ASEAN's weakness in dealing with South China Sea issues has been described on pages 140-141.

The current state of scholarship in India of strategic situation, IR and maritime issues has been examined by the author. He rightly concludes that the scope as well as extent of scholarship is inadequate given Indian's global aspirations. Also India has rather unique positions on issues like climate change, terrorism etc. which need to be studied from an Indian perspective but in a global context.

On pages 171-173, India's bold initiatives of 'Security and Growth for All in the Region' (SAGAR) and Project Mausam reveal India's plans for the future. But the financial resources at the disposal of India are no match to the financial back up of China for its Maritime Silk Route. India is rightly selective focussing its attention on Maldives, Mauritius, Seychelles and Sri Lanka. The author has made some keen observations about the dynamics of institutional governance and argues that the "the debate on effectively meeting the 21st century maritime challenged needs to be situated in the larger governance debate------."

On page 173, the author pleads for the "necessity for cooling hyper-nationalistic passions." But in an age driven by social media; populism and xenophobia have trumped sober reflection and moderation. This is a reality which has no easy solutions.

On page 181, the author rightly cautions that the policy makers would need to adopt a 'Broad Approach' which in the Indian context includes the inputs from the coastal States' governments in shaping the foreign policy. Foreign policy is no longer formulated in New Delhi alone and there is need to "reach out much more deeply, both politically and intellectually, to the various interest groups and the public at large…."

Chapter VIII on "Policy Recommendations and Capacity Creation for the Proposed Maritime Diplomacy" has a rigorous survey of the challenges for Indian maritime agencies. The threat of jihadist infiltration has posed a new dimension to the coastal security of the country where both Navy and Coast Guards are involved along with the local police and intelligence agencies.

While discussing IOR governance structures for a stable maritime order (page 200), the author has described approvingly the establishment of Indian Ocean Naval Symposium. The setting up of the BIMSTEC secretariat at Dhaka would also add to the efforts towards meaningful cooperation in maritime sphere. To take optimum advantage of these fora, the author rightly recommends development of institutional and intellectual capabilities and capacity building both in the organs of the State as also in think tanks and academic institutions.

The concluding chapter is eminently readable and summarises the author's maritime vision of India and the required diplomatic and muscular capacities to realise it. On page 219, the author enumerates India's 'extensive interests' in global water bodies including the Mediterranean and the Atlantic. Here a word of caution would be in order. Indian policy makers need to focus on keeping the IOR placid and free of overt rivalry. Indian Navy's forays even in East

and South China Sea would needlessly entangle India in conflicts far from its shores. With its vast coastline to protect and provide safety of sea lanes Indian Navy's present and future capacity is already committed. There is no need to be un-realistic and over-ambitious in seeking for ourselves a regional or global role beyond our capacity.

In sum, this timely book makes a significant contribution to the literature around the maritime challenges before the country. The book has been written after an extensive reading of the material available from various sources and is very well researched. It also provides deep insights in the changing strategic environment in and around IOR and gives well reasoned suggestions on how best to move forward to safeguard and promote peace and stability in IOR as well as India's extended neighbourhood.

The book deserves to be essential reading for India's strategic experts, naval officers and diplomats.

Amb Skand Ranjan Tayal (Retd)

Ambassador Skand Ranjan Tayal (Retd) is a graduate of Allahabad University and has a Post-Graduate Degree in Chemistry from the prestigious Indian Institute of Technology, Kanpur.

After joining the Indian Foreign Service (1976), Ambassador Tayal served in Indian Missions in Sofia, Warsaw, Geneva and Moscow. He was India's Consul General in Johannesburg (1996-98) and Houston (2002-05), and Ambassador of India to Uzbekistan (2005-08). He was Ambassador of India to the Republic of Korea during 2008-11.

Ambassador Tayal was Secretary of the Indian National Commission for UNESCO during 1991-95 and served briefly as the Director in charge of IITs in the Department of Education, Ministry of Human Resource Development. He was Joint Secretary in the Ministry of External Affairs and the Chief Passport Officer of India during 1999-2002. He introduced far reaching reforms in the passport issue system including comprehensive computerization, machine printing of passports and Tatkal Scheme for fast track issue of passports.

Ambassador Tayal has wide experience in both bilateral and multilateral diplomacy and has been a frequent speaker on contemporary affairs.

Ambassador Tayal was Visiting Professor in the Delhi University during 2012-15 in the Department of East Asian Studies. He served on the Board of Hindustan Shipyard Limited (2012-15) and MMTC Limited (2013-16) as an independent director and is Vice Chairperson of the India-Republic of Korea Friendship Society. He was also Chairman of the Governing Board of Dyal Singh College in New Delhi during 2013-16. Ambassador Tayal is a Guest Faculty at Symbiosis School for International Studies, Pune.

Ambassador Tayal has authored a book *'India and Republic of Korea: Engaged Democracies'* which was released in December 2013 by the Hon'ble External Affairs Minister of India.

New Procurement Procedure and its Synergy with Mission 'Make in India'

Major General Mrinal Suman (Retd)

Prior to 1990, procurement of defence equipment was carried out as per the normal rules governing all government purchases. No separate procedure for the procurement of defence equipment was evolved. One of the major reasons for that was the fact that most of the imports during that era were from the erstwhile Soviet bloc and were always on government-to-government basis.

After the break-up of the Soviet Union, sources for imports had to be diversified. A need was felt to have a detailed and well-structured procedure to facilitate decision-making and eliminate ad-hocism. The Public Accounts Committee (PAC) also expressed similar concerns in its 187th Report (1989).

As a result, Defence Procurement Procedure 1992 (DPP-1992) was promulgated in February 1992. However, it suffered from three major deficiencies, which affected its implementation. One, there was no dedicated organisation structured specifically to handle the complex task of defence procurements. Two, the procedure was incomplete as it primarily dealt with outright purchases only. And most importantly, it did not cater for emergent requirements of the armed forces.

Group of Ministers on National Security, in their report submitted to the Prime Minister on 26 February 2001, suggested the creation of a separate

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and dedicated institutional structure to undertake the complete gamut of procurement functions to inject a higher degree of professionalism and reduce delays. Consequent to the acceptance of their report, a new acquisition set-up was created in the Ministry of Defence (MoD) in October 2001.

A comprehensive procurement procedure (DPP-2002) covering all aspects of 'Buy' decisions was promulgated on 30 December 2002. Subsequently, its scope was enlarged to include 'Buy and Make through Imported Technology' cases as well. The procedure has been undergoing periodic revisions.

DPP-2005 included procedure for ship building and policy on offsets. Integrity pact was introduced in 2006 while DPP-2008 allowed offset banking. 'Buy & Make (Indian)' category was included in DPP-2009. Shipbuilding procedure was split into nominated and competitive in 2011 version. DPP -2013 gave preference to the indigenous industry.

Despite repeated reviews, the whole dispensation has been an unqualified failure. India has not been able to sign a single major defence contract in an open competitive environment. With the arrival of the new government in 2014, mission 'Make in India' was made the cornerstone of its nation-building initiative and defence manufacturing was identified as one of the key sectors. For that, a need was felt to align and delineate DPP towards the achievement of the objectives of 'Make in India'.

Dhirendra Singh Committee

An expert committee under Dhirendra Singh was constituted on 01 May 2015. It was tasked to evolve a policy framework to facilitate 'Make in India' in defence manufacturing and align the policy evolved accordingly; and to suggest the requisite amendments to DPP-2013 to remove the bottlenecks in the procurement process and also simplify/rationalise various aspects of the defence procurement.

The Committee suggested a number of important changes in the various clauses of DPP. One, the period of validity of Acceptance of Necessity (AoN) for 'Buy (Indian)', 'Buy & Make' and 'Buy (Global)' be reduced to six months as Services Qualitative Requirements (SQR) for these cases are finalised prior to the accordance of AoN.

Two, the Defence Procurement Board be authorised to approve minor deviations to SQR which do not materially alter the character of the Request for Proposals (RFP) in terms of capability being sought, associated deliverables or have major commercial implications.

Three, the minimum threshold of the percentage of indigenous content for 'Buy (Indian)', 'Buy & Make (Indian)' and 'Make' categories be revised to 40, 60 and 40 percent respectively. Further, it suggested upward revision of indigenous content across the board biennially.

Four, in case a single vendor situation develops after technical evaluation of the bids, RFP should not be retracted in the 'Buy (Indian)' and 'Buy and Make (Indian)' cases, since the commercial quotes would have been submitted in such cases in a competitive environment.

Five, 'Performance Based Logistics' should be preferred over 'Annual Maintenance Contract'. 'Total Cost of Acquisition' should be employed for all platforms/systems where major elements of cost are quantifiable and verifiable either on time basis or running-hour basis.

Six, contents of Technology Perspective and Capability Roadmap should be made more specific as regards the nature of equipment/systems that would be required to be inducted/up-graded during the next 15 years. The Committee opined that the details of all schemes included in five-year Services Capital Acquisition Plan should also be shared with the industry.

Seven, while stressing the need to integrate the private sector in the defence industry, the Committee recommended a number of measures for the provision of level playing field to the private industry vis-à-vis the public sector and the foreign vendors.

The Committee studied draft policies on debarring of vendors for alleged misdemeanours and employment of agents by foreign vendors. While agreeing with the government's approach on both the issues, it has suggested uniformity in the text of the relevant clauses pertaining to agents throughout DPP to avoid misinterpretations.

The Committee has devoted a full chapter to preparing the contours of the initiatives required to attain the envisaged goals of 'Make in India'. A conceptual ladder has been evolved to represent progressive development of competence level in the defence industry, from the very basic level of repair and maintenance to the level of acquiring ability to design systems; and design, develop, manufacture and test equipment.

Various stages in the ladder have been effectively correlated with various categories in the capital procurement as obtaining today. It has recommended incorporation of defining attributes of a category for a procurement case in DPP to lend rationality, clarity and transparency to the decision making process

The report rightly warns against 'Make in India' degenerating into 'Assemble in India' programme. It suggests higher indigenous content across all defence purchases and inclusion of upgradation of in-service equipment under the 'Make' category. It suggests 'Industry in the lead, DRDO as a partner' model for quicker and more efficient realization of the objective; if necessary, a foreign technology partner could also be considered.

The Committee has highlighted the need to define Indian vendor in unambiguous terms. It is of the considered opinion that the essential ingredient of the Indian vendor criterion is the controlling stakes of the Indian entity except cases where FDI above 49 percent has been allowed to an entity for a particular defence product and the entity is competing for the supply of that product.

Interestingly, the Committee has recommended that the power to accept the report of the Technical Evaluation Committee and the Staff Evaluation Report should be delegated to the Service Headquarters. It has also suggested fine-tuning of the offset policy for smooth implementation, with due incentives for encouraging participation of micro, small and medium enterprises (MSMEs).

As regards organisational reforms, the Committee is of the view that the management structure of the Ordnance Factory Board should be corporatized. In addition, the Committee has recommended that the four shipyards under MoD be merged into one corporate entity, retaining the yard facilities in their present geographical locations but working under one single management.

Going beyond the scope of DPP, the Committee has made a few important recommendations. It feels that the strengths of private industry can be harnessed only through well defined partnership models, depending upon the strategic needs, quality criticality and cost competitiveness. It has recommended two types of partnership models.

In case of platforms of strategic importance, 'Strategic Partnership' model has been suggested to create capacity in the private sector on a long term basis; over and above the capacity and infrastructure that exists in the public sector. Likewise, 'Development Partnership' model has been suggested in cases where quality is critical and vendor base is very narrow.

The Committee has recommended creation of a well staffed, distinctive organisation to meet the growing challenge of defence procurements as well as Indian defence industry. Citing the successful models evolved by the Departments of Atomic Energy and Space, the committee suggests grant of a measure of autonomy and flexibility to the suggested organisation to devise its own procedures for activities under DPP.

The Committee has realised that the acquisition workforce needs to be equipped with requisite skills in diverse fields. It has suggested formal institution of training for the acquisition functionaries at induction level and through career, with wide participation of all stakeholders.

Although the expert committee was given a very restricted mandate, it has failed to do justice to the assigned task. Except for a handful of original recommendations, the rest of the report is disappointingly commonplace.

DPP–2016 and Mission 'Make in India'

Mission 'Make in India' was formally launched on 25 September 2014. It aims at persuading indigenous and foreign companies to invest in manufacturing in India by making it an irresistible destination, both for capital and technological investments. To start with, 25 sectors of economy have been identified and defence manufacturing is one of them.

For the defence sector, two major measures were announced in August 2014. One, many components of defence products list were excluded from industrial licensing requirements and dual use items having military as well as civilian applications were deregulated. Two, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) cap was raised from the earlier 26 percent to 49 percent composite (includes all kinds of foreign investments). In addition, the government declared its willingness to allow even 100 percent FDI for modern and state-of-the-art technology on case to case basis.

DPP-2016 was promulgated with effect from 01 April 2016. However, the version made public is incomplete so far. It does not contain the most awaited chapter on the partnership models.

With a view to end the existing confusion regarding the definition of an Indian vendor, DPP has clarified that for defence products requiring industrial licence, an Indian entity/partnership firm should comply with, besides other regulations in force, the guidelines/licensing requirements stipulated by the Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion, as applicable. For defence products not requiring industrial licence, an Indian entity/partnership firm should be registered under the relevant Indian laws and complying with all regulations in force applicable to that industry.

Recognising the need to harness the immense potential of manpower and engineering capabilities within the country, DPP-2016 seeks to create an enabling and supportive environment for attaining self-reliance in design, development and manufacturing of the defence systems.

DPP-2016 has adopted a three pronged approach to support 'Make in India' initiative — institutionalization, streamlining and simplification of the procedure to promote indigenous design, development and manufacturing of defence items; refinement of 'Make' procedure to ensure increased participation of the Indian industry; and enhancement of the role of MSMEs.

Creation of a new category called 'Buy (Indian-IDDM)' with overriding preference over all other modes of procurement is certainly the most radical change. 'Buy (Indian-IDDM)' refers to the procurement of products from an Indian vendor meeting one of the two conditions — products that have been indigenously designed, developed and manufactured with a minimum of 40 percent Indigenous Content (IC) on cost basis of the total contract value; or, products having 60 percent IC on cost basis of the total contract value, which may not have been designed and developed indigenously.

DPP-2016 mandates that categorisation of procurement proposals should be carried out in the following order of priority (reasons for according a lower priority are required to be duly justified):-

a) Buy (Indian–IDDM)
b) Buy (Indian)
c) Buy and Make (Indian)
d) Buy and Make
e) Buy (Global)

As stated earlier, 'Buy (Indian–IDDM)' has been made the most preferred route. 'Buy (Indian)' category comes at the second priority. It refers to the procurement of products from an Indian vendor, having a minimum of 40 percent IC on cost basis of the total contract value.

Next in the priority is 'Buy & Make (Indian)' category. It implies initial procurement of limited quantity in fully formed state from an Indian vendor engaged in a tie-up with a foreign OEM, followed by indigenous production in a phased manner through technology transfer. Under this category of procurement, a minimum of 50 percent IC is mandatory on cost basis of the 'Make' portion of the contract.

'Buy & Make' category refers to an initial procurement of equipment in fully formed state from a foreign vendor, in quantities as considered necessary, followed by indigenous production through an Indian Production Agency (PA), in a phased manner with transfer of critical technologies as per specified range, depth and scope. 'Buy (Global)' is the least preferred option for obvious reasons.

In addition to the above categories that entail purchase of full or partial requirement, DPP-2016 has streamlined the 'Make' procedure that aims at developing long-term indigenous defence capabilities. It is a noteworthy reform.

Revamping of 'Make' Procedure

Under the 'Make' category of DPP-2008, two major projects, i.e. Futuristic Infantry Combat Vehicle and Tactical Communication System were initiated for Indian entities. Both were to get government funding support to the extent of 80 percent. The balance 20 percent was to be contributed by the PAs.

As both the above projects have made little progress, MoD realised the need to look at the 'Make' procedure afresh. As a result, DPP-2016 has considerably overhauled it to ensure wider participation of the industry, smooth implementation, transparent execution and timely deliveries.

Depending on the funding pattern, the procedure has been further split into 'Make-1' and 'Make-2' sub-categories. Projects under 'Make-I' will involve government funding of 90 percent — to be released in a phased manner and based on the progress of the scheme. Usually, projects under this sub-category will involve a development period of not less than three years.

Projects under 'Make-II' will involve prototype development of equipment or their upgrades, or their sub-systems with a focus on import substitution, for which no government funding will be provided for prototype development purposes.

With a view to provide impetus to MSMEs, DPP-2016 directs that preference be given to them for 'Make-1' and 'Make-2' projects costing less than Rs 10 crore and Rs 3 crore respectively for prototype development.

Most significantly, to kick-start 'Make in India' mission, MoD has announced that 23 fresh projects will be taken up under 'Make-I' and 'Make-II' sub-categories. The list includes thirteen projects for the Army, six for the Navy and four for the Air Force. The range of products is highly varied and, inter alia, includes 125mm smooth bore gun barrels for tanks; 1000 HP engines for T-72 tanks; tracked light dozers; mechanical mine layers (self propelled); assault track-way Class 24; advance pilotless target aircrafts; aircraft refuelling pumps; supersonic aerial targets; targets for combat torpedo firing; rotor blades for MI helicopters; air to ground rockets; and long range glider bombs.

Although the total cost of the projects may not exceed Rs 3,000 crore, it is a path-breaking initiative and provides a unique opportunity to all companies to enter the sector and establish their credibility.

If the above proposal proves successful, MoD will be encouraged to widen the scope further by adding more complex projects. Equally encouragingly, in a complete departure from the past practices, MoD has also indicated the likely quantity requirements and the time lines. It will help industries to take well-informed investment decisions.

MoD's initiatives have generated visible euphoria. Both the public and the private sectors are excited about the business prospects. The defence public sector has already recorded 20 percent growth, increasing its turnover from around Rs 43,000 crore to Rs 51,000 crore. OFB has earned acclaim for developing Howitzer Dhanush from the Bofors drawings. Defence undertakings are equally keyed up. Things are looking up for them as well: HAL is going to manufacture Kamov (Ka-226T) helicopters with complete technology transfer.

As regards the private sector, all major players are eagerly gearing up for the anticipated business opportunities. L&T is likely to bag an order for K9 Vajra-T 155mm/52 calibre Howitzers, developed in partnership with Korea's Samsung. L&T is also going to manufacture Lakshya-1 (pilotless target aircraft) and develop Laksha-2 with DRDO. It is also eyeing refit and upgradation of Russian Kilo class submarines at its shipyard at Kattupalli.

Tata Group has 14 group companies in the defence sector. In addition to getting a repeat order to supply additional 619 6x6 High Mobility Vehicles, Tata Motors have tied up with Bharat Forge and General Dynamics to develop FICV. Whereas modernisation of infrastructure of 67 air fields is already being undertaken by Tata Strategic Division, Tata Sons is joining hands with Airbus Industries to manufacture medium transport aircraft.

Reliance Defence Limited has 11 subsidiaries in niche defence segments and aspires to be the leading manufacturer and supplier of state-of-the art advanced weapon platforms, equipment, systems and hardware to meet the domestic requirements.

Mahindra Defence Systems is planning to collaborate with BAE Systems of the US for the manufacture of M-777 Ultra Light Howitzers. Furthermore, an agreement to produce medium and heavy lift helicopters is being finalised with Airbus. Bharat Forge is fast emerging as a serious player in the defence sector. It is partnering many Indian and foreign companies to develop and manufacture guns and fighting vehicles.

Raising of Offset Threshold

Offset threshold denotes the value above which contracts attract offset obligations. It implies that all deals above that value will necessarily have associated offsets. All countries fix offset thresholds as per their national policies. India fixed the threshold for defence imports at Rs 300 crores in 2005 and has been continuing with it since then. As most defence imports cost over Rs 300 crores, India has signed a large number of offset contracts.

In 2015, MoD raised offset threshold to Rs 2,000 crore, Defence Minister Parrikar gave two reasons for the step – offsets inflate the cost of equipment by 14-18 percent and India has limited capacity to absorb offsets. By raising offset threshold to Rs 2,000 crore, MoD has exempted majority of contracts from the onerous offset regime. It is a very significant reform and will not only expedite procurements and but save defence budget as well. Both the aspects need further examination.

The services had welcomed the introduction of offsets in 2005, in the hope that offsets would give an impetus to the Indian defence industry, thereby making India self-reliant. However, it did not take long for the initial euphoria to be replaced by disenchantment and frustration. There has been no technology infusion and no discernible increase in the participation of the Indian private sector.

Offsets do not come for free and impose a cost penalty. Foreign vendors have to incur additional expenditure to fulfil them and hence amortise the offset expenditure by suitably factoring it in their price quote. In other words, it is the buyer who is made to pay for the offsets demanded by him: no vendor reduces his own margin of profit by absorbing offset overhead costs.

According to Parrikar, the cost increase has been between 14 to 18 percent. It implies that the defence budget has paid 14-18 percent more for every import which carried offset provisions. It is estimated that defence budget would have suffered an extra outflow of about USD 8.5 billion on account of offsets.

Presently, MoD allows foreign vendors to select the mode of discharge of their offset obligations. It could be through any one or a combination of the specified routes. Almost all offset contracts signed so far have been pure counter-trade deals or entail outsourcing of low-tech components from some select Indian companies. India gains little from such transactions.

According to Parrikar, it will take India 15-20 years to absorb USD 17 billion worth of offset agreements that have either been signed or are under negotiations. Earlier, India had allowed the vendors to choose methodology

and areas of offset programmes. Needless to say, every foreign vendor opted for programmes that cost the least and were easy to fulfil. Even such a liberal dispensation did not help and MoD has been forced to concede that India had limited capacity to absorb offsets.

As is apparent from the above discussion, MoD's decision to increase offset threshold to Rs 2,000 crore is wise and rational. There is no logic in paying offset cost penalty without drawing commensurate benefits – offsets make sound economic sense only when they are in consonance with national priorities and if the trade-off results in extraordinary economic or technological gains.

The Way Forward

As regards defence ordnance, planning and implementation functions are distinctly different. They demand dissimilar but highly focused treatment. Therefore, they must be segregated. Planning functions should primarily be performed by officials and military leaders who possess necessary understanding of the national security concerns.

On the other hand, implementation functions must be entrusted to professionals who are fully conversant with modern technologies and are aware of the latest management techniques to administer multi-faceted and multi-agency programmes. An independent body should be established to carry out all execution functions to implement perspective approved plans. It should be the nodal agency to oversee the complete defence acquisition process and the development of the indigenous defence industry.

MSMEs are universally accepted as engines that drive technological progress in all industrial sectors. Their importance in the defence sector gets further enhanced due to the fact that the defence industry is highly technology-intensive. MSMEs are small players with limited resources and cannot compete on their own. They need more focused governmental support.

The Comptroller and Auditor General had observed that the existing system of defence acquisitions being handled by unspecialized personnel posted for three-year tenures was simply not adequate. Therefore, attention should be paid to the quality of the acquisition staff through meticulous selection, proper training and longer tenures.

The government is earnestly trying to make mission 'Make in India' a success. A number of far-reaching decisions have been taken to encourage indigenous production. FDI norms have been liberalised. Validity of industrial license has

been increased from 3 to 15 years with a provision for further extension. Offset threshold has been raised to Rs 2,000 crore, thereby freeing a large number of contracts from the encumbrances of offset obligations.

True test of national leadership is not routine governance but ability to take bold and radical decisions to put a derailed and inefficient system back on track. Hence, there is a need to examine the existing structures, organisations and policies to ascertain their appropriateness for the 'Make in India' mission. 'Make in India' is a highly overdue clarion call and a key statement of intent – a preamble of a mission, a philosophy and a resolution. However, mere reiteration of intent produces no results by itself. It has to be backed by an enabling environment; and that is a grey area and a cause for concern.

Major General Mrinal Suman (Retd)

General Suman heads Defence Technical Assessment and Advisory Service (DTAAS) of Confederation of Indian Industry (CII). He has also been conducting and directing highly acclaimed Defence Acquisition Management Courses for Indian and foreign industry, both in India and abroad. Government functionaries are also detailed to attend these courses.

General Suman commanded an Engineer Regiment in the Siachen Glacier where he was awarded a gold medal for being 'the most outstanding engineer of the year'. He was the Task Force Commander at Pokharan and was responsible for designing and sinking shafts for the nuclear tests, for which he was duly honoured by the President of India.

General Suman has been closely associated with the evolution and promulgation of the new defence procurement mechanism. Today, he is considered to be the foremost expert on myriad aspects of India's defence procurement regime and is regularly consulted with regard to proposed reforms. His views are sought by the policy makers including the Parliamentary Committee on Defence.

He is regularly invited to address, both in India and abroad, various chambers, associations and industrial delegations on various facets of defence procurement policies, offsets and business opportunities existing in the defence sector.

The General is a prolific writer. His articles are regularly published in a large number of journals and have been translated in many languages. His views command immense respect, both in India and abroad. A strong proponent of dynamic participation of the private sector in defence production, he has advocating injection of professionalism in the acquisition process.

What Light does the Truman-Mac Arthur Dispute During the Korean War Shed on the Problems of Civil-Military Relations in the Conduct of Limited War?

Rear Admiral Sudarshan Y Shrikhande (Retd)

"The military man executes their orders. This is his duty… He may not openly question that policy when he is still in command… If he cannot accept the orders he has received, he must resign; that is his responsibility as a moral being. If he will not resign, he must be dismissed. Civilian control of the military demands no less."

- John W. Spanier[1]

Had General MacArthur been General Zhukov and President Truman been Joseph Stalin, and whether the Korean War was a limited conflict or whether the Second World War an unlimited Armageddon, insubordination of MacArthur's magnitude would have been resolved with dismissal and very likely, a bullet. It is one of the admirable characteristics of democratic polity that disobedient and/or threatening soldiers are allowed to merely fade away! The Korean War provides us an interesting template to examine the consequences that limited wars have on the gamut of civil- military inter- relationships and the impact that tensions of such wars have on subsequent wars or on "near- war" periods.

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Thesis

The Truman- Mac Arthur controversy should be essentially seen as a very illustrative tool of the impact of civil- military friction on the entire spectrum of limited war. The dynamic imposed, adopted or preferred by the nations and actors involved to keep one or all facets of warfare i.e. objectives, efforts and participants limited, significantly influenced the outcome. While these considerations do impact on totalitarian regimes, their effects in democracies are more complex. **The fallout can be more pervasive, often in unintended ways on wars that could follow.** Nonetheless it is my belief, earlier submitted in my analysis of Bismarck's wars that **civil- military friction (that is arguments and discussions) is important in coming to more rational identification of the ends and means of limited warfare.** The pulls and pushes of other factors soured this aspect of "good" friction in the Korean War. In a curious way, unlimited war with total effort is perhaps easier to execute and win or lose than a more limited war.

(***Author's Note***: The Wars of German Unification were covered in an earlier week of study during the Strategy & Policy trimester. Among other things, the way in which Bismarck handled not only both the Kaisers Wilhelm, but also powerful Generals like Moltke to make Germany stronger was masterful, to say the least. After his dismissal and Wilhelm II's assumption of all powers the story was different.)

Personalities

Since people create, win or lose the plot during a conflict, a recap might help progress this analysis. The Truman- MacArthur combination was an interesting one, designed for irrational rather than rational friction. President Truman was not seen as an impressive successor to Roosevelt. The flamboyant MacArthur was not the self- effacing (albeit tough and determined) General George Marshall, the WW II Army Chief of Staff. Nor was MacArthur a tactful "CEO" like Eisenhower. As a veritable "viceroy" of Japan, he had had a critical role and more than deserved acclaim in Japan's recovery. This capped his WW II image to such an extent, that he considered himself Caesar rather than pro consul.[2] He was effectively a head of state and Truman had seen no pressing reason to trim his royal robes. A viceroy who had imperiously not set foot on continental United States (CONUS) for 14 years was better off in Tokyo rather than as a popular Republican candidate closer at home. To make it worse, MacArthur did not consider Truman presidential enough. Thus, rather than an inevitable

or institutional civil-military clash, this was primarily due to the circumstances and MacArthur's persona. **Leaders, riding on a crest of popularity or fearing someone else's halo, are often more prone to do what makes them look better than choose what could be better thing to do.**

Who Comprised Military?

I would suggest that MacArthur came to represent the 'military' half of this divide rather completely such that the JCS almost came to be identified as part of the 'civil' half. If Truman did very little to rein in MacArthur, the viceroy, the JCS were also at fault in making themselves effectively subordinate to MacArthur, the Commander-in-Chief Far East (CINCFE). This was a serious failure. First, the JCS was a well oiled "*Stavka*" (the name given to Soviet Military Command headed by Stalin. Please see a reference to this in the "letter" to Field Marshal Manekshaw). Second, in the 1950-51 dispensation they all had excellent combat and higher command credentials earned during WW II; next, they preferred backing MacArthur with increased enthusiasm only when he was successful; finally it was the JCS that was keenest off the blocks in risking escalation after Inchon. Inchon was, of course, MacArthur's move and a successful operation as such. The lesson I may want to learn is that a strong, quietly opinionated JCS is the crucial interface between civilian leadership and the CINCs. Secondly, an emasculated JCS may provide a psychological edge to civilian egos, but is a wartime disadvantage as other wars show. **The civil-military combined team's duty is to win wars and not internal arguments**.

Domestic Politics

Political Generals

After the half- hearted attempt to nominate him as the candidate for president in 1944, MacArthur's Republican leanings were well known. Moreover, he was never known to be lacking in ambition! To leave such a political general in a political job as the boss in Japan would have been unusual in most democracies. But MacArthur's halo, his successes, his open political preferences and utterances were the very factors that increased the political risks for Truman. Perhaps he felt more secure in Washington with the General away in Tokyo. **Nonetheless, the price to be paid for vacillation increases with time and so it**

did in this case. The lesson I would like to consider is that in democracies for a serving general to dabble in politics or hobnobbing with politicians should be seen as an unwelcome development. (A "republican" Truman and a "democratic" MacArthur should be seen in the same light.) Truman found himself anxiously looking at his own general through the prism of electoral politics. MacArthur was goaded into thinking of several pol- mil options as Republican/ Democratic courses of action. While no one could doubt his ultimate commitment to civilian supremacy or loyalty to a President, his penchant to make policy or publicly question policy, were clearly unacceptable.

Internal Dimensions of Limited War

If a war is limited (i.e. limited in terms of means and/or ends) it can become another of a government's activities and not always the most important one. Challenges are imposed if the objectives are geographically remote or ideologically foggy or contentious. This has a direct political/ policy dimension. (The job of the Opposition is to oppose at least something if not everything at some time if not all the time- almost the sine-qua-non of a healthy democracy) War also has a people dimension in terms of waxing and waning support. If a limited war prolongs, the repercussions also vary. Inter alia, winning elections could become more difficult. To be fair, while battlefield reverses are genuinely rued by all sides of a political divide, electoral advantage can also be derived by detractors and opposition parties. Likewise, success can also be exploited. Inchon was a brilliant military victory; it was also talked of as a Republican success. Another aspect is that a change of war- waging policy is sometimes possible only with a change of administration (reduced loss of face problems…. "someone else got us into this mess…") and the voters usually know it. Most of these considerations were present in the Vietnam war as well.

The Conduct of War

Geostrategic Awareness

To an extent much greater than in total war, senior leadership, political or military, have to display a higher degree of sophistication in making geostrategic estimates of the situation. To that end, the net assessments of the Truman team as well as that of MacArthur were off the mark in some important ways. This happens,

and it is not so important here to cite specific aspects, but to say **that the friction between them and the inadequacies of the JCS prevented professional discussions and disagreements that could have led to better policy and consequential strategy.** One of the glaring omissions was the Administration's exaggerated fear of Soviet intervention [3] and the underestimation of Chinese strategic moves by MacArthur. Such apprehensions and incoherence, often in public, enabled the Chinese to make some smart inferences and moves. These fears also impacted upon the level of effort that could be used. Strangely, some of these lessons were not applied in Vietnam and the results were even more unfavorable. One benefit from all this was that preparation through professional military education in war colleges around the world but especially in the US acquired a new quality.

Leaving the War to the Generals

Some of the reading implies a *Moltkean* influence on WW II in leaving military leaders to operate with minimum control. (Note. This refers to the strong conviction that Bismarck's main military strategist, General Helmut von Moltke had: "Politics, in short, was to be decisive before the beginning and end of hostilities, but not in between." [4]) Essentially I would argue that all war cabinets generally exercise adequate command and control. [5] It is tempting to think that the JCS in the US was under very little command and control in WW II. The reasons for not seeing obvious evidence of strong political control in WW II in this way could be:

- United bipartisan/ multipartisan resolve and a free hand to the President. Roosevelt's style was not intrusive and neither did he delve into details. Admiral Leahy, his Chief of Staff as well as General Marshall were exceedingly competent, self-effacing and very loyal to higher causes.
- A strong, trusted JCS. While the JCS members during the Korean War were also individually competent, we must remember the intense inter-services strife over several issues that began almost immediately after WW II and existed throughout the Korean War.
- A large canvas that forced everyone to see the big picture first.
- Absence of any real dissent in the political arena. Apart from the tiredness ex- WW II, there was enough internal political distraction and drama within the US during 1950- 53.
- Greater constancy of objectives.
- War was a struggle for survival.

Leaving the War to MacArthur?

For all of MacArthur's protestations, he had much more latitude (the problem was he also had too much "attitude"!) than he would admit and his success at Inchon gave him an even longer rope. Truman, the JCS, Syngman Rhee, Chiang Kai Shek ***all*** deferred to him. The regrettable fallout of the Korean War on the Vietnam War was in (a) micro managing the war; (b) an even weakened JCS; (c) worried generals and admirals including those on the scene; (d) the appointment of a very headstrong Secretary of Defense, McNamara. Nonetheless, the catharsis that followed resulted in very positive developments and the results were there to see in Desert Storm. Another lesson to chew on is the consequences of success or failure. MacArthur's brilliant success at Inchon made the JCS eat humble pie and exacerbated the rift. A popular general who wins in battle is harder to control, much less to dismiss than one who may have emerged the runner-up. While not totally analogous examples, Hitler could not afford to publicly disgrace and then hang Erwin Rommel for his alleged role in the 20 Jul 1944 plot. He was urged to commit suicide and then given a hero's burial. Stalin, another man who showed no signs of morality or a stomach for forgiving, could not afford to get rid of Zhukov in a Lubyanka cellar .

Escalation

In a radio address, Truman said, "So far, by fighting a limited war in Korea, we have prevented aggression from succeeding, and bringing on a general war…."[6] As a generalisation, it might be correct to say that MacArthur wanted to fight with more tools and in greater depth to include first, North Korea and then Manchuria. This could have led to escalation and perhaps an earlier and more crushing defeat for the UN. Since it took time for a UN build-up, a quick escalatory defeat for the Chinese was not feasible. A stepped- up bombing campaign, not backed by the presence of ground troops and control of territory was unlikely to be effective. Since this was not done, it was difficult to learn the lesson. The strategy was tried in Vietnam and failed. (However, there were several other reasons for the US' and South Vietnam's defeat at the hands of Ho Chi Minh and Giap.)

In his out of turn communiqués and other policy pronouncements, especially after Inchon, MacArthur took an excessively simplistic view of the further conduct of the war. His confidence at the conference with President Truman on Wake Island about Chinese passivity was misplaced, and yet, the bravado of his 30 Dec 1950 reply to the JCS on dealing with the Chinese was worth considering in part. Escalation had happened and the Chinese were coming! MacArthur had crossed the 38th parallel after

enthusiastic directives from a chastened post-Inchon JCS and DefSec were received [7]. Despite the rhetoric, he was not responsible for China's entry into the war. I would like to suggest that China's entry was proactive and not reactive and neither do I fully share Prof Nichol's dismissive views on Chinese strategy nor on the lack of savvy on the part of Kim Sr or Junior.[8] Even today, it is North Korea that is menacingly proactive and the US reactive. (Note. This was written in 2003, but is even more appropriate with the current Kim having tested several N-weapons and being, at least seemingly, even less vulnerable to US pressures than in 2003.)

The Atomic Threat

In a 30 Nov 1950 press conference, Truman hinted, "Naturally, there has been consideration of this subject since the outbreak of hostilities in Korea….consideration of the use of any weapon is always implicit in the very possession of that weapon." MacArthur also proposed the use of A-bombs but this was not quite in the public domain then. To quote, "MacArthur's solution was a precisely stated intention to drop an atom bomb after full notification to the North Koreans of our purposes."[9] Later, Eisenhower and Dulles also made similar pronouncements and dropped hints that this was a possibility. Bernard Brodie's four assertions on why A- bombs were not used are interesting and summarized in Halperin's article.[10] If the Soviets lacked retaliatory capacity, it was conceivable that the possible use of these weapons would have been more actively considered. As it were, the threat may have had some impact on the Chinese.

The Price of Negotiations

One of Mao's masterstrokes was the timing of the start of peace negotiations **wanting not peace but a more advantageous position**. One can discern very smart statecraft on the part of the Chinese. Show the truce flag when you have suffered minor defeats, but when your main strength is intact and when the enemy is tired, fractured, and somewhat demoralized even if he has won a few battles. UN forces were netter poised to continue the offensive, but they certainly were also politically and militarily weary. The Communists wanted to have protracted negotiations and they contrived to do this brilliantly. They withdrew their main forces generally intact. The UN coalition weakened a new administration could claim some credit for a Chamberlain style "peace in our times." **A crucial lesson from the First World War, of continuing the offensive till the truce came into force, was not applied. Time was used smartly by the Communists to consolidate Space and weaken the opposing Force**. (This alludes

to the three important military- strategic and military- operational factors of Time, Space and Force. Indian national and military strategy made brilliant use of these in the 1971 war leading to the creation of Bangladesh.) What is even more surprising is that peace negotiations during the Vietnam War also had similar characteristics even when the price that was paid was much higher. Negotiators also need to have a feel for the military situation on ground if advantage is not to be lost; a predominantly civil viewpoint may not be necessarily advantageous. Cottrell and Dougherty sum it up succinctly, "**Acceptance of the idea that the only appropriate conclusion for a limited conflict is a stalemate was a gross error,** into which the west was led by its own self-induced paralysis and by shrewd Chinese bluffing."[11] (Please see end note for the way in which these factors are relevant to the Sino- Indian situation.)

Shaky Coalitions

Another enduring lesson for limited wars (limited means and/or ends) is that coalitions are difficult to build and even harder to sustain. In the Korean war, many participants had their own axe to grind and their own reasons for preventing escalation. There were also some bilateral civil-civil /military- military tensions in this war as indeed in any other. Another aspect we may consider is that negotiations, in the face of reverses, seem even more attractive for smaller partners since they have fewer chestnuts in the fire and can transfer loss of face issues to the "big brother." Is going it alone the answer? This is not an easy one….could Vietnam have been different as a nominally UN show? Probably not. Coalition dynamics of Gulf War 1991 or even today (i.e. at the time of writing this essay in early 2003, when the US was making a case for taking down Saddam for having WMD!) underlines one important lesson for bigger powers: **allies are not necessarily friends; friends need not necessarily want to be allies.** The Soviets would have certainly concurred since they too experienced this.

Ultimately, MacArthur and Truman both faded away. **In a sense, each had managed to dismiss the other and yet their clash sheds useful light on how democracies should wage war, when they must wage war, since there actually is no substitute for victory**. (Readers of the CASS journal may enjoy my Professor's comment (George W Baer, professor-emeritus of the Dept) on the conclusion. "I hadn't quite connected to the delicious irony that in the end, Truman was defeated in the election held in the middle of the war (in 1952) BY ANOTHER FIVE STAR GENERAL, who also promised to 'end the war in Korea.'" (emphasis in the original. General of the Army Eisenhower was elected President.)

(Letter "Written" to Field Marshal Sam Manekshaw as a literary device to illustrate lessons from the Korean War on civil-military tensions for an essentially US audience)

US Naval War College
Cushing Rd, Naval Station
Newport, RI
Feb 2003

"*Dear Field Marshal Manekshaw,*

Please let me introduce myself. I am Capt Sudarshan Shrikhande, IN, in the Class of 2003 at the US Naval War College. I am enclosing a paper on the lessons of civil-military tensions during the Korean War which I hope you may find interesting at least in parts. Reading about this and other wars during the Strategy and Policy trimester and in trying to understand better "how to win wars", I was thinking about some aspects relevant to India and trying to get a better understanding of those events through this framework. I would be happy if you could share your views at some later stage.

***Political Generals**. India and the US are both vibrant and liberal democracies. The degree to which armed forces in our country are separated from politics is perhaps larger although I am sure my American classmates here might find that hard to believe not the least because so many countries have been ruled by Juntas or have had tenuous democracies. Gen MacArthur continued in command even after he became an obvious Republican. Truman had problems with such a successful general but could not do much about it, because political affiliations are acceptable perhaps. After the spectacular victory in 1971, and the creation of a new country, Bangladesh, you were as popular as PM Indira Gandhi. But I daresay that if you had shown the slightest inclination of cashing in on your prestige and "halo", by even hinting of entering politics, she would have probably sacked you and not promoted you to be the only 5-star general that we have. You could have done so after your retirement, but even that is so rare for us. I am reminded of the sacking of Air Marshal Sekhon for writing to a politician to lobby for him to become Air Chief. Everyone agrees that this is the way it should have been. Here also the principles are similar. However, the symbology is different. You may have seen on TV members of the JCS in the Capitol for a State of the Union Address. I don't think our Chiefs are ever in the Parliament or would be asked to attend any meeting where the PM is making an essentially political statement. So,*

in some ways things are different but essentially there is a separation. Like us, they have no political generals.

***Negotiations**. I can now understand better various Indian governments declining international suggestions or Pak urging bilateral talks on Kashmir unless some clear conditions are met by Pak. We have seen how truce negotiations in Korea and Vietnam contributed to a great power being left in a weaker position and how the weaker powers should be prevented from making better use of Time for gains in Space and Force. I feel it was a mistake to agree to UN truce in Kashmir in 1948 because Pak was retreating and we mistakenly felt magnanimous! Mao had learnt from this even if others had not!*

***1971 War**. The strategy adopted to fight what would inevitably be a two-front war was a wise one. You still had to leave troops along the Chinese border (a three-front war?!) It is interesting that in the East, our objective was unlimited (i.e. create conditions for a regime change, create a new country) and in the West was limited to contain any offensives and launch offensives mainly to relieve pressure. In 14 days, Bangladesh was liberated, a provisional Bengali govt was supported through this and 96,000 Pak POWs were captured after an unconditional surrender. The next day, Pakistan's plea for a ceasefire was accepted. Escalation was a military problem for you with China such a close ally of Pakistan and the US largely anti- India. We had hedged a bit for such situations by signing a Friendship pact with the Soviets. Do you think that the US was being mauled in Vietnam and thought better of getting involved in another mess especially on the side of a Pakistan that had killed several lakhs of Bengalis in nine months of civil war? The sortie of the USS enterprise CVBG into the Bay of Bengal was a gesture to the blockaded Pakistanis but probably did not have that effect either. The civ- mil interface for you must have been interesting because recent writings do seem to suggest that you said you would rather resign than listen to Mrs Gandhi's directive to prepare to go to war by May/June 1971. You felt you would be ready to fight only after Nov 1971. Characteristically, you have been silent on this and she never said anything in later years. Zhukov had also argued with Stalin about the timing of some offensives and had his way while keeping his head too! Is that why you admired him and named your home in the Coonoor hills "Stavka"?*

Sincerely,

Sudarshan Shrikhande

Author's Note

This essay was written during the author's course in 2002-03 at the US Naval War College, Newport, (Rhode Island). This unpublished paper has been adapted for the CASS Journal as a follow-up to very interesting—and sometimes charged—papers and discussions on the civil-military relationship problems in India during the PDNS Seminar in Sep 2016.

This author's view is that the problems of civ-mil relationship in India have now largely become one of equivalence, pay and protocol instead of being an instrument of more effective deterrence, war-fighting and the making of a more strategically secure India. In general, no matter how a discussion begins, it tends to be dominated by the former bug-bears. In the bargain, the "civ" has come to signify essentially the bureaucracy and hardly the political leadership which is what it is meant to be. Secondly, there is also an underlying misconception that in most OECD- type countries, the civilian bureaucracy is essentially of less consequence, and non-interfering. This is patently not so. On the other hand, instead of political control and leadership at the strategic level underscoring the very political/policy purposes of the use of the military as an instrument of policy, we have the unedifying spectre of insinuations of a military coup as alleged by the West Bengal Chief Minister! It required a pained and tersely worded letter from the Defence Minister to her to publicly set the record straight. The armed forces must remain an instrument of state policy, not victims of "politicking" as regrettably happens increasingly in India.

Further, at a time when we seem to be close to the establishment of a Permanent Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee (PCOSC)/ Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), looking back at the Korean War could be of interest. The author would like to add that some parts of the original paper have been elaborated here for the readers of this journal because it was originally written for internal circulation of faculty and peers. They would have all been expected to have done about 2000 pages of reading in the week devoted to learning lessons from the Korean War that could resonate in other conflicts as well. Readers of this journal may also like to read an "imaginary" letter written by the author to Field Marshal Manekshaw and attached to the original essay that harks back to what was a generally good-civil military relationship with a very healthy level of "good" friction between the pol and mil leaders that led to better decision making in the 1971 war.

Endnotes

1 Spannier, John W. "***The Truman- MacArthur controversy and the Korean War***." Cambridge; HUP, 1959. From the Introduction.

2 My impression, although not subjected to rigorous analysis is that, as an individual, Admiral Chester Nimitz' contribution to winning the Pacific war was superior to MacArthur's. Yet, in the peoples' eyes, MacArthur had the halo and this was useful for Washington also. He (or Admiral "Bull" Halsey who often commanded the Third Fleet in MacArthur's AOA) were good at the type of public relations often required in war. Nimitz (or Spruance) were very self-effacing but were simply better at winning than the MacArthur-Halsey combine .

3 If one may use the term, the Soviets were never surpassed at "active non-intervention" during the Cold War. They aided with materiel, money, proxies and the UN veto in many continents…..right until their own "Vietnam" in Afghanistan thus sustaining about the only major European casualties of the Cold War.

4 Gordon A Craig, ***The Politics of the German Army 1640-1945***; Oxford University Press (1955), p 196. Clausewitz might have perhaps groaned at this restrictive view of the relationship between war and politics. Clausewitz believed that war was about politics and that the political purpose of war should never be forgotten. No general or political leader could afford to compartmentalize war into neat phases of politics/ diplomacy and military actions and back to politics after military actions were over.

5 The intensity of military operations, the chaos and bloodiness of wars sometimes creates a feeling of slack political command and control over military leadership. This is actually rarely the case. The author would highly recommend Elliot A. Cohen's remarkable and very readable book, " ***Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime***", Simon & Schuster, New York (2002).

6 Richard Lowitt. "***The Truman- MacArthur Controversy***". Rand McNally, 1967, pp48. Speech of 11 Apr 1951.

7 The JCS Directive of 27 Sep 1950 had authorized MacArthur to use only South Korean troops (I feel this was a non- escalatory subtlety lost on the Chinese if they knew about it!) half way to the Yalu. Strangely, the new SECDEF, Gen Marshall directed MacArthur on 29 Sep "*We want you to feel unhampered strategically and tactically to proceed north of the 38th parallel."*

8 Lecture on 30 Jan 2003 by Prof Tom Nichols, Chairman of Department of Strategy & Policy. While an interesting talk, it could be argued that some of his assertions were very sweeping and import lost by trivializing personalities too often. For India, Kim Jong II's dictatorial and cruel rule, missile proliferation and reported nuclear weapons collusion with Pakistan, and his menacing value to the world are serious

concerns. A cavalier attitude is not likely to help us. The US barely scraped through in Korea and a stalemate could hardly have been considered satisfying. The Kims have really been smart in a distorted way!

9 Sherman Adams. ***"Firsthand Report."*** Quoted in David Rees, "***Korea, and the Limited War***".

10 Morton J Halperin. "***The Limiting Process in the Korean War".*** Reproduced in "Korea and Theory of Limited War, D.C> Heath and Co., 1967, pp92-106.

11 Alvin J Cottrell and James E Dougherty. "***The Lessons of Korea: War and the Power of Man***". Orbis II, Spring, 1958. Of course, their remarks predate Vietnam. It is this writer's view that specifically in the Indian context, China has once again contrived to brilliantly use Time to consolidate Space and Force in Tibet. All the while, a relatively weak India has preferred to play up the significance of the Peace & Tranquility symbolism while losing out on any substantial improvement of her own national- strategic situation vis-a vis China even along the land borders. Chinese forays into the IOR are further evidence of their skill in using these factors. What is especially unusual is that in Korea as well as in Vietnam, it was the weaker sides that used negotiations to strengthen their own position vis- a vis the stronger side. In the case of Sino- Indian disputes, it has been the stronger side, China, that becomes stronger by the day!

Rear Admiral Sudarshan Y Shrikhande (Retd)

RADM Sudarshan Shrikhande, commissioned July 1980; served in several ships before specialising in ASW & Sonar Weapon Engineering from the Soviet Naval War College (1985-88). Thereupon, he was ASWO & Ops officer in INS *Ranvir* for four years. He has been EXO INS Delhi, commanded IN ships *Nishank, Kora* and *Rajput.* Appointments ashore include ASW School, War Room Delhi, Director INTEG (Navy's tactical evaluation group) and as Defence Adviser (2005-08) in Australia, Fiji, Papua New Guinea, NZ and Tonga. A 1995 graduate of the Staff College, winning the Scudder Medal; Naval Higher Command Course in Mumbai (2002); the US Naval War College (2003) graduating with highest distinction while winning the *Robert Bateman* & *Jerome E Levy* individual first prizes and *James Forrestal* seminar prize. As a flag officer, he has been ACNS (Intel & Foreign Cooperation (2009-10); Chief of Staff/ SNC (2010-2012); ACIDS (Fin Plg)/HQIDS2012-14); CSO/ Strategic Forces Command (2014-15). As Flag Officer Doctrines & Concepts for the Indian Navy since November 2015, he requested and retired early on 10 July 2016. He has an M.Sc. (Weapon & Sonar Engineering); M.Sc. (Defence Studies); M.Phil (Mumbai University) and is pursuing a Ph.D. (Mumbai University). Throughout his career, he has contributed service papers, articles and has taken modules on Strategy and operational art at the Naval War College, Staff College, CAW.

Civil-Military Relations in India

Shri R Chandrashekhar

It is axiomatic that in a democracy, the Armed Forces of a nation are subordinate to its elected Government. There is no universal yardsticks to evaluate the Civilian control nor do the control mecahnisms in various democracies comform to any of the various theories of Civil Military Relations. A hallmark of the polity of Indian democracy has been that since Independence, despite numerious examples to the contrary even in the immediate vicinity, its Armed Focres have remained entirely apolitical and completely professional.

Historical Backdrop

The existing Civil–Military Relations and Higher Defence Management structures in democratic India, though broadly derived from structures that evolved during British Raj, have post independence, evolved on a unique trajectory. While the obtaining state of the 'balance' between the Civil and the Military in our nation's body politic is perceived by the Military to be congenitally skewed against it to the detriment of larger national interests, the Civil side disagrees and justifies the perceived imbalance as intrinsic to democratic traditions. This endeavour of this article is to understand the causative factors underlying these perceptions, identify faultlines and suggest correctives that would enhance and promote larger national interests.

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A recount of some landmark occurrences forms a useful historical backdrop to understand Civil Military relations in present day context. The first 'Higher Defence Management' structures in India came with the Regulating Act of 1773 that created the post of 'Governor General' in India who was supported by a Council of four members to make 'rules, ordinances and regulations for the good order and civil government' of all the Company's territories. The C-in-C was one of these members of the Council. In 1786, a 'Military Department' was constituted with the responsibility to 'communicate directions and orders of the C-in-C to the three Presidential Armies and placed under a 'Military Member' who was also a member of the Governor General's Council. Whereas the C-in-C controlled operational matters, other matters relating to the three Presidency Armies were coordinated by the Military Member. **As the C-in-C at times personally led operations, which entailed his absence from the Headquarters for extended periods, the Military Member's presence on the Council assured continued advice on matters Military to the Governor General's Council.**

A episode that defined the civil military equation in India occurred in 1832 consequent to Lt Gen Edward Barnes who served in the Staff of the Duke of Wellington, participated in the invasion of Martinique and the Battle of Vitoria, besides the Battle of Waterloo being appointed C-in-C. More significantly, he was Governor of Ceylon from 1822 to 1831 just prior to his being appointed C-in-C in India where he oversaw the building of the military road between Colombo and Kandy besides other lines of communication and conducted the first census in Ceylon, achievements classically in the realm of the 'Civil'. However, as C-in-C, he was required to function under the then Governor General Lord William Bentinck. Gen Barnes, could not accept a subordinate role and contested this position but his appeal did not find favour with the Secretary of State in London consequent to which he relinquished his Command.

The Curzon-Kitchener Standoff in 1903 is however the most quoted and significant episode. Gen Horatio Kitchener, erstwhile C-in-C in South Africa during the Boer War who was appointed C-in-C in India, ironically on the recommendation of the then Viceroy Lord Curzon himself, found the decision-making apparatus relating to the Army in India to be unsatisfactory for operational effectiveness. In his words *'the* (then) *existing system was faulty, inefficient and incapable of expansion necessary for a great war'* and sought for the appointment of 'Military Member' in the Viceroy's Council to be abolished.

Maj Gen Sir ER Ellis, the Military Member argued that the Army in India has but one head – the 'Governor General' in Council, and the 'Military Member in the Council' is the representative of the Governor General in Council in respect of all business which is not brought before the Council collectively. The Commander-in-Chief, on the other hand, commands the Army according to rule and practice. Further, he opined that *'the control and interference that the Commanderin-Chief resents is not that of the Military Member but that of the Government...'* and emphasized by stating, *'I maintain that effective criticism, not only from the financial point of view but from every aspect in which it affects other departments of the State, is not only vexatious but also necessary' adding that 'Effective criticism must entail some delay'.*

Lord Curzon, however, viewed Kitchener's plan as being one that would obliterate Civilian Authority and having potential to rise the appointment of C-in-C to that of a Military Autocrat. The matter was referred to the British Government at London where the then Prime Minister, Author Balfour, a staunch Conservative, was of the view that the ultimate authority for the governance of India rested with the House of Commons and agreed with Kitchener's standpoint.

As a consequence to acceptance of Kitchener's proposals, the Military Member was dropped from the Viceroy's Council. The C-in-C thus remained as the only Military Officer on the Council. Further, the Military Department became the 'Army Department' with Army Secretary of the rank of Major General was placed under the C-in-C.

The 1919 Army in India Committee, headed by Lord Reginald Esher viewed that as all Secretaries of the Government of India including the Army Secretary had to report directly to the Viceroy, the Army Secretary being a serving Major General, could provide the Viceroy with an additional window for obtaining advice on Military matters. **To obviate such contingency, it recommended the post of Army Secretary be held henceforth by a Civilian officer. This recommendation was accepted and officers from the Indian Civil Service were posted as the Army Secretary. This appointment was later to be re-designated and become the genesis for the present day appointment of Defence Secretary.**

Post-Independence Structures

Independence brought about a tectonic shift insofar as the Armed Forces were concerned. They were now no longer a 'theatre command' of the British Empire, with their role changing to assessing security threats the new nation India faced and securing against them. This had to be done against competing requirements for funds to fulfil social objectives of a new nation. A set of foundational decisions were initially required to be taken by the Cabinet concerned core defence-related issues, such as what the strengths of the nation's Armed Forces should be, how they should be organized, the purpose for which they would be deployed, long-term planning for their growth and development, the resources to be allocated for the purpose, etc.

The senior most Indian Military officers at the time of Independence were all young and with limited experience and exposure particularly in regard to in policy formulation. Gen KM Cariappa was only forty-eight years of age at the time of his appointment as C-in-C on 15 Jan 1949. Two years prior, in 1947, he was a Brigadier. Air Marshal Subroto Mukherjee, later to be CAS was an Air Commodore and Naval Chiefs-to-be Katari and BS Soman were both then in the rank of Captain (IN). Such 'juniority' and lack of experience required to be taken into account while formulating Command and Control Structures for Independent India's Armed Forces. Likewise, very few Indian Civil servants of the times too possessed adequate experience on Defence matters, especially aspects of policy and strategy which were formulated to suit Britain's larger global world view and applicable to meet the requirements of a new nation.

A Defence Committee of the Cabinet (DCC) was constituted on 30 Sep 1947. The DCC was chaired by the Prime Minister (also at the time the External Affairs Minister) with the Deputy Prime Minister (Home Minister), the Finance Minister and Defence Minister as its members. The Heads of the three Armed Forces were to be in attendance in all meetings of the Defence Committee of the Cabinet to provide on-the-spot clarifications and appreciation. Likewise, the Defence Secretary and the Financial Adviser (Defence) were also to be present to provide clarifications on aspects of administrative and financial aspects.

The Ismay Proposals

General Hastings Lionel "Pug" Ismay, a British Indian Army Officer and Chief of Staff to Lord Louis Mountbatten, a diplomat with unique experience of a prolonged association with higher defence structures in England

was asked to advise on how the higher defence management of for India should be organised. His credentials for the task were immaculate, having served as as Secretary of the Committee of Imperial Defence and being Chief Military Assistant and Staff Officer to Winston Churchill during the War years. After the War, Ismay worked with a Committee to draft the Statement Relating to Defence which formed the basis of reforms, earning him recognition for being the 'Chief Architect' of the post-war Ministry of Defence.

Lord Ismay went on to recommend a set of subordinate structures which would support the Defence Committee of the Cabinet and also provide a robust graded structure for coordinated decision making at various levels. These included the Defence Minister's Committee with the Defence Minister as Chairman, the C-in-C, Defence Secretary and the Financial Adviser; the Chiefs of Staff Committee, consisting of the three Service Chiefs with the responsibility to prepare Military plans and advise the Government on all operational matters and military matters in general. The COSC also became a crucial forum for coordination between the three services. There was, however, no separate Chairman for the COSC and the mantle of Chairmanship came upon the Chief who had been longest serving on the Committee. There were also numerous other subordinate Committees to support the COSC.

A separate 'Military Wing' was set up in the Cabinet Secretariat in October 1947 to function under a Deputy Secretary (Military) as its head. The incumbent for this appointment was a Services officer of the rank of Brigadier and the post was held in rotation by the three Services. The administrative control over the Military Wing was of the Cabinet Secretary. Secretariat support for all Inter-Services Committees was to be provided by the Military Wing of the Cabinet Secretariat, which thereby provided a window for the formal involvement of Services personnel in decision making.

Lord Ismay's proposals included a provision for the Service Chiefs having a 'direct access' to the Defence Committee of the Cabinet 'if necessary through the Defence Minister's Committee'. The then Defence Secretary, Shri HM Patel (later to be Finance Minister of India) strongly objected to this recommendation, perhaps because all three Service Cs-in-C at the time were British officers. The Defence Secrtetary's objections were accepted by the Defence Minister's Committee whereafter Service Chiefs had access only to the Defence Minister and only through him to the Defence Committee of the Cabinet.

The Military 'Distanced'

A series of developments followed over the next decade that had direct bearing on the functional relationship between the Ministry of Defence and the Services Headquarters. A major dilution of the position and Status of the Armed Forces took place with the issuance of the "Organisation, Functions, Powers and Procedure of Defence Headquarters, 1952" by which the Services Headquarters are not part of the Departmental structure of the Ministry of Defence but only 'Attached Offices' to the Department of Defence which, provide executive direction required in the implementation of the policies laid down by the Department to which they are attached besides serving as repositories of technical information and advise the Department on technical aspects of questions dealt by them. Though the proposal was referred to the Chairman COSC, no discussion on the same was held and Of equal significance had been the manner in which it was taken. On 27 May 1952, the Defence Secretary, HM Patel informed Gen KM Cariappa Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee of the proposal. Gen Cariappa wrote back to the Defence Secretary on 13 Jun 1952 that the Services Chiefs had strong reservations on the intended changes and that the issue should be discussed in detail. No discussion however took place and on 07 July 1952, the Cabinet Secretariat notified Gen Cariappa of Government's approval to the proposal.

The major implication of accepting the proposal is that the Ministry of Defence acquired the authority to make policy on all defence matters and strengthen their hold on virtually all aspects of administration and functioning of the Services Headquarters and through them, the Defence Services. The Services Headquarters as 'Attached Offices' had their responsibility now restricted to 'executing' the implementation of policies laid down by the Government besides serving, in terms of the Manual on Office Procedure as 'the repository of technical information and advise the Government on technical aspects of questions dealt with by them'.

After Independence, all three Service Chiefs had assumed the title "Commander-in-Chief' of their respective Services. The Constitution of India, which came into force on 26 Jan 1950, stipulated and the President of India was also the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. There was indeed a 'clash of nomenclatures' requiring resolution. In 1955, the appointments of the three Services Chiefs were re-designated as the 'Chief of the Army Staff' (General), the 'Chief of the Naval Staff' (Vice-Admiral) and the 'Chief of the Air Staff' (Air Marshal). The announcement made in Parliament by Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, quoted below, elucidates the reasons for such re-designation:

> *"It would be better if in future the designation of the Commander-inChief should be dropped and they should be called the Chiefs of Staff... It is proposed that the Heads of the Services in future be called Chief of Army Staff, Chief of the Naval Staff and Chief of the Air Staff, and in the course of a few days, orders to this effect will be issued. In some countries they do not have these Commanders-in-Chief in this manner, in fact in most countries they have some kind of Defence Councils...No doubt it may be desirable for us also to form these Councils...We are going into this matter and hope gradually to develop these Councils".*

The issue before the Chiefs of Staff now was whether they continue to be the operational Commanders of their respective Forces or be Chiefs of Staff and delegate Operational responsibility to Commanders. On their part they chose to be separate 'juridical entities' under the Army, Navy and Air Force Acts as applicable, and have a legal status outside the Government.

Krishna Menon - Thimayya Standoff

The Krishna Menon – Thimayya stand-off of the late 1950s had serious repercussions on the Civil Military balance. The prime cause of differences, besides Menon's abrasive personality, was one of perspectives. While Gen Thimayya, advocated that the strategy to be adopted by India against the two perceived enemies it faced had to be dissuasive. Krishna Menon's view was at variance. He harped on India–China friendship and saw no need for the growth of the army at the rate that Thimayya regarded to be inescapable.

While the events in this unfortunate episode have been extensively written about and debated, the takeaways from the entire episode are that the survival instinct of the political class keeps their own interests uppermost. Second, that the political class does not brook dissent, even on legitimate and valid grounds (an aspect that was evident in the dismissal of the then CNS Admiral Vishnu Bhagwat in 1998). Next, the episode concluded on the note of 'supremacy of the civil authority' being inviolate. The Chiefs were now firmly under the control of the Defence Minister. They did not formally have direct access to the Prime Minister (and therefore the Union Cabinet) without going through the Defence Minister even on matters of grave national importance.

AoB and ToB Rules 1961

The issuance of the Allocation of Business Rules and the Transaction of Business Rules 1961 over the signatures of the President of India and constitutionally the Head of the Executive also the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of India, which stipulated business allotted to the various departments of the Government had serious implications for the status of the Armed Forces. There is no mention of the Service Headquarters or their Chiefs in these Rules or their Appendices. The eventual responsibility for the defence of India or any part thereof, as per these Rules, rested on the Defence Secretary. The position of the Services Headquarters came to be that of 'executive agencies' to carry out directions of the Defence Secretary whose task it is to draft and obtain approval from the Government and communicate these for implementation to the Defence Services.

Although the Services Headquarters have been redesignated as 'Integrated Headquarters of the Ministry of Defence' upon acceptance of the Group of Ministers' Report in 2000, the cosmetics of such befuddling title befool few. In substantial terms, the 'functional relationship' and the control mechanisms of the Civil over the Military, but for a few delegations of administrative and financial authority, remains that between a controlling 'Department' and its 'Attached Office'. No substantive alteration can be deemd to have occurred without definitive amendment to the AoB and ToB Rules and specific inclusion of the Service Chiefs into the Apex structure of Government under these Rules.

Faultlines

The principal faultlines in the Civil Military matrix are first, though political control of the Military being the established principle, *de facto* it is the Civil bureaucracy and not the political class that occupies the central ground with the perceived unstated endeavour to ensure that the military leadership is marginalised and largely insulated from the political leadership. Second, and one that does little good to national interests is that the Ministry of Defence, responsible as it is for the defence of the nation, is not adequately equipped with professionally trained functionaries. In plain terms, it is a set of functionaries who have no 'specialised' exposure to matters military, its capabilities, limitations, culture or ethos, exercise effective control. Third, an aspect more within the ambit of the Services themselves is the lack of a CDS, (or even a PC COSC) which would preclude any conflict of interest exists for an incumbent Chairman COSC between that role and as the Chief of his Service.

The 'Reform' Process

Early Committees: A realisation of these and other systemic deficiencies both on principles and in practice has been there fior long. A functional appraisal of the Defence Organisation was carried out for the first time as far back in 1958 by the Estimates Committee of Parliament headed by the late Shri Balwantrai Mehta. Its Report on the 'Organisation of the Ministry of Defence and Services Headquarters' found that 'the existing system was inefficient, not making for economy or speedy decision making, ridden by considerable duplication with various segments functioning in a compartmentalised manner instead of moving jointly towards achieving common objectives'.

The Administrative Reforms Committee of 1967 for the very first time considered formally two issues which are a vortex of discussion even today - the need for an Integrated Ministry of Defence and for appointing a Chief of Defence Staff. The Commission had two Committees for Defence matters, headed each by two eminent personalities, Nawab Ali Yavar Jung and Shri SN Misra. Both these Committees considered that Integration of the Ministry of Defence and the Services Headquarters is required, but had different perceptions on the appointment of the CDS. Ali Yavar Jung visualisation of what the functional arrangement and structure was that the Services *'should retain their separate identities but all operational matters need to be coordinated and operations eventually integrated. This alone would ensure a single line of ultimate professional responsibility; without it the Services would not be able, all of a sudden, to bring about the effective unified command which is required in war. We believe there is a need for a Chief of Defence Staff who would be the coordinator and the executive at the top echelon of all the three operational commands. The structure in peacetime should conform to the requirements of war.'* Though much speculation emerged during the last few months of the tenure of General (later Field Marshal) SHFJ Manekshaw of his being appointed CDS, the opportunity was missed.

DG DPS Instituted

A major reform that sought to establish a modicum of inclusiveness across the Civil and Military divide as also to promote 'jointness' within the Services came in 1986 with the setting up of the Directorate General Defence Planning Staff. It was unique in its composition as besides representatives from the three Services, it included representatives from the Ministry of External Affairs and the Defence Research and Development Organisation and had a wide-ranging

mandate including threat analysis and formulation of threats assessments, formulation of the concept of combined operations, joint training and logistic management and coordination of Perspective plans.

Committee on Defence Expenditure

The endeavour to seek a clear road ahead for further reforms continued with the appointment, in 1990, of Shri Arun Singh, erstwhile Raksha Rajya Mantri as Chairman of a Committee on Defence Expenditure (former COAS, General K Sundarji and Shri K Subrahmanyam were its members). The Report of the CDE is not available in the public domain but it did not apparently recommend the appointment of a CDS but a Joint Chiefs of Staff be headed by an Army Commander rank officer.

Besides, the CDE also apparently recommended the integration of the Ministry of Defence with the Services Headquarters with the Defence Secretary being nominated as the Principal Administrative Adviser to the Defence Minister with functions including coordination Perspective Plans, Budgets, Overall policies for administration, accounting, parliamentary matters, interface with other Ministries and Departments. The Ministry of Defence was recommended to be reorganized to play this revised role. 'Services Boards' were recommended to be set up for the management of individual Services to improve efficiency in all functional and administrative matters. Respective Chiefs of Staff were recommended to be made responsible for all revenue expenditure in respect of their Services to allow them flexibility and speedy decision making.

Kargil Review Committee

The Kargil Review Committee, set up post the Kargil War inter alia recognised that (in the then prevailing structure), "*the Prime Minister and the Defence Minister do not have the benefit of views and expertise of the Army Commanders and their equivalents in the Navy and Air Force so that higher level defence management decisions are more consensual and broad based.... Locating Services headquarters in the government would in fact further enhance civilian supremacy, not dilute it*". It also strongly felt that the obsolete system bequeathed by Lord Ismay be re-examined and for the entire gamut of national security management and apex decision making and the structure and interface between the Ministry of Defence and the Armed Forces headquarters be comprehensively studied and re-organized.

Task Force on Management of Defence

The Task Force on Management of Defence, set up to examine the recommendations of the Kargil Review Committee and headed, by Shri Arun Singh, the former Minister of State for Defence who had also headed the earlier Committee on Defence Expenditure (CDE). This Task Force agreed with the Kargil Review Committee on the need for restructuring of the Defence apparatus, but differed on how this needs to be achieved. At the centre of the Reforms was the need to create the appointment of the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) as also the Integrated Defence Staff (IDS), creation of a tri-services command at Andaman and Nicobar Command (ANC) and the Strategic Forces Command (SFC). The other aspect was the integration of the Services Headquarters with the Ministry of Defence.

Arun Singh's own belief was that *'there are two broad components to this [civil-military] relationship – those involving the strategic and tactical issues concerning military operations where the advice must come predominantly from the military with the civil service component of MOD providing a historical background and an inter-ministerial view and matters involving issues like acquisitions, personnel, budgeting, and a host of similar issues where the Civil MOD inputs can be vital for the political leadership in assessing military advice'.*

Group of Ministers' Report

The Group of Ministers' Report of 2000, headed by the then Deputy Prime Minister Shri LK Advani, recommended some far reaching measures. It accepted that the COSC has not been effective in fulfilling its mandate and needed to be strengthened by the addition of a CDS and a Vice-Chief of Defence Staff (VCDS) to provide single-point Military Advice to the Government inter alia enable requisite 'jointness' amongst the Services, enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of the Planning Process through Intra and Inter-Service Prioritisation and to ensure, at the same time, it stressed that there be no dilution in the role of the Defence Secretary as the 'Principal Defence Adviser' to the Defence Minister and that the appointment should be officially designated in standing orders as the 'Principal Defence Adviser' and rank primus inter pares among the secretaries in the MoD. On the issue of restructuring the Ministry iof Defence, the Committee viewed that '*... dynamic and rapidly changing security environment, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) needs to be suitably restructured and strengthened. Far reaching changes in the structures, processes, and procedures in Defence Management would be*

required to make the system more efficient, resilient, and responsive. This would also ensure the maximisation of our defence capabilities through the optimal utilisation of our resources, potential, and establishment of synergy among the Armed Forces'. The GOM Report had been accepted by the Government in all aspects except the appointment of the CDS for which a wider political consultation and consensus was felt necessary and which has not been achieved.

Naresh Chandra Task Force

A significant segment of Services Officers community viewed the very institution of the Naresh Chandra Task Force to be with the silent intent to scuttle the recommendation for appointing the CDS. Though its recommendations are not in the public space, the NCTF appears to have stopped half-way house proposing the appointment of a Permanent Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee (PC COSC) who would coordinate and prioritize long-term procurement plans, administer tri-services institutions and agencies, the A&N Command as also other Commands such as the Special Forces Command. The PC COSC would also provide single-point military advice to the Government with direct access to the Raksha Mantri. Equally pertinent, from the perspective of Civil Military Relations, are the proposals for the Services HQ being given a specific role under the AOB and TOB Rules 1961, with the responsibility for the defence of the country being placed on the Services rather than on the Defence Secretary as at present. It further recommended that Service Chiefs also to have direct to the Raksha Mantri on individual service aspects and importantly that Services Headquarters are to be designated as 'Departments' of the Government of India under the Ministry of Defence, with the internal administration of each department being under the respective Vice Chiefs. To give substance to this, the NCTF has also recommended the induction of Military personnel into the Ministry of Defence.

Way Ahead

To set the Civil Military 'balance' on an even keel on which both the 'administrative genius' of the civil and the 'professionalism of the military' are harnessed to best effect in the interest of the nation, there is firstly, a need for a clear, holistic visualization of 'Comprehensive National Power' and the role of Military therein. The objectives to be achieved by the military should be clearly and unambiguously expostulated and disseminated to the general public.

Second, the policies and principles of how the Military is to be used as 'an instrument of power to meet national objectives' must be clearly articulated. The example of Russia's Military Doctrine (available in the public domain) is often mentioned as the appropriate form of public statement that expounds in clear lucid terms the role of the military, its professional objectives and its command and control structure.

Third, the National Security Architecture must be such as to maximally harness the professional capabilities, domain knowledge and experience of the military, particularly its participation in the decision making process.

A good start point to initiating further reforms to this end would be to empower Military Commanders. Once decision /directions have been to the military, the primacy of command over the 'follow up' to execute must thereafter rest solely with the military. For this, the roles of the Service Chiefs and Chairman COSC as Advisors, Planners and Executors of military operations require to be clearly defined and included in the AoB and ToB Rules.

The Military sees some hope in the various proposals made by the Group of Ministers and by the Naresh Chandra Task Force. Though the recommendations of the latter are widely perceived by the military to be merely cosmetic, yet achieving even the half-way house, in present circumstances, is a move forward. What the Services seek is in essence, their inclusion as an integral part of the national government superstructure.

The paucity of domain knowledge in the Ministry of Defence, especially in operations related Divisions is obvious. While 'inputs' are no doubt obtained from the concerned Branches of the Services HQs, a stage of analysis follows where raw untrained non-military minds 'process' the information to formulate options for action or policies. Apprehensions of the Services 'creeping' into the Ministry of Defence are misplaced as decision making, in any case, remains squarely the domain of the Civilian Authority.

While on the one side Services have been urging appropriate institutional and procedural changes to enable their being included in the decision making structures and processes, certain constraining factors lie within their own domain. Here the Services have to accept some part of the blame as some or other of them as at various times, one or other of them have resisted significant reforms to infuse substantial Jointness such as instituting a common 'Armed Forces Act', common Human Resource management principles and procedures, joint Administrative Structures and Command and Control systems. Even on issues of common tri-service concern, such as the Pay Commission issues, in the words of a senior officer, 'they choose to work together, but not as one'.

There is hence still a long uncharted path ahead on which Civil Military Relations in India have to tread to reach a destination of a ' dynamic balance' and confluence of the experiential and professional skill sets of both. Acceptance of the NCTF Report on these aspects, though not correcting the civil military 'balance' to the extent recommended by the GOM Report, would meet some of the aspirations of the Military and place it on a higher platform to seek further correctives to the imbalance in the time to come.

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Shri R Chandrashekhar

Shri R Chandrashekhar, former member of the Armed Forces Headquarters Civil Service held a unique string of select appointments during his thirty-five year career including extended tenures in the Chief of Army Staff Secretariat, which provided him a ring side view of the dynamics of Civil Military Relations as they played out. His is an alumni of the Fergusson College and the Gokhale Institute of Politics and Economics Pune, he has attended the Executive Course at the Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies at Honolulu, Hawaii USA. Post his superannuation in 2013 as Additional Director General in 2013, he is presently Senior Fellow at the Centre for Joint Warfare Studies, New Delhi. An ardent student of Civil Military Relations, his book ' Rooks and Knights Civil Military Relations in India' is regarded as a seminal treatise on the subject.

India's Water Security: Comprehending the Complexities

Dr Uttam Kumar Sinha

Value of water

There is an adage that says that you don't know the true worth of water till the wells run dry. For that matter even the 'Blue Planet', as the earth is referred, has an instructive irony to its description. It tells us the value of water which we often tend to ignore. While water covers 73 per cent of the planet only 3 per cent is fresh water, of which 2 per cent is held in ice caps and glaciers. The remaining 1 per cent in the form of rivers, streams, lakes, ponds, swamps and marshes, is non-frozen, salt-free and accessible for human consumption. This amount also includes the ground water available.

The dependence of society on groundwater resources is also growing rapidly. Globally, groundwater account for about 50% of pumping for drinking water, and 20% for irrigation. In India, 80% of agricultural production depends on groundwater and in the arid and semi-arid zones, 60% of the water used for irrigation comes from groundwater.[1] Knowledge on groundwater resources is

1 *Water, a shared responsability*. The United Nations World Water Development Report 2, Paris, UNESCO Publishing, 2006, p. 128.

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also not exact. For example, are aquifers determined by political boundaries? What exactly are their renewal flows and their stocks? What impact does groundwater have on surface water (river flows, precipitations infiltration, groundwater pollution, etc.)? Importantly, how fast do they replenish?

We live in a world with limited availability of water, which is unevenly distributed. There is approximately the same amount of water on earth today as when it was formed. Since we cannot create more water than what nature provides us or discover it like oil, the 'Blue Planet' teach us not to be wasteful and manage water optimally. As global economic activity and development continues, increase in water demand will be compounded by the decreasing availability of water resources in most major hydraulic basins, either because of deterioration in quality or quantity. This drop in availability affects surface water in a visible and immediate way, and leads to further enhancing the value of groundwater. Competition for groundwater becomes an additional factor of social and political instability, both internally and regionally.

The following facts make water a challenging issue. First, water is indispensable and the ultimate renewable resource. Second, water is being severely impacted by global population increase and economic growth. Together they are extracting and polluting it faster than it can be replenished. Third, the ever-expanding gap between demand and supply potentially make water a contested issue particularly in densely populated countries. Fourth, since disputes over water are inevitable because of the changes, as described above, understanding the processes of resolution and framing new mechanisms and approaches becomes a necessity.

Water is also an unruly resource and a source of instability because sovereignty over water is not determined by formal international law. Water, unlike oil, is a trans-boundary resource. A large volume of water—over 90 per cent, crosses international borders. It is difficult to determine whether water is a 'public good' (defined as non-rival and non-excludable) or 'private good' (defined as rival and excludable). Such amorphous definitional demarcation subjects trans-boundary rivers to various interpretations. That said, there is, a general view to perceive it as 'collective good' or 'common pool resource.' 1966 Helsinki Rules on the Uses of Waters of International Rivers and the 1997 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, are useful guideposts setting norms and principles on sharing waters between states determined by watershed limits of the system of waters.

The World Bank in its several studies and reports indicate that the overall

water demand for India will increase from 552 BCM (Billion Cubic Metres) to 1050 BCM by 2025, which will require the use of all available water resources in the country. The per capita water availability according to the World Bank has dropped from over 5,000 cubic metres per year in 1947 to less than 2,000 cubic metres per year in 1997 and by 2025, this figure will further drop to 1,500 cubic metres per year, which is well below the level at which water stress is considered to occur. India's 20 major river basins, according to various studies, are below the water scarcity threshold of 1,000 cubic metres per year.

The Mckinsey Report (2009) suggests that by 2030, water demand in India will grow to almost 1.5 trillion m3, principally driven by population growth and the domestic need for rice, wheat and sugar. According to the Report, the current water supply is approximately 740 billion m3. Clearly, the drivers of future water challenge are essentially tied to development and economic growth with the agriculture sector as the largest water withdrawer. The interplay of food, energy and water (FEW) within the complex context of population increase, rising standards of living and resource constraints poses interlocking challenges to sustainable environmental policies.

Constitutional and Legal Perspective

The legal framework of water in India is diverse and has been developed over a long period of time. It draws elements from ancient local customs and traditions and during the Colonial times laws on irrigation was framed. International conventions such as the Helsinki Rules and the 1997 UN Convention also strengthen the water laws. Principles and norms of 'equitable share' and 'no significant harm' help in dealing with inter-provincial disputes. Discourses such as 'water as a human right' and maintaining the 'environmental flow' has equally influenced water laws in India.

Constitutionally water is a state subject (Entry 17 in the State List). Central intervention comes in when there is an inter-provincial water dispute. The provisions (Entry 56 in the Union List) are clearly laid out in the Rivers Board Act (1956) and the Inter-State River Water Disputes Act (1956). The latter empowers the Centre to set up tribunals to adjudicate disputes over water sharing. The Centre can also intervene in the interest of protecting the environment or for developing a water basin "expedient in the public interest" by enacting a law to give the Union the legislative power over the river. No law till date has been passed to bring any river under the Union. Water has

thus been divided in the Constitutional scheme with the Centre and the State having the power to legislate over various aspects and demonstrating in the process the separation of power. Placing water as a State subject was part of the federal exercise to deepen and wider democracy. Since water and people are closely related and connected religiously and culturally it was only appropriate for water to be decentralized.

There has emerged recently the debate whether water should be put in the Concurrent List and whether by doing so would mean centralization. In fact it opens up the old debate of whether the constitutional provisions over water need to be relooked. Some earlier commissions, particularly the Sarkaria Commission, constituted to look at the Centre-State relations have not favoured any changes. In times of coalition politics, greater claim for decentralization and enhancing federalism, shifting water to the Concurrent List would clearly be a retrograde step. Water experts like Ramaswamy Iyer strongly feel that the enabling provisions of Entry 56 should be fully utilized and the Rivers Board Act be activated.[2]

There also has been considerable development on the aspect of human right to water and water rights. However, both are legally and conceptually different. First, though not incorporated explicitly in the Constitution, there is a fundamental right to water for every person in India that has been judicially evolved over the years. For example, 'Right to life' under Article 21 has been interpreted as an entitlement for 'pollution free' and 'safe drinking' water for every person. The closest that the law makers have come to incorporating right to water as a fundamental right was when the National Commission in 2002 recommended that a new Article 30D be inserted in the Constitution. It has yet to be enacted.[3] The fundamental right to water may not be forever elusive. After all the right to education of a child from 6-14 years of age was also judicially evolved and eventually became a fundamental right under Article 21A.

Second, the Constitutional space relevant for water rights and management is expressed through parts IX and IXA of the 73rd and 74th Amendments that came into effect in 1993. The two amendments brought in local self governance as an enforceable ideal and obliges states to create local bodies to "function

2 Ramawamy R Iyer, "Should water be moved to Concurrent List?", The Hindu (New Delhi), June 18, 2011.

3 Videh Upadhaya. "Water Rights and the 'New' Water Laws in India". India Infrastructure Report, 2011, p.57-58

as institutions of self government" in rural and urban areas. The *panchayats* as institutions of self governance were given power and authority and subjects like drinking water, water management and even minor irrigation and watershed development came under jurisdiction of the *panchayats*. In the urban areas, municipalities were given similar powers of self governance looking after matters like water supply for domestic, industrial and commercial purposes. The 73rd and 74th amendments led to what is described as "inspired changes" in the *panchayats*, municipal corporation and municipal council laws leading to responsibility and accountability in the services provided particularly water.

National Water Policies

In India water security has been high on the national agenda. Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh's 2004 Independence Day speech highlighted the importance of water. He identified water as one of the *saat sutras* requiring special attention. The Prime Minister said:

"Water is a national resource, and we have to take an integrated view of our country's water resources, our needs and our policies and water utilization practices. We need to ensure the equitable use of scarce water resources…I urge you and all our political leaders to take a national and holistic view of the challenge of managing our water resources."

India has a range of data reports on water. At the national level, a National Water Policy 1987 was drafted and later, in 1999, a comprehensive document titled "Integrated Water Resource Development: A Plan for Action", was published by the Ministry of Water Resources. It provided a comprehensive summary of data, problems and policies. This was followed by an updated and revised National Water Policy 2002. One of the latest document on water is from the Prime Minister's Council on Climate Change, of June 2008, entitled, "National Action Plan of Climate Change (NAPCC)". It envisages eight national missions of which the National Water Mission is central to the action Plan. It states:

A National Water Mission will be mounted to ensure integrated water resources management helping to conserve water, minimise wastage and ensure more equitable distribution both across and within states. The Mission will take into account the provisions of National Water Policy and develop a framework to optimize water uses and by increasing water use efficiency by 20 per cent through regulatory mechanisms and differential entitlements and pricing.

The more recent national water document based on new understanding and knowledge and a unified national perspective is the National Water Policy 2012. It relooks, reconsiders and candidly observes some of the earlier water approaches and management practices. For example, it says:

With a growing population and rising needs of a fast developing nation as well as the given indications of the impact of climate change, availability of utilizable water will be under further strain in future with the possibility of deepening water conflicts among different user groups.[4]

It further says:

Low consciousness about the scarcity of water and its life sustaining and economic value results in its mismanagement, wastage, and inefficient use, as also pollution and reduction of flows below minimum ecological needs. In addition, there are inequities in distribution and lack of a unified perspective in planning, management and use of water resources.[5]

Significantly it states that internal water management cannot be delinked from the external water approaches:

Inter-regional, inter-State, intra-State, as also inter-sectoral disputes in sharing of water, strain relationships and hamper the optimal utilization of water through scientific planning on basin/sub-basin basis.[6]

More recent has been the Draft National Water Framework Bill, 2016, proposed as model legislation and to be adopted by states through a broad national consensus. Although India has low per capita water consumption; it lags in the efficient use of water across sectors. Continued population growth and the impact of global warming along with inadequate conservation and huge wastage are putting enormous pressure on water resources. The various revised documents suggest that India's policy exercise on water issues is responding to the ground realities

External Dynamics

Trans-boundary rivers are a significant part of the freshwater biome. There are about 260 river basins of which 200 are shared by two or more countries

4 Draft national water policy (2012) as recommended by national water Board in its 14th meeting held on 7th june, 2012 see http://mowr.Gov.In/writereaddata/linkimages/draftnwp2012_english9353289094.Pdf

5 Ibid

6 Ibid

with roughly 145 sharing treaties in existence.[7] Since most of the rivers are trans-boundary in nature originating from, flowing through and draining into territorially defined boundaries, riparian relations will always be critical. Given that states as actors operate within the constraints of an international system that essentially remains anarchic and that states are not only "guardians of their own security and independence"[8] but also 'rational egoists',[9] water can assume hegemonic attribution. As major parts of the globe experience high levels of water-stress, the water sector is likely to get contentious. The possession or capture and control of water resources can easily lead to aggressiveness and can equally translate into power and dominance.

South Asia and the Hydrology

South Asia is home to about 34 per cent of Asia's population (1/6th of world's population) and has about 4 per cent of world's annual renewable water resources that flows through several river basins.[10] Almost 95 per cent of water in the region is consumed by the agriculture sector as compared to the world's average of 70 per cent. Except for Nepal and Bhutan, the per capita water availability is falling below the world average. It is projected that the per capita water availability in India is rapidly declining. For the year 2025 at a projected population of 1.3 billion, the water availability will be 1341 cubic meter/person/year.[11]

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7 *Trans-boundary Freshwater Dispute Database*, Oregon University. http://www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu/database/interfreshtreatdata.html

8 J. Spanier, *Games Nations Play: Analysing International Politics*, 3rd edition, New York, Praeger Publishers, 1978, p.11

9 According to Joseph Grieco, "…Neoliberals see states as 'rational egoists' interested in their own utility, while realist view states as what I describe as 'defensive positionalists' interested in achieving and maintaining relative capabilities sufficient to remain secure and independent in the self help context of international anarchy". See Grieco, "Understanding the problems of International Cooperation: The Limits of Neoliberal Institutionalism and the Future of Realist Theory" in David Baldwin, *Neorealism and Neoliberalism*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1993, 303

10 Freshwater Under Threat: South Asia, UNEP Report, 2008

11 Population Growth and Per Capita water Availability in India. 1951, 1955, 1991, 2001, 2025 and 2050. Details available at: http://www.indiastat.com/table/percapitaavailability/24/watersupply/18198/365176/data.aspx. Also see, *Water: The India Story*, Report by Grail Research and World Bank Report, *India's Water Economy: Bracing for a Turbulent Future*, 2005

Of significant importance is the fact that planning any water resource utilisation policy will have to take into account the assessment of the impact of climate change in terms of seasonal flow and extreme events. In both direct and indirect ways climate change is related to water as is evidenced through floods, drought and glacial melt.

South Asia with its rising population, increasing urbanization and unchecked poverty has added enormous pressure to the existing water sources and with no proportional increase in availability, water challenges seem imminent. The trans-boundary nature of water as seen through the rivers that crisscross the South Asian states makes it intensely political and contentious while simultaneously creates opportunities for hydro-cooperation. Hydro-politics will increasingly factor in state dynamics both *between* (inter) and *within* (intra). The intricately interconnected nature of these challenges requires both macro and micro-level collaborations such as integrated water management efforts between governments.

South Asian states will have to juggle competing and conflicting food-energy-water (FEW) concerns, yielding a set of difficult consequences. A "perfect storm" of food-energy-water shortages by 2030 has already been predicted.[12] These sets of critical drivers will present difficult-to-manage outcomes and will reinforce each other as never before.

Himalaya hydrology

The impact of climate change on water resources is growing dangerously stronger. The Hindu Kush Himalaya (HKH) mountain system with its high altitude, snow, ice, permafrost and precipitation is being affected by increasing global warming. The HKH is regarded as the Third Pole because the region has the world's largest volume of glacial ice and perennial snow outside the two poles – Antarctic and Arctic. Some of the major rivers that originate from the HKH – the Indus, the Ganga, the Brahmaputra, the Salween and the Mekong are undergoing dramatic changes in their flow pattern. These rivers fed by glacier and snow melt and precipitation provide the region with the most valuable freshwater. Downstream millions are dependent on the waters from these rivers for domestic use, agriculture, energy and industry.

12 As noted by John Beddington, UK Chief Scientist on March 18, 2009. http://www.guardian.co.uk/science/2009/mar/18/perfect-storm-john-beddington-energy-food-climate

In the Himalaya, according to the recent studies carried out by the International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development (ICIMOD), temperatures are rising faster than the global average. The study further points that the monsoon is suspected to become longer with more erratic precipitation, which means more floods and droughts. It is estimated that the volume of water in the river system of the Indus, Ganga and the Brahmaputra is not going to decrease until 2050. An effective adaptation policy therefore is urgently required to minimize far-reaching consequences for livelihood and the agricultural dependent rural community based on both the floods and drought situation.

ICIMOD based in Kathmandu forms the backbone of regional cooperation on science studies and adaptive policies in the Himalayas but there remain many knowledge gaps that need to be filled with greater research coordination and knowledge integration and synthesis amongst various institutions and research centres. For example, the present state of knowledge is inadequate in identifying and assessing the magnitude of potential outbreaks of glacial lake outburst flood or GLOF. In Nepal a GLOF event was observed in 1981 that damaged the only road link from Nepal to China and the 1985 another GLOF event destroyed a small hydroelectric project. According to the latest ICIMOD assessment there are about 200 glacial lakes in the HKH region that are "potentially dangerous": (25 in Bhutan, 77 in China, 30 in India, 20 in Nepal, and 52 in Pakistan). The ICIMOD keeps an inventory of 8,700 glacial lakes in the region. Glacial lakes are recognized as a threat to mountain areas worldwide. These are spectacular formations due to the impact of warming. The lakes form as glacial melt-water collects behind ridges of loose rock debris called moraines that were deposited by the glaciers themselves.

Countries in the region with trust deficit can easily misinterpret these natural hazards as intentional and deliberate. Regional cooperation will need to factor in enhanced and updated forms of an automated early warning system. Also upgraded remote sensing projects are important for flood warning systems because they can detect small changes in lake levels and send immediate signals to alarm systems near villages. These are under process but greater coordination is required at the political level particularly in treating river systems like the Ganga-Brahamaputra-Meghna and the Indus holistically and reorienting hydro-diplomacy on a multilateral basis than just a bilateral format. This would entail a shift from 'sharing waters' to 'sharing benefits'. Ecological considerations should be the overarching perspective. In the past the dominant perspective was engineering and economics now the emphasis should be on ecology and climate

change. Keeping the principle of just and wise-use of water, sensible riparian policies can be framed both internally and externally.

With an additional 500 million people expected in the next 10 years in the Himalayan watershed states, the stress on food, energy and water resources will only increase. It is thus important to understand the Himalayan region as a climate system and the impact that it can have on food production, livelihood, and migration and thereby the political stability in the region.

Over the next 20 years, perceptions of a rapidly changing ecosystem in all likelihood will prompt nations to take unilateral actions to secure resources and territorial sovereignty. Any willingness to engage in greater river basin cooperation will depend on a number of factors, such as the behavior of other competing countries, the economic viability, and other interests that states are reluctant to either compromise or concede.

Importance of China's hydrological position

China is a dominant upper riparian and has taken several unilateral actions to secure water resources and territorial sovereignty. Given that the major rivers flow from the Tibetal plateau including the Brahmaputra, Sultjes and the many tributaries of the Ganga, therefore from a hydrological perspective China cannot be ignored from the South Asian regional configuration. While China is not member of the SAARC (South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation) it gained observer status along with Japan, South Korea and the US in 2009. Increasingly, and as India's neighbouring countries like Bangladesh, Pakistan and Nepal would like, China is making its presence felt in South Asia and in the process competing directly with India which considers the region to be its sphere of influence.

From a hydrological position, India is a lower riparian vis-à-vis China and an upper riparian vis-à-vis Pakistan and Bangladesh. An emphasis that has not been correctly articulated is the fact that India is middle riparian and has concerns over water uses with China and responsibility of sharing waters with its lower riparian neighbours. China's hydrological position, on the other hand, is one of complete upper riparian supremacy. India's middle riparian position increases its dependency on the head waters of the rivers sources such as Indus, Sutlej and Brahmaputra which originate in the Tibetan plateau. Of the nine major tributaries of the Ganges that flow in from Nepal, the three principal tributaries Karnali, Gandaki and Kosi rise from Tibet.

China is equally water insecure but its insecurity relates to the disproportionate availability or uneven distribution of waters within its territory, the majority of which is in the south (Tibet Autonomous Region) with the north excessively water stressed. China suffers from an annual shortage of 40 billion cubic meters of water and is expected to face 25 per cent supply gap for projected water demand by 2030.[13] More than anything else, the water shortage becomes an impediment to China's goal of meeting food production and challenges the leadership claims to self-sufficiency in food grains. Electricity is equally crucial in China's economic development.

With a GDP pegged high, China's energy requirement is projected to increase by 150 per cent by 2020. While resource rich in coal and a net importer of oil, both climate unfriendly, China is compelled to develop its hydroelectricity as a clean and renewable source of energy. China has already half of the world's large dams including the Three Gorges. China's dams and water diversions are an important component of its rise. Its 'hydroegoism' or 'hydroaggression' is intended to secure its massive water requirements for economic development. But importantly the control over such a valuable natural resource gives Beijing enormous strategic latitude with its neighbours.[14]

It will be fundamentally important therefore to structure a broader water dialogue with China on the Brahmaputra and to also bring in other basin partners like Bhutan and Bangladesh. The rapidly changing Himalayan hydrology will require genuine willingness of states to engage in greater river basin cooperation and evolve new mechanisms and approaches to channelize water in the subregional economic development. The BCIM (Bangladesh-China-India and Myanmar) economic corridor; the BBIN (Bangladesh-Bhutan-India and Nepal) sub-regional connectivity; and the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral, Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) among nations in the coast of Bengal including Bangladesh, Bhutan, Nepal. India, Sri Lanka, Myanmar and Thailand provide a platform for knowledge integration and implementation. Hydrological knowledge will be key to broader development and economic prosperity.

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13 Mckinsey Report, 'Charting our Water Future', November 2009.

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Conclusion: Comprehensive understanding of water

Water requirement has undoubtedly emerged as an issue of great concern and urgency. With multiplying demand on water, the availability of which remains constant, water hardship is impending. A comprehensive water policy for the South Asian states would need to take into account the rapidly changing water conditions, in terms of quality, quantity, and the uneven distribution of water. The role of enforcement and monitoring agencies like the EIA (Environment Impact Assessment) needs to be effectively enforced in respective countries. The purposeful participation of the civil-society will be equally crucial for greater awareness and balance of development and water resources.

Much of the past policies on water were narrowly framed on the principle of 'water management' that entails manipulation of water for specific uses through water-based projects. Clearly, a more comprehensive policy for protection, development, and utilization of water resources—including both surface and underground water—is being debated and developed – a shift to a more rational and integrated 'water resource management' that treats water bodies as one hydrological unit embracing the 'conjunctive use' of both surface and underground water resources and their sustainable development.

Sub-regional cooperation with its larger emphasis on economic development will need to factor in the impact of climate change. The cooperative framework would require enhanced and updated automated early warning system and remote-sensing projects, which are critical for improving flood warning systems. While building such capacity is important, local knowledge and indigenous understanding are immensely important to the overall assessment. Thus a lot of fresh thinking based on evolving hydrological knowledge and understanding is required—thinking that is sincere, evidential, and scientific; and not alarmist, rhetorical, and misrepresented.

Some of the impacts of climate change are already being observed with glacial melt, seismic activity, and unpredictable weather patterns. States would need to reorient their riparian polices on a multilateral basis. While, on the one hand, a shift from merely 'sharing waters' to 'sharing benefits' is necessary, on the other, it is imperative not to lose sight of the ecological consideration.

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He is also the author of the book *Riverine Neighbourhood: Hydro-politics in South Asia* (Pentagon Press, 2016). Some of his other recent edited volumes include: *The Modi Doctrine: New Paradigms in India's Foreign Policy* (Wisdom Tree, 2016); *Non-Traditional Security Challenges in Asia: Approaches and Responses* (Routledge 2015), and *Emerging Strategic Trends in Asia* (Pentagon Press, 2015). His works on the Arctic include an edited volume, *Arctic: Commerce, Governance and Policy* (Routledge, 2015) and a monograph *Climate Change Narratives: Reading the Arctic* (IDSA, 2014).

Regulatory Framework for Acoustic Habitat Degradation in the Indian Ocean Region

Dr (Cdr) Arnab Das

Introduction

India sees a massive transformation in many ways than we can imagine. The fundamental transformation is probably in governance and the attitude in governance. The recent climb in our global ranking in ease of doing business, substantial update in our regulatory framework for multiple sectors and aspects, transparency in the banking and financial sector, Digital India initiative and most recently the demonetization are indicators of a paradigm shift. We are looking at a system driven institutionalized governance mechanism rather than ad-hoc political party and ideology-driven government that shifts gears post every regime change. These are signs of a mature democracy and a modern system.

Post independent India has failed to recognize its maritime potential and struggled to exploit its maritime nation status in many ways than one. The blue economic possibilities have remained unexplored, and its contribution to the GDP has been abysmally low. No global power in the world has risen to its stature without a major contribution from its maritime

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sector. Politically, we have ignored the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) and failed to take any leadership role in the region, resulting in extra-regional powers getting involved in the internal issues of security and power sharing. Regulatory frameworks have remained a casualty and majority of aspects remain unregulated giving a free hand to extra-regional powers and non-state actors to indulge in all kinds of activities.

There is a significant maritime push from the present government and massive infrastructure projects for building the maritime capabilities and capacity are being seen in the recent past like the *Sagarmala* project and much more. Incentives to the shipping and shipbuilding industry as part of the "Make in India" have energized the maritime sector to contribute to the GDP growth. Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) norms have also been relaxed to favor growth in the sector. The recent Essar-Rosneft deal will further boost demand and the associated blue economy in the IOR. The growing maritime activities in the IOR have a critical impact on the marine eco-system. The increasing anthropogenic noise can cause catastrophic degradation to the marine environment as seen recently in the two big whale stranding off the west coast as reported in figure 1.

Fig. 1 Two consecutive big whale stranding reported recently off the west coast.
Left: 40 ft blue whale stranded and died off Alibaug in Jun2015.
Right: 50 ft giant bryde whale washes up dead off Juhu beach in Jan 2016.

The initiative for arresting habitat degradation has to start from improved awareness of the undersea domain. The concept of Underwater Domain Awareness (UDA) encompasses our ability to monitor each and every

development in the undersea domain of the maritime space and even build situational awareness to the extent that we can prevent any development from taking the shape of an event. There are broadly four stakeholders that would be directly relevant to the UDA concept. The first is the security apparatus involved in ensuring territorial integrity from external threats and also internal threats from non-state actors both within and outside. The second would be the corporate entities involved in the blue economy for commercial exploration and exploitation of the maritime space and resources. The third stakeholder would be the science and technology people like oceanographers, marine science experts, technology providers, etc., engaged in generating an enhanced understanding of the undersea domain and providing tools and systems to improve access. The last but not the least stakeholder would be the marine environment related people involved in regulating and disaster management.

In this work, we focus on the acoustic habitat degradation in the IOR as a result of the heightened maritime activities and attempt to recommend a roadmap for sustainable growth in the region. The acoustic habitat degradation is a complex issue specifically for formalizing a regulatory framework and requires significant Underwater Domain Awareness (UDA). UDA at its heart mandates high levels of acoustic capacity to monitor every situation in the undersea domain. The IOR with its tropical shallow characteristics further presents unique challenges for ensuring reasonable acoustic capabilities. The socio-economic aspects also need careful considerations when we look at regulatory provisions, the impact of political regime (democracy or otherwise) and the Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) could be a good formulation. Multiple aspects require deliberations, and we have considered some of these in this work.

Acoustic Habitat Degradation

Acoustic signals or sound is the only signal that propagates efficiently underwater, so all exchange/processing of information is largely done using sound. The naturally occurring sound in the oceans creates a soundscape that the marine species use as a clue for making sense of the environment around them. However, the manmade sound or the anthropogenic sound does interfere with the perception of the environment by these species. It is well known that the majority of the marine species use acoustic vision to sense the environment around them, unlike the terrestrial creatures that use optical vision.

The biologically critical functions like foraging, navigation, communication, breeding, etc., are important for the survival and health of a species. Any disruptions in these could mean depletion in the population count and subsequent extinction. Marine species use multiple types of calls like clicks, whistles, moans, etc. The clicks are two-way acoustic signals generated as part of the biosonar for echolocation of prey for foraging and even navigation by sensing the environment around. The increasing noise in the marine environment interferes with their ability to deploy biosonars. The whistles are one-way signals used to communicate between the members of the species and more importantly communication between mother and calves. The other types of signals are used to indicate danger from predators, navigation clues and even to attract possible mating partners. Such interference with the use of sound by the animal is termed as masking.

In addition to masking, there is more direct harm caused by high levels of anthropogenic noise. Higher levels of ambient noise can compel the animals to migrate from their natural habitat causing stress and deprivation in many ways. Migration to deeper waters could have a deleterious impact on the health of these species in the short term, and possible population impacts the long term. High sound levels have the ability to cause very serious health hazards like internal bleeding leading to fatalities. Additionally, there are several indirect impacts as well that can degrade the ability of the species to survive and maintain its population abundance in its natural habitat. Acoustic habitat degradation is a term that refers to change in the sound levels of the marine habitat that directly or indirectly has an adverse impact on the population size of the species.

When we discuss the manifestation of acoustic habitat degradation, the most striking and visible one is the stranding of marine mammals recorded globally. Other manifestations typically escape human notice due to poor access to the marine environment. To establish the source-path-receiver correlation, we elaborate on the sources of noise in the ocean and the possible habitat degradation caused by them. The noise source that has caused the maximum number of the direct stranding of marine mammals, particularly whales has been attributed to sonars. The naval sonars spread over low, mid and high-frequency bands directly fall in the hearing frequency range of multiple species. Sonar transmissions in close range of these marine mammals cause hemorrhage, disorientation and subsequent stranding in the nearby coast often resulting in fatalities. Such stranding has generated significant public outcry and political attention.

The oil and gas industry use high intensity compressed air for seismic surveys to identify undersea reserves. The seismic surveys have been recorded as major source of noise pollution causing temporary or permanent migration of the species from its natural habitat exposing the animal to substantial stress in the new habitat resulting in degradation in its population size. The shipping industry is a major contributor to the ubiquitous low-frequency noise in the ocean. The ever increasing shipping traffic has ensured a 3 dB per decade increase in the ambient noise since the pre-industrial era and still counting. The slow but steady degradation of the marine environment due to radiated noise from the ships is impacting the big whales as their frequency of vocalization and possible hearing matches with this source. There is a possibility of complete disruption of the eco-chain and the ecosystem with this kind of degradation. There are several other sources of habitat degradation. However, these three sources are recognized as the major ones that require immediate attention.

Indian Ocean Region

The IOR presents unique challenges and conditions for any possible efforts to arrest further degradation of the marine environment. The resource abundance is attracting more and more state and non-state actors from the region and outside. The lack of regulations and absence of a dominant regional power is opening the possibility of grabbing by entities with enhanced access capabilities into the undersea domain. Such a free for all is causing conflicts and unrest in the region with significant political instability. The energy flow through the region for emerging powers like China and others in Southeast Asia and reverse flow of finished goods combined with security concerns has elevated the strategic relevance of IOR. Powers from the region and outside are maintaining naval forces to not only ensure the safety of their assets and interests but to counter balance other powers. Unstructured military presence from the regional and extra-regional powers is causing confusion and further instability.

The UDA in the IOR is yet to take off from the ground, attributable to multiple limitations. The UDA at its core requires acoustic sensors known as sonars to sense the so-called developments. These sensed data needs to be analyzed to draw meaningful conclusions and generate actionable inputs for the stakeholders. The sonars in the IOR suffer from sub-optimal performance due to the tropical

shallow water conditions. The degradation in the performance is estimated to be close to 70%, due to a local condition requiring far higher asset deployment in the region. Traditionally, sonar development happened during the Cold War period for requirements in the temperate and polar regions for the two super-powers to engage each other in the deep waters of the Greenland-Iceland region. However, post the Cold War era, the naval theatres shifted to the littoral waters closer to the coast and also spread to the tropical regions. The shallow waters ensure multiple interactions of the sonar signals with the bottom and the sea surface while propagating from the source to the receiver, unlike the deep waters where duct formation minimizes the boundary interactions. The tropical waters present random fluctuations of the surface and also site specific bottom types. Further, in the tropical waters, the duct formation is minimal ensuring acoustic shallow water behavior even at higher depths. The combined impact of the tropical shallow waters results in reduced sweep width for the sonar.

The effective UDA requires local site-specific efforts to improve sonar performance for efficient deployment of resources. The oceanographic studies demand significant infrastructure and know-how along with multi-disciplinary and long-term research efforts. The IOR has witnessed military-driven efforts so far with a major emphasis on the import of technology. Security concerns have limited the governments to encourage participation of other stakeholders in ocean related studies. The local site-specific conditions cannot be overcome without indigenous efforts and pooling of resources with the participation of all the four stakeholders will be essential to muster the infrastructure required to achieve a reasonable level of UDA.

The IOR with the tropical shallow water condition also boast of a very rich biodiversity. However, the unregulated and unrestricted maritime push is threatening to destroy the marine eco-system to an irreversible scale. The larger concern is that the poor UDA is also ensuring lack of precise understanding of the biodiversity and the extent of degradation. The blue economic potential can be effectively and efficiently leveraged to elevate the socio-economic status of the densely populated and poverty-stricken nations of the IOR.

The global regulatory initiatives are largely led by the developed nations with higher scientific inputs and resources. However, their self-interest and in many cases vested interest prevents them from formulating regulations that address the concerns of the developing nations causing significant heart burns and unrest subsequently. Also in many cases, the precautionary principles of environmental conservation directly interfere with the economic aspirations of

the population at the lower end of the socio-economic status. Such conflicts make it politically unviable for the ruling class to take bold regulatory measures. The IOR represents the lower end of the socio-economic strata for the majority of the nations and its population.

Environmental Kuznets Curve

There has been a substantial debate on the impact of the type of political regime on the management of maritime environment and regulations. Democracies have largely been driven by people's choice, and political leadership has more often than not steered governance based on public opinion. Analysis of democracies across the spectrum presents two distinct categories – collective action in the interest of the environment or patronage, clientelism and redistribution of natural resources for the favoring vested interest of allies. A detailed study of time series-cross section data using Marine Trophic Index (MTI) as a proxy for the health of marine ecosystem to investigate the impact of democracy on the marine environment in a global sample from 1972 to 2006 reveals interesting conclusions on the conditional role of economic development.

There is a clear economic pattern as presented in the said study of 142 countries over a 34-year time frame. In the low end of the economic development, the nations are seen to consume marine resources indiscriminately causing severe degradation in the MTI, however as the economic development rises (measured in terms of Gross National Income (GNI) or equivalent), and crosses the threshold of middle-income economy, there is a reverse phenomenon observed on the impact on marine ecosystem. The conventional thinking that developed nations with enhanced technology and know-how having better access to the marine domain will cause higher damage is countered. It has been observed that they care more for the environment, thereby resulting in an improvement in the marine health.

The Environmental Kuznet Curve (EKC) is a more formal formulation to discuss this phenomenon as presented in figure 2. EKC postulates that at the initial phase of industrialization the economy observes a direct correlation with the pollution levels and environmental degradation. However, post a certain level of economic growth we observe an inverse relation of income versus pollution. EKC hypothesizes an inverted U-shaped relationship between environmental degradation and growth of an economy determined by 'scale,'

'composition' and 'technique' effects. The 'scale' effect represents the early stage of industrialization when higher economic activities are accompanied by higher pollution levels. Subsequently, as the economy grows, the activities mature and adopt cleaner technologies that offset the direct relation between the rate of pollution levels to economic growth. Further, it is also observed that the composition of activities and inputs change, also driven by technology to reverse the rate of pollution. This is termed as the 'composition' effect.



Fig. 2 Environmental Kuznets Curve.

An elaborate study in India to test the EKC hypothesis (though not for the marine environment), with the generalized co-integration model establishing a relationship between carbon emission, energy use, economic activity and trade open-ness for India presents some interesting findings. The study is a unique effort that accounts for 'regime shifts' over a long period from 1971 to 2008. The EKC is hypothesis is established . However, the study is critical of the environmental policy framework in India for terrestrial pollutants. The energy market reforms have been listed as the key priority going forward, and the economic crisis of 1991 has been flagged as the major turning point in the EKC analysis.

The federal structure in India also has a significant political connotation when we analyze the environmental policy framework. The EKC formulation does not follow a uniform pattern across states with varied economic status. Cooperative federalism has to mature to be able to tackle important issues that pertain to the environment in a pre-modern set-up with a far more political focus on necessities of the citizens. The marine environment impacts only the nine coastal states, and the policy formulation has moved back and forth between the centre and the states. Some of the states with structured governance mechanism have tried to take control to be able to leverage the maritime potential. However, others have left it to the union government to support them. The lack of uniformity has ensured a sub-optimal effort both from the centre and the states, and the political difference has added to the confusion and prevented consolidation of efforts and resources.

Regulatory Framework

The Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA) was probably the first regulation to recognize and implement the precautionary principle for the marine environment. In 1972, the MMPA in the United States recognized the harm caused by noise to marine mammals and mandated that activities in the oceans have to contain their energy (acoustic) emission into the water. It does suffer from certain limitations in defining the noise thresholds and also in its ability to implement its announced provisions.

Globally, the United Nations Convention on the Laws of the Sea (UNCLOS), way back in 1982, did declare the hazards of noise on the marine mammals and stated that it had a deleterious effect on them. However, even today, it has failed to announce regulatory framework on tackling noise in the ocean. The UN body has been repeatedly urging the scientific community to undertake studies and generate more inputs. The absence of US participation in the UNCLOS has been attributed to the failure of the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) in taking this forward.

The International Maritime Organization (IMO) in its protocol of 1978 (MARPOL) addresses the aspect of marine pollution from ships through its six annexure. The MARPOL fails to recognize noise as a pollutant being in energy form and only defines substance pollution (oil, noxious liquid substances, harmful packaged substances, sewage, garbage and air pollution). More recently, it has declared certain vulnerable areas as Particularly Sensitive Sea Areas (PSSA),

where noise from the ships is recognized as a hazard and bars the ships from these areas in order to protect the acoustic habitat. However, in the open ocean IMO fails to regulate the noise from the growing shipping traffic.

The International Whaling Commission (IWC) does recognize the adverse impact of noise on the whales from the whale watching vessels and others. However, it fails to formulate an effective policy for protecting the whales from noise in the ocean. The Maritime Strategic Framework Directive (MSFD) at the European Union (EU) lists noise as a descriptor for "good environmental status" by 2020 and does have a very detailed policy framework on the subject. The EU continuously updates its policy framework as and when new inputs are available. There are multiple other regional initiatives originating in Europe like the Helsinki Commission (HELCOM), OSPAR Convention, ASCOBANS, ACCOBAMS, etc that do address the issue of noise in the oceans. However, it is important to recognize the trans-boundary nature of noise and the limited effect of regional initiatives.

In India, we are yet to recognize the issue of noise and its impact on the marine ecosystem or more specifically the acoustic habitat degradation. The stakeholders overlook the issue, and the policy makers fail to recognize the aspect of sustainable growth for the blue economy. The specific challenges of IOR, mandate significant efforts to generate reasonable inputs before a regulatory framework and monitoring mechanism can be deliberated. The research agencies and the academic institute lack the sea legs to undertake reasonable experimental field work to validate the estimates of the Underwater Domain Awareness (UDA) in IOR. Public awareness on the subject is also very poor or rather our citizens are not sea-minded, so there is hardly any political motivation to initiate any measures for effective regulatory provisions. Environmental regulations lack the depth and are not interlinked to other aspects of resource sharing and conflict resolution. Acoustic habitat is more often than not a victim of low awareness. The recent stranding of big whales as shown in fig. 1 is a glaring example of security concerns undermining the environmental impact of the regulatory actions. The anti-piracy drive is causing a huge increase in the maritime activities for the security of assets. However, it is also accompanied by a significant rise in the ocean ambient noise. A comprehensive strategic framework that recognizes all aspects of maritime activities is needed under the grand maritime strategy.

Conclusion

The IOR is undergoing a significant transformation and many developments in the recent times are indicative of a catastrophic degradation in the marine environment. The high economic activities are driving security concerns, and the absence of a comprehensive strategic vision is hampering the sustainable blue economic possibilities. Extra-regional powers seem to be encouraging short-term economic boom and ensuring regional entities stay away from long-term policy initiatives.

The IOR has unique site-specific realities and import of technology, ideas and capabilities cannot effectively address the requirements of the region. Local leadership, vision, and efforts are extremely important to ensure sustainable growth in the IOR. The 21st century presents itself as the most critical moment in time for IOR and its people to demonstrate cogent and comprehensive strategic vision in the maritime domain to ensure global peace and well-being. India and its leadership do have the opportunity and mean to be at the forefront.

The following way ahead are proposed to take forward the vision of effective regulatory framework for acoustic habitat degradation in the IOR:

(a) A comprehensive Underwater Domain Awareness (UDA) perspective needs to be formulated to identify the role and requirements of all the four stakeholders. The organizational structure has to be formulated to bring the stakeholder on a common platform to meaningfully collaborate and build required infrastructure at a national and regional levels.
(b) The acoustic capacity building would be a key requirement, and the challenges of sub-optimal sonar performance in IOR have to be effectively mitigated. Pooling of resources across stakeholders and even from global players has to be carefully worked out.
(c) A Maritime Domain Authority (MDA) with significant actionable inputs from the UDA effort could work on regulatory provisions at the national level. The MDA will address the concerns of all the four stakeholders and monitor their activities and strategic growth.

(d) The national level regulations will not be effective in the maritime domain and will require regional cooperation and initiatives. Effective UDA has to trigger diplomatic initiatives leveraging blue economic and security support to powers in the region for bringing regulatory initiatives. The regional initiatives will undermine the presence and indulgence of the extra-regional powers.

The entire effort has to be on multiple fronts - technology, tactical, strategic, diplomatic, management, financial and much more. UDA and the acoustic capacity building will be at the core of any initiative. Awareness at all levels will be the key for the success of any initiative.

Dr (Cdr) Arnab Das

Arnab Das is an expert on underwater technologies with a Master's and PhD from IIT Delhi. He has over 50 research papers in underwater technology and maritime strategy in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). He has also worked in the Acoustic Research Lab at the National University of Singapore. He has served in the Indian Navy for over 20 years and is presently the Director of the Maritime Research Centre at the Indian Maritime Foundation, Pune. He is associated with multiple academic institutes to pursue his research.

His present research interests include shallow water acoustics in the IOR to improve sonar detection and classification. He is pursuing a unique Underwater Domain Awareness (UDA) concept in the IOR for enhanced surveillance for security, blue economic thrust and mitigating acoustic habitat degradation. Effective UDA requires enhanced acoustic capacity building, particularly in the IOR. His work is related to technology development for acoustic capacity building and also maritime strategy for facilitating enhanced UDA for an emerging maritime power like India in IOR. His vision includes developing an effective regulatory framework and monitoring mechanism for managing the growing acoustic habitat degradation in the IOR due to increasing maritime activities related to the blue economic growth plan.

Trump, Media and Yudhishthira's Chariot…

Shri Yogesh Parale

The recent emphatic victory of Mr. Donald Trump in the presidential elections is a kick in the face of almost all of the mainstream traditional media houses in the USA. It's a ceaseless scar that media would never wish to remember and social psyche would never fail to resonate.

How the heck did this happen? Trump had made all the perfect enemies. He was misogynist. He was a bigot. He was undoubtedly racist. Most importantly, he was a morally crooked nationalist vehemently refuting the ideal vision of globalization and humanity. He never was a man of grace; nor was he a man of class. He never stood for anything besides hideous street business and he did not reflect any bloody audacity of hope which would have stamped him as liberal, secular and global civilian. He was clearly as naked as any flawed supremacist would appear and he exhibited strange similarities with the enemies of Western Ideals and Values. In fact, some of his statements and stands appeared as if articulated by destiny herself to sadistically claim a cruel revenge against USA's very foundation. At a particular juncture, he was even abandoned by some of the "elite republicans'. They viewed him as ultra right or basically, a blockhead! Yet; this clumsy, loud hotel developer who pierced voter's minds with the long criticized stand of "Blut and Boden – Blood and Soil" simply became the President of United States of America! He won. This "Commonsense Conservative' won and surely, he did prove that the system of democracy is a trap!

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The pundits and intellectuals, analysts and observers, forecasters and thinkers took a concrete asylum in some of the best literature defending individualism and liberalism against the clout of democracy. Bloody game of numbers after all! Horrified and shocked as they were; they sought refuge in Orwell's 'Freedom of Park' where 'the point is that the relative freedom which we enjoy depends of public opinion'. Liberals have always deafeningly shared their concerns with the system of Democracy. They have feared that "empowered but misguided" masses can threaten liberties and fundamental rights. "Victory of a Trump' has just proved this dreadful trepidation! Some of them soaked pillows with tears as "Abject dumbness was glamorized." Some witnessed and blamed a staggering emergence of Nationalist wave throughout the world which brought America to such a sorry state of affairs. A few sniffed at the blasphemous flood of "Fake News Sites'. Some of the respected professors declared it a doomsday as they believed that "the mere fact of Trump's candidacy is evidence of the failure of journalism". The dismal and despondency ran so high that leaving the country seemed to be one of the best options. Well, intellectuals and journalists can have a freedom to view democracy contemptuously if denied expected and Right results. USA has to respect the verdict and come along.

Trump's march to victory has in fact not been as shocking as it is being portrayed. He played his cards smartly. He presented himself in a naked and shrilled manner. Yet, his win seems to be a total disaster to most of the media establishments. There are multiple reasons for his success; and surely, there is a whole plethora of rationale which can satisfactorily explain Hillary's not so shocking defeat. Yet, a singular question surfaces so glaringly at the whole background of presidential elections. This question has in fact surfaced again and again during this last decade of informatization. It looms up beyond Trumps and conventional horizons of politics and society. It haunts those glamorous media pundits. It does pose serious troubles for the so called liberals who like to claim themselves as sacred protectors of freedom of expression, civic liberties and democratic values. They are spread everywhere and they do have a strong influence. The question simply goes as follows - Does the so called traditional media has ability and willingness to comprehend and resonate general public perception, anymore? More importantly, is the institution of media ready to play the role it is expected to play? Answers to these questions would not be easy and sweet. Yet, an attempt to explore for such answers would surely explain a thing or two in articulating this whole pseudo liberal, preconcerted carnage. Such an endeavor would certainly be quite vital than meaninglessly investigating

for reasons following a victory of one candidate. Of course, it would be worth noting that Trump's curious case provides perfect sample for such a venture.

It was clear since the beginning that almost all of the traditional media houses strongly hated the very fact of being Mr. Trump. They despised him as a person. His style, his policies, his mannerism (if any!), his dressing, his way of doing things, his way of speaking, his attitude towards women and so on… Everything... They loathed him as their personal enemy. In fact, most of them made this electoral battle a personal one. So, of course, no holds were barred. Out of the first 100 newspapers (considering circulation) in the USA, only two newspapers endorsed Trump. In fact, newspapers like San Diego Union Tribune and Arizona Republic 'created history' to have endorsed a Democrat Candidate for the first time. Most of them thought of Trump as a dangerous cancer or even worse, as a noxious weed. They considered and treated him like a social evil or a despicable epidemic. They prayed as "Heaven help America were, unthinkably, Clinton to fail". In fact, this was ridiculously the most one sided contest regarding media endorsements. This was practically Media and Hillary vs. Trump contest. Eventually, it went a step ahead of endorsements. Most of the publications predicted contented triumph for Hillary and human civilization. They all succeed to fail. Statistics, polls, research, data presentation, political and psychological analysis, interviews, survey – all the holy tools betrayed like never before. The distance between a prediction based on those 'scientific systems' and a fact must have never been so unbelievably vast and deceiving. The answer for such a trounce lies deep within the forbidden sanctorum of the institution of media. It again showed that the institution of Media is in a deep crisis. The tale of Yudhishthira might help us to contemplate this crisis.

The great epic of Mahabharata consists of numerous tales. Tale of Yudhishthira is just one of them. The tale goes - Yudhishthira's chariot never used to touch the ground as a symbol of his absolute adherence to truth (Satya) and righteousness (Dharma). In the great war of Mahabharata, eventually, he lied. His chariot, which represented his piousness and disposition, also came down with this one lie... There is a common aspect which connects both the institution of Media and Yudhishthira. They both had been given a special place assuming their unflinching allegiance to truth and objectivity. They both were considered as infallible. So, Yudhishthira's chariot was singular. And the institution of Media was regarded as the fourth pillar of Democracy. Eventually, they both have failed. The difference – Yudhishthira knew the moment he lied; the institution of media is yet to admit its fallibility.

The age of modernity practically initiated with the historic invention of printing. It surely was a catastrophic moment for various socio-political elements who believed in monopoly of knowledge and control of information. They knew that that power in a real sense was the control over information. This was also the significant moment in time where the institution of media came of age. It initiated a great movement of spreading knowledge and providing information objectively. This movement of liberating information from the clutches of establishments like monarchy, aristocracy, theocracy strengthened the institution of media. Media as an institution spearheaded the struggle for "independence of information'. The institution eventually led various struggles against racism, religious fundamentalism, gender discrimination, illiteracy, poverty etc.

These all were necessarily the struggles against monopolies and privileges; struggles against the concentration of power. It significantly contributed in transforming the cruel, feudal world into a modern, secular place promising equality and freedom. This movement of liberating information and embracing modernity did transcend the geographical borders of nation states. This very institution of media accompanied the modern governing system of democracy since her infancy, embarking upon a new journey. It simply became the very foundation of democracy which gained acceptance universally. Comparing to other business institutions, the exceptional place granted to the institution of media had been granted for a sacred yet unwritten promise of providing information objectively. Unlike the other three pillars of democracy; media was regarded as an institution which would provide information (content) "without manipulation". That was the sanctified promise. An institution which would empower people… Media thus naturally acquired the moral edge with legal assurance as the vanguard of freedoms. Well, these godly circumstances changed drastically in last few decades. The golden age of Journalism has long been over; and today's media conglomerates are acquiring "power' as any other business corporations. The institution of media emerged as a medium to broaden the horizon of knowledge; to terminate the monopoly of information. Yet, over times, the institution of media has itself attempted to be the prevalent monopoly of information. For example; justice is the solitary privilege of Judiciary. Or articulating laws is the sole privilege of the Parliament. One cannot challenge the institution of judiciary regarding justice. The institution of media also seems to have been under strong sedative that content (or information) is the sole privilege of media. They seem to hold that the process of News and Views

regarding any matter should be media owned and media controlled. Such an arrogance and indifference… And when this grand institution is on the verge of losing it's very relevance.

Two vital factors must be considered in an attempt to articulate this jumble. Advent of the media groups/companies as one of the most important business models; and the outburst of digital revolution are those two factors. The staggering emergence of Technology and "changed business module in accordance with changed times' have practically destroyed Media as an institution. The hard earned moral circumference of traditional Media has long been over encompassed by multiple layers of towering business aspirations and Media Corporation's rising commercial stakes in various other fields. So, just like any other industry like steel or weapon industry; media as an industry does have its own purposes to serve. Over the years, they have moved from being a reporter on the fence to Manufacturers of the versions of reality with sinister or commercial motives. In fact, in over few last decades, Media's outright attempt to transform itself from a nonaligned "information provider' to proactive "trend instigator' has been the prime catalyst bringing down that Yudhishthira's chariot! The coverage of presidential elections was quite a proof of media's journey from a watchdog to bulldog working with a specific agenda. The most unfortunate thing – plodding erosion of credibility and moral foundation… the very foundation which justifies the necessity of press in a democratic setup. On this background, we should also consider an advent of the age of digital informatization with globalization. As both these factors allow resourceful and swift flow of information, individuals and societies have been greatly empowered to access knowledge and information. This is an astounding revolution. It has ensured two things. It has greatly helped in democratization of information. Also, an individual's dependence on information provided by media houses has been remarkably reduced. On the one side, he can crosscheck and verify the content offered by media houses; and on the other side, he can easily point out the hypocrisies, double standards, overt editorial agenda and covert business orientation. This momentous disruption has not quite been embraced the way it should have been by the traditional institution of media! In fact, most of them have been scornful towards free, faceless and outspoken individuals having diverse opinions. Doesn't matter whatever they say, they hate digital format and social media. It directly questions the motive of media establishments, points out the discrepancy, ridicules the evident agenda, mocks their views; disputes their understanding and intellectual capacity. And it is inescapable now. The

flood of information through digital means does have problems. Yet, this system does pose a direct repercussion for traditional media houses – their ability to create and maintain public perception regarding any subject is almost finished. In fact, the crisis is two folded. They cannot shape a public perception; and they have lost ability to interpret prevailing, dominant social mood. They can barely provide traffic, weather updates and news. They have been gradually barred from the subconscious mind of a reader which articulates his views and influences his decision making. They are no longer the engineers of opinion. They are no longer the educators of values and beliefs. They are no longer the advocates of wisdom. The consumer of a digital informatization module either does not believe them; or he simply ignores them. He needs no entity for "processing content' originating from a particular source. Media's institutional crave for respect looks silly on this background! Also, the situation has turned to be more complex as it seems that much more has changed drastically apart from the conventional business module.

Is Mr. Trump the worst President of USA? Can we even begin to evaluate him as a President at this moment? Can we even start comparing him to other gems of USA like Warren Harding or James Buchanan, Jr.? No sane analyst would answer these questions in affirmative. One can understand and respect constructive criticism based certain ideological foundation. The institution of media does have a natural right to disapprove, condemn. Sharp, violent attacks can also be part of it. Yet, considering all kinds of freedoms and liberties, ideological standings and liberal perspectives; the press attacks against Trump were not only unprecedented and brutal; they were partial and biased. One cannot help but wonder for what lies behind such paranoia and acute abhorrence. Why media has to hate a mere opportunist like him at such an extreme level? They must have seen a significant number of politicians worse than him. They must have written flattering editorials and comforting commentaries for administrators shoddier than him.

The answer to this question is simple. And it's not just Trump; they do hate number of other such leaders for one simple reason – Last two decades have witnessed the birth of a whole new generation of smart politicians who do not buy narratives constructed by media. The corollary of this statement is in fact more dangerous. Not only these politicians do not buy narratives constructed by Media; they articulate and unfurl their own antithesis which does not need Media Establishment's support. They have found ways to reach out. They are smart enough to articulate their message as the medium.

They have carefully constructed their own narrative by studying the generation of readers which is simply done with the traditional left- liberal narrative provided by media. And they have been enormously successful in a last decade considering media's anathema for them. They are better known as "Nationalists, Populists or Alt-Rights".

Victories of Trump or other "Nationalists' have been a great upheaval for media. These victories have in fact a clear sign of a colossal catastrophe for left-liberal narrative constructed for decades by the institution of media. The institution of media has traditionally reflected a strong left-liberal (if the combination works!) influence. The narratives build by media houses come from that so called liberal perspective. For decades, they have been extremely intolerant and sometimes, cruel to fanatically reject any other viewpoint apart from those particular constructed narratives. In fact, not only were the other parallel narratives, perspectives rejected; they were demonized to the core. These narratives such as "Terrorism has no Religion' or "Nationalists are conservatives and oppressors" have been completely rejected by societies throughout the world. Yet historically, the traditional institution of media obstinately imposed these narratives as they had the "power'. They had monopoly over the published information.

As they were in the driving seat; they constructed narratives to serve their own purpose. Now, all those rejected narratives have filled in the huge space created by digital medium. Today, the left-liberal narrative is one of the most ridiculed narratives in a digital format. It's an 'original sin' perpetrated by the institution. Trump's victory has to be studied on this background following this particular perspective.

The victory of Donald Trump thus comes at a very critical juncture. He certainly defeated a Democratic candidate. It's actually not that important. He defeated the traditional narrative imposed by the media pundits. True. Yet, the most significant fact is still underestimated. This was just another case of established media vs. public perception. The future certainly looks more democratic and disruptive.

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Yogesh Parale is currently working as a Journalist with Sakal Media Group. Co-relation between Global Affairs and Media is his topic of specific interest. He is a columnist for Group's weekly publication "Saptahik Sakal" and has written extensively regarding ISIS, Terrorism, India's Foreign Policy and other Global Affairs. He is also a regular contributor to the Group's other verticals including op-ed page.

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